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Social inequality has been a popular topic of inquiry in the criminal sentencing 
literature for decades, but the effects of innovations like evidence-based sentencing on 
inequality have not been investigated. Evidence-based sentencing, the use of actuarial 
assessments to inform sentencing decisions, is a data-driven approach to sentencing that 
highlights public safety, promotes more selective and effective use of incarceration, and 
may foster both transparency and objectivity in punishment decisions. However, the 
practice is not without its critics, and one of the more prominent criticisms of evidence-
based sentencing is that it will worsen social inequality in sentencing. This dissertation 
uses simulation procedures and a unique dataset that combines official court records from 
Connecticut with results from Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) risk 
assessments to inform that concern. 
 
 
An assessment of disparities in Connecticut’s current sentencing system reveals 
disparities according to race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status (SES) that 
cannot be fully explained by legal and case processing characteristics or by risk factors 
drawn directly from the LSI-R. Several risk factors, most notably those related to 
offenders’ residential situation, companions, mental health, and attitudes toward 
convention and the criminal justice system, also have their own direct influences on 
punishment. Disparities in LSI-R composite and domain scores are observable as well. 
While similar composite scores mask substantial variation across domain scores for 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups, low-SES offenders receive higher scores in every 
domain and in the composite, regardless of which SES indicator is considered. A 
simulation procedure further shows that disparities in the LSI-R have the potential to 
translate into disparities in punishment that exceed those already present in Connecticut, 
particularly in the decision to incarcerate. 
This dissertation suggests that evidence-based sentencing may come at a social 
cost. It underscores the need for more empirical research on evidence-based sentencing 
and sources of sociodemographic inequality in punishment. It also invites discussion 
about the treatment of low-SES offenders in the criminal justice system, about whether 
actuarial risk assessments designed for correctional settings can and should be adapted to 
inform sentencing decisions, and about the tenuous balance between effectiveness and 
fairness in sentencing. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The investigation of social inequality has long been a cornerstone of empirical 
research on fairness and effectiveness in criminal sentencing. Unwarranted disparities 
hinder the ability of the criminal justice system to impart equality before the law and 
undermine its legitimacy (Blumstein, 1982; Kennedy, 1997; Tonry, 1995; Tyler, 2003), 
which may in turn jeopardize the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and further 
strain criminal justice relations in the United States (Ruth & Reitz, 2003; Tyler, 1990; 
Western, 2006).  In light of these concerns, it is hardly surprising that sentencing 
disparities receive so much attention in the empirical literature. Sentencing scholars 
routinely highlight the importance of conducting critical research on the various forms of 
unwarranted disparity (e.g. Baumer, 2013; Zatz, 2000). As a result, the fields of 
criminology, sociology, and law have jointly amassed thousands of studies examining 
disparities in sentencing outcomes based on defendants’ social characteristics, arriving at 
a general consensus that race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status all have 
detectable, though inconsistent, effects on punishment (Baumer, 2013; Daly & Bordt, 
1995; Mitchell, 2005; Ulmer, 2012; Wu & Spohn, 2009; Zatz, 2000).  
With the introduction of numerous sentencing reforms beginning in the 1980’s, it 
has also become critical to consider the effect of different sentencing schemes on social 
inequality in sentencing. Zatz (2000) noted the tendency for disparity research in the 
1980’s and 1990’s to focus on determinate sentencing, sentencing guidelines, and 
mandatory sentencing systems and found that these structured sentencing schemes do not 
eliminate disparity and in some cases even lead to stronger indirect and interactive effects 




(e.g. Miethe & Moore, 1985; Spohn et al., 1981). Similar research conducted since 2000 
arrives at parallel conclusions (Bushway & Piehl, 2007; Mustard, 2001; Ulmer et al., 
2007). Ample work suggests that disparities exist under both structured and non-
structured sentencing schemes (Baumer, 2013; Mitchell, 2005; Ulmer, 2012), yet little is 
known about how more recent developments, such as risk assessments tools and broader 
evidence-based sentencing practices, affect patterns of inequality in punishment. In line 
with the work comparing disparities before and after the implementation of sentencing 
guidelines, determinate sentencing, and mandatory sentencing systems, it is imperative 
that scholars examine the impacts of evidence-based sentencing on social inequality.  
Evidence-based sentencing uses actuarial assessments to help inform sentencing 
decisions. Actuarial assessment has been defined as the application of “an objective, 
mechanistic, reproducible combination of predictive factors, selected and validated 
through empirical research,” and applied to key “outcomes that have also been 
quantified” (Heilbrun, 2009: 133).  Actuarial risk assessments in the criminal justice 
system have been variously used to identify low-risk offenders, good candidates for 
particular programs, and those at high risk of future violent offending (Cullen & 
Gendreau, 2000; James, 2015; Latessa & Lovins, 2006; Elek et al., 2015).  They have 
been primarily applied to criminal justice decisions that fall outside the purview of 
sentencing decisions (e.g. parole decisions), though as many as 20 states have begun to 
integrate risk assessments into sentencing (James, 2015; Starr, 2014b). These assessments 
contain a variety of risk, protective, and needs factors, both static and dynamic, that have 
been shown to influence offender risk and future recidivism (Andrews & Bonta, 2000; 




prediction tool in use among states that have not adopted their own state-specific 
instruments (Andrews & Bonta, 2000; Elek et al., 2015; Olver et al., 2014). 
Criminal sentencing involves a broad range of punishment goals that include 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, community protection and 
restoration (von Hirsch, 1976), and the primary aim of evidence-based sentencing is to 
assist judges in delivering the most appropriate sentences to the most suitable offenders 
as they address some of these goals (Heilbrun, 2009; Monahan & Skeem, 2015).  In 
particular, risk assessments can be useful for effectively identifying a) which offenders 
can be given non-custodial sentences without compromising public safety and b) which 
offenders are at the highest risk of future recidivism (Bergstrom et al., 2009; Hyatt et al., 
2011; Warren, 2007). Needs assessments can also be useful for identifying offenders who 
are well-suited to rehabilitation or restorative justice programming (Andrews & Bonta, 
2000, 2002; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Warren, 2008).  This is important because the 
effective use of incarceration, community punishments and alternative sanctions helps to 
maximize public resources. 
The available empirical evidence suggests that actuarial assessments can serve as 
valuable predictive tools for judges during the sentencing process (Andrews et al., 2006; 
Latessa & Lovins, 2010; Skeem & Monahan, 2011; Pew Center on the States, 2011; 
Casey et al., 2014). The body of research evaluating the predictive validity of risk 
assessments is often interpreted as evidence that predictions based on risk assessments 
outperform clinical judgments (Andrews et al., 2006; Gottfredson, 1961; Gottfredson & 
Gottfredson, 1985; Sacks, 1977), and evidence-based sentencing has been touted as a 




Oleson, 2011; Warren, 2007). The practice may also appeal to citizens because it fosters 
transparency, emphasizes both objectivity and public safety, and is scientifically 
validated prior to implementation (Hyatt et al., 2011; Marcus, 2009; Oleson, 2011; Van 
Nostrand & Lowenkamp, 2013; Warren, 2008; Wolff, 2008).  
However, as Stuart and Sykora (2010: 465) opine in their discussion of the flaws 
in evidence-based sentencing, “when forming public policy to respond to crime, there are 
no silver bullets. It is an ever-evolving science.” Opponents have levelled a variety of 
criticisms at evidence-based sentencing. Some critics have expressed concerns about the 
constitutionality of risk assessments, branding them discriminatory and in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause (e.g. Starr, 2014b). Others question the ethics of “statistical 
profiling”, equating the use of risk assessments in sentencing to punishment for having 
similar characteristics to other offenders (Auerhahn, 1999; Hannah-Moffat, 2005). Still 
others argue that risk estimation is too imprecise to be used with confidence; large 
margins of error and the possibility of high rates of false positives and false negatives 
render risk assessment instruments inappropriate for determining individuals’ risk of 
recidivism (Berk et al., 2009; Berk & Bleich, 2014; Cooke & Michie, 2010; Harcourt, 
2007; Hart et al., 2007). Finally, many scholars contend that risk assessments in 
sentencing will exacerbate social inequalities (Hannah-Moffat, 2009, 2013; Monahan & 
Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b,c). 
This final objection, that risk assessments may yield sentencing decisions that 
intensify social inequality, echoes repeatedly throughout the evidence-based sentencing 
literature (Etienne, 2009; Hannah-Moffat, 2005, 2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; 




Former Attorney General Eric Holder recently recognized the importance of this issue, 
noting that “evidence-based strategies show promise in allowing us to more effectively 
reduce recidivism,” but they also hold the potential to “inadvertently undermine our 
efforts to ensure individualized and equal justice” and to “exacerbate unwarranted and 
unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system” (Holder, 
2014). The importance of assessing the impact of evidence-based sentencing on 
inequality cannot be overstated. As Starr (2014c: para. 13) argues, “Criminal justice 
policy should be informed by data, but we should never allow the sterile language of 
science to obscure questions of justice.” Social equality is a fundamental objective in the 
pursuit of justice. Thus, the effects on social inequality should be a key concern in the 
decision to adopt an evidence-based sentencing scheme. 
However, the effects of evidence-based sentencing on social inequality remain 
largely untested in the empirical literature (Heilbrun, 2009). As some policymakers and 
scholars argue, it is indeed possible that risk assessments are discriminatory toward some 
groups, such that an evidence-based approach to judicial decision-making will exacerbate 
sentencing disparities (Holder, 2014; Starr, 2014b,c; Hannah-Moffat, 2005). It is also 
possible that such an approach will have no discernible effect on disparities or will even 
reduce them (Laskorunsky, 2017; Monahan & Skeem, 2015). Surprisingly little research 
exists on the topic. An evaluation that assesses the effects of evidence-based sentencing 
on social inequality is needed. What is also needed is a more nuanced approach to 
characterizing social inequality, one which considers the mechanisms through which the 
use of risk assessments may alter inequality, to provide further elucidation about how 




This dissertation project speaks to this concern by comparing existing patterns of 
social inequality in Connecticut’s sentencing system to patterns of disparity in a 
simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario.  Using data from the Connecticut Judicial 
Branch Court Support Services Division, it investigates racial, ethnic, gender, and 
socioeconomic disparity in sentencing among felony offenders convicted in the state of 
Connecticut between Fiscal Years 2008 and 2010.  Then it examines these same 
disparities in domain-specific and composite scores from the LSI-R risk assessment 
instrument, as well as in a model that simulates an evidence-based sentencing scheme 
predicated on legal/case processing factors and offenders’ scores from the LSI-R. Finally, 
it compares the amount of disparity under the current guidelines system to the disparity 
observed in the simulated evidence-based scenario. 
Connecticut provides an interesting context for this evaluation of social inequality 
and the use of actuarial risk assessments. Connecticut does not have sentencing 
guidelines, which sets it apart from most of the other states in which studies of sentencing 
inequalities are conducted. Most evaluations take place in states that have sentencing 
guidelines (Griffin & Wooldredge, 2006; King & Johnson, 2016; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998). Moreover, while the state is politically liberal, its criminal justice system was 
heavily influenced by the widespread “tough on crime” movement during the 1980’s and 
1990’s and is now dealing with a variety of issues stemming from policies that led to 
mass incarceration. Connecticut’s corrections expenditures have skyrocketed, racial 
disparities in incarceration rates have grown larger, and the state has felt pressure to 
reform its court system in order to stem the steady flow of money and offenders into its 




and prison sentences more effective, Connecticut has already incorporated risk 
assessments into various criminal justice decision-making points, including pretrial 
detention and bail setting, probation, and parole release decisions. This demonstrates the 
state’s understanding of risk assessments and its openness to evidence-based sentencing 
as a method for curtailing incarceration, which in turn maximizes the utility of this 
project for policy decision-making. 
The project makes several significant contributions. First it provides a thorough 
treatment of sentencing disparities in Connecticut, a state with broad offense 
classifications and no sentencing guidelines. Typical evaluations of sentencing disparity 
lack measures often thought to be important for judicial decision-making, such as 
socioeconomic status, family situations, mental health, and attitudes toward crime, but 
this dissertation capitalizes on measures included in LSI-R risk assessments to capture 
these and other potentially impactful offender characteristics in its assessment. Second, 
the project evaluates whether or not the incorporation of risk assessments into judicial 
decision-making might exacerbate social inequalities, a question frequently asked but 
never empirically addressed in the criminal justice literature. Third, it explores the 
mechanisms through which disparities could operate in an evidence-based sentencing 
scheme, providing information about which domains captured in the LSI-R risk 
assessment tool are likely to play a role in constraining or amplifying social disparities in 
sentencing. This information may be meaningful to academics who theorize about the 
role of various offender characteristics in fostering or counteracting social inequality in 
punishment, and to policymakers/practitioners who decide when and how to use risk 




The proposal proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 considers extant research on racial, 
ethnic, gender, and socioeconomic disparities in the criminal justice system. Chapter 3 
describes the use of actuarial risk prediction in sentencing, including specific mention of 
the Level of Service Inventory-Revised risk assessment instrument that will be used in 
this study. Chapter 4 discusses the state of Connecticut and Connecticut’s sentencing 
system as the research context for the study. Chapter 5 addresses relevant theoretical 
frameworks for evaluating social disparities in sentencing. Chapter 6 details the data and 
analytic methods that are used in this project. Chapter 7 presents data compilation 
procedures and descriptive statistics for the project sample. Chapter 8 presents results 
from all quantitative analyses. And lastly, Chapter 9 closes with a discussion of the 
results and consideration of study limitations, future directions, and policy implications 




CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN SENTENCING 
Unwarranted disparities threaten the legitimacy and effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system by stimulating perceptions of unfairness and promoting public distrust 
(Tonry, 1995; Western, 2006), which is why social inequality is perhaps the most widely-
studied point of inquiry in empirical sentencing research (e.g. Baumer, 2013; Bontrager 
et al., 2013; Bushway & Piehl, 2001; Mustard, 2001; Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 2000). In order 
to situate the investigation into Connecticut sentencing within the context of prior 
evidence on social inequality in sentencing, this chapter provides an overview of the 
extant research on sentencing disparities with a specific focus on the effects of race and 
ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status. It additionally reviews some of the 
limitations that characterize this body of research.  
Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
The body of research on racial disparities in sentencing is voluminous, and the 
evidence suggesting a disadvantage for minority offenders at sentencing is compelling 
(Baumer, 2013; Mitchell, 2005; Pratt, 1998; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 2000). In 
one review of the literature, Baumer (2013: 15) proclaims that “There is little 
disagreement among scholars about whether there is racial inequality in sentencing 
outcomes… there are considerable racial inequalities that are highly visible in the final 
sentencing stages, and these inequalities are quite large.” Notably, however, the effects of 
race on sentencing outcomes are not universal; though relevant research collectively 
yields an affirmative answer to the question of whether or not disparity exists, equally 
relevant questions include when, where, and how these disparities can be observed. These 




(2013) and others also note, the meaning of these inequalities are less definitive. Much 
like the role of race in American society, the role of race at sentencing is highly nuanced. 
The complexity of sentence decision-making combined with the hypothesized 
multifunctionality of race as both a demographic characteristic and an indicator of social 
and economic status, behavioral tendencies, and even a legacy of historical oppression 
muddies interpretations of the relationship (Howard, 1975; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
 Several reviews provide a good synopsis of the race and sentencing literature 
(Baumer, 2013; Mitchell, 2005; Pratt, 1998; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 1987; 
2000). The earliest studies were documented by Zatz (1987), who traced the progress of 
sentencing research through four historical waves with increasingly more rigorous 
methodologies and better acknowledgement of the subtleties that characterize the race 
and sentencing relationship. Spohn (2000) reviewed 40 studies that investigated the link 
between race/ethnicity and sentence severity, concluding that while there is a direct link 
between race and punishment decisions, contextual and indirect effects are also key parts 
of the equation. Interestingly, Pratt’s (1998) meta-analysis of studies examining the effect 
of race on sentence length found no significant disadvantage for black defendants. That 
said, the analysis did not consider effects on the incarceration decision, and race effects 
tend to be stronger for that decision than for sentence length (see Mitchell, 2005).  
In a more comprehensive meta-analysis of 116 black-white contrasts drawn from 
71 empirical studies, Mitchell (2005) identified a small but statistically significant direct 
effect of race on sentencing, such that African-American defendants received harsher 
punishment than white defendants. 73% of the effect sizes identified in the study showed 




the contexts in which studies were more likely to yield a significant effect size. He found 
that racial disparities were largest among non-federal drug offenses, in imprisonment and 
discretionary punitiveness (e.g. upward departures, sentencing enhancements) decisions, 
in jurisdictions with structured sentencing regimes, in cases collected from a single city 
or county, in studies with fewer control variables and less precise measures of criminal 
history and offense seriousness, and in studies that were published. Given the substantial 
variability in these characteristics across sentencing studies, Mitchell’s (2005) 
conclusions are of paramount importance. A full understanding of racial disparities in 
sentencing requires thoughtful consideration of the settings in which scholars are able to 
observe them. 
More recently, Baumer (2013) reassessed the sentencing literature, observing that 
research tended to focus on one or more of four primary objectives: detecting racial 
disparities, detecting racial discrimination, evaluating the effects of policy interventions 
on racial disparities, or assessing the impact of race on legal decision-makers. In concert 
with the reviewers before him, he also noted the importance of race’s conditional role in 
sentencing and identified several shortcomings, both conceptual and methodological, that 
have limited the growth and development of the research. 
 Even so, research on race and sentencing disparities has made advancements 
down a variety of topical avenues in recent years. As Johnson and Lee (2013) note, the 
incorporation of new dependent variables is particularly valuable in the context of 
modern sentencing systems in which judicial discretion is no longer the sole determinant 
of punishment outcomes. Sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimums, habitual offender 




(Tonry, 1996), such that punishment may be thought of as the confluence of several 
decisions, ranging from guidelines placement to the imposition of enhancement statutes, 
made by sentencing judges, prosecutors, and even policymakers who craft sentencing 
policy (Bushway & Forst, 2013). Failure to acknowledge the role of related courtroom 
decisions in determining punishment ignores the mechanisms through which sentencing 
is determined. For example, Mustard (2001) found that black defendants received 
substantially longer sentences than white defendants, but also that over half of the 
disparity was due to guidelines departures. Thus, this new line of research is exemplified 
by work on disparities in mandatory minimums (Crawford et al., 1998; Ulmer et al., 
2007), guidelines departures (Britt, 2000; Johnson, 2005), and alternative sanctions 
(Gainey et al., 2005; Johnson & DiPietro, 2012), much of which bolsters the notion that 
racial and ethnic disparities are found in a variety of discretionary decisions that in turn 
impact sentencing outcomes. Evaluating disparities in evidence-based sentencing, which 
allows actuarial risk assessment to influence risk perceptions and ultimately punishment 
outcomes, fits in well with this direction of development. 
Expanding the conceptualization of race to consider more than just black-white 
dichotomies has also resulted in more fine-tuned conclusions about the role of race in 
sentencing. Studies examining the effects of skin tone and the Afrocentricity of facial 
features find that darker skin tone and Afrocentric features contribute to harsher 
punishment above and beyond the influence of categorical race (Burch, 2015; Eberhardt 
et al., 2006; King & Johnson, 2016). There is also a growing body of evidence that racial 
and ethnic groups other than blacks experience advantages or disadvantages at 




(1996), Spohn and Holleran (2000), and Steffensmeier and Demuth (2001) all highlight 
the importance of evaluating disparities for Hispanic defendants, while others point to a 
need for more investigation into sentencing for other racial groups such as Asians and 
Native Americans (Alvarez & Bachman, 1996; Franklin, 2013; Johnson & Betsinger, 
2009). On top of these effects, some studies find that immigration/citizenship status 
exerts an additional influence on sentencing (Demuth, 2001; Hartley & Tillyer, 2012; 
Wolfe et al., 2011). This body of work demonstrates that moving beyond simple black-
white comparisons, as this project will do, holds great potential for further clarifying 
racial/ethnic and related disparities in sentencing. 
Gender Disparities 
Relative to racial and ethnic disparities, gender disparities in sentencing have 
received less scrutiny in the empirical literature. Historically, women have constituted 
only a small fraction of known offenders (Bonczar, 2003) and evaluations of their 
treatment in the criminal justice system have been viewed as a niche enterprise falling 
under the umbrella of “feminist criminology” (Chesney-Lind, 1997). Early reviews of the 
gender disparities literature observed this inattention (Bickle & Peterson, 1991; Daly & 
Bordt, 1995; Nagel & Hagan, 1983). Nagel & Hagan (1983) identified only 16 studies in 
which gender was used as a predictor of sentencing outcomes, while Daly and Bordt 
(1995) included only 28 sentencing studies in which gender was the primary focus. Both 
reviews found evidence that women tend to receive lighter punishments at sentencing 
than men (Nagel & Hagan, 1983; Daly & Bordt, 1995). While effect sizes were relatively 
small when compared to the effects of legal factors such as criminal history, they were 




identified a disparity that advantaged women at the sentencing stage. These findings went 
largely uncontested, as they fit with the conventional view of women as less dangerous 
and less responsible for their actions, less suitable for prison due to family 
responsibilities, and better targets for rehabilitation efforts (Bickle & Peterson, 1991; 
Daly, 1989). As Crew (1991) opined, gender disparities in sentencing were treated as 
commonplace and legitimate.  
More recently, the rapid growth of female representation in the criminal justice 
system (US Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009) has 
seemingly begun the process of integrating gender differences into the mainstream 
criminal justice conversation. A meta-analysis of contemporary research on gender and 
sentencing identified 58 relevant studies published between 1991 and 2011, 39 of which 
were published in the 2000’s (Bontrager et al., 2013). The review found clear evidence 
that women remain an advantaged population at sentencing in modern times, especially 
for the decision to incarcerate, but with one important caveat: studies that used data 
collected in or after 2000 showed smaller gender gaps in sentencing than studies that used 
data collected in the 1990’s. The authors note that this shrinking is consistent across 
sentencing outcomes, going so far as to conclude that “women no longer enjoy 
significantly shorter sentences, have lower odds of incarceration, or have better chances 
at a sentencing departure than their male counterparts” (Bontrager et al., 2013: 366).  
Still, generally speaking, contemporary research on gender disparities continues to 
identify a small advantage for women at sentencing while both improving 
methodologically and becoming more attuned to the nuances of inequalities in 




2005; Steffensmeier et al., 1993) as well as in federal courts (Albonetti, 2002; Brennan & 
Spohn, 2009; Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Mustard, 2001), that the effect seems to be 
larger in the decision to incarcerate than in the determination of sentence length 
(Bontrager et al., 2013), and that there are also several interactive effects that color the 
relationship between gender and punishment (Bloch et al., 2014; Doerner & Demuth, 
2010). 
Sentencing scholars have made great strides by acknowledging that gender does 
not operate in isolation but rather intersects with other conditions to create advantages or 
disadvantages for certain defendants at sentencing. A noteworthy portion of the literature 
on gender disparities in sentencing has thus been devoted to potential interactive effects 
between gender and other defendant or case characteristics. Interactions between gender, 
race, age, and class are discussed later in this chapter. Studies examining the joint effects 
of gender and familial factors, factors such as marital status and having children or other 
dependents, is somewhat mixed. Koons-Witt (2002) found that female offenders were 
granted leniency if they had dependent children, while others find that neither marital 
status nor responsibility for dependents condition the effects of gender (Brennan & 
Spohn, 2009; Griffin & Wooldredge, 2006; Mustard, 2001) or even that the benefits from 
being a family caretaker are larger for male than for female defendants (Freiburger, 
2010).  
A second area of study is the conditional effects of offense type on gender 
disparity. It is well-documented that women tend to commit fewer and less serious crimes 
(Belknap, 2007; Britton et al., 2017), and several scholars have theorized that women 




have violated both law and gender norms (e.g. Franklin & Fearn, 2008). Moreover, others 
postulate that high offense severity may constrain judicial discretion by requiring harsh 
sentences, such that there is more gender uniformity in sentencing among serious 
offenses (see Kalven & Zeisel, 1966 for the original formulation of the liberation 
hypothesis). In line with these expectations, several studies find that females receive 
leniency relative to males among those committing less serious crimes (Koons-Witt et al., 
2014; Rodriguez et al., 2006); however, others identify little to no discrepancy across 
offense types (Mustard, 2001). Much like interactions between race and gender as well as 
race and familial factors, the nature and import of interactions between gender and 
offense type therefore remain in question. 
Socioeconomic Disparities 
The importance of social class for determining sentencing outcomes has been a 
hallmark assumption of criminal justice literature for decades. Conflict models of 
criminal justice posit that the law is applied discriminately as a means of oppressing 
marginalized groups, namely blacks and the lower class, and preserving the power of the 
social elite (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1973). Criminal justice sanctions are 
one of the mechanisms that function as a tool of institutional oppression, and as a result, 
lower class criminal defendants receive harsher punishments than their upper class 
counterparts (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). This proposition, that the lower class is 
disadvantaged at sentencing, is widely acknowledged (D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993; 
Chiricos & Waldo, 1975; Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; Miethe & Moore, 1985). However, the 
impact of social class on sentencing outcomes remains largely an assumption. Countless 




influence and hail it as a crucial topic for future sentencing research (e.g. Ulmer, 2012; 
Zatz, 2000), but it predominantly plays a supporting role in the empirical sentencing 
literature. 
This is likely because measures of social class are often coarse, incomplete, or 
nonexistent. SES is widely accepted as “a composite measure that typically incorporates 
economic status, measured by income; social status, measured by education; and work 
status, measured by occupation” (Dutton & Levine, 1989: 30). Rarely are all three of 
these components- income, education, and occupation- captured in official court records, 
making it difficult for scholars to fully account for SES in sentencing research. Studies 
that do include robust measures of SES are few (for exceptions, see D’Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 1993; Chiricos & Waldo, 1975). Instead, the modal method is to include one 
or another of the SES components as the only indicator. In other instances, researchers 
use other variables hypothesized to relate to social status as proxies for SES, such as 
defendants’ type of attorney (Bloch et al., 2014; King & Johnson, 2016; Kutateladze et 
al., 2014), or do not include any socioeconomic indicators at all (Britt, 2000; Bushway & 
Piehl, 2001). 
Educational attainment is commonly used as a stand-alone indicator of SES. 
While defendants’ education may indeed serve as an indicator of social status, judges 
may also use educational background as a signal for defendants’ work ethic, commitment 
to prosocial achievement, and desirability as a job applicant, as qualitative work in the 
Pennsylvania court system suggests (Kramer & Ulmer, 2009). Franklin’s (2017) 
sentencing evaluation put the spotlight squarely on educational attainment, finding that 




decisions and even moderated the effects of other extralegal variables such as race and 
gender in some cases. Obtaining a college degree did not have any significant effect. 
Franklin’s (2017) findings are consistent with much of the work on education and 
sentencing. There appears to be a general consensus that receiving a high school diploma 
provides an advantage at both sentencing stages (Albonetti, 1997; Franklin, 2013; 
Johnson & Betsinger, 2009; Mustard, 2001; Rehavi & Starr, 2014), while the evidence 
for significant effects of going to college or obtaining a college degree is on the whole 
much weaker (Franklin, 2013; Johnson & Betsinger, 2009; Koons-Witt, 2002; & Starr, 
2014). 
 Employment factors are also often used in isolation to represent SES. Early 
sentencing studies incorporated indexes measuring occupational prestige (Bedau, 1964; 
Wheeler et al., 1982; Willick et al., 1975) and often obtained little evidence that 
defendants’ occupation significantly impacted sentencing. On the other hand, there is 
some evidence that unemployed offenders receive harsher sentences than employed 
offenders (Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Myers, 1987; Wooldredge, 2010). However, it is 
worth noting that the effects of employment status also appear to vary across contexts, 
including geographical contexts (Nobiling et al., 1998), sentencing guidelines models 
(Koons-Witt, 2002; Miethe & Moore, 1985), judges (Anderson & Spohn, 2010; 
Wooldredge, 2010), and offender demographic characteristics (Chiricos & Bales, 1991; 
Spohn & Holleran, 2000). 
 Income, the third traditional component of SES, is more difficult to obtain in 
criminal court datasets and therefore a less common control in the empirical literature 




white collar sentencing included a dichotomous measure indicating whether each 
defendant had an income of over or under $13,777 per year, but the authors opted to 
present results focusing on divisions of educational attainment instead. Mustard’s (2001) 
evaluation of sentencing outcomes for federal offenders included a series of dummy 
variables capturing defendants’ income ranges, ultimately concluding that defendants 
who earned less than $5,000 per year were the most disadvantaged at sentencing. 
Wooldredge (2010) took a different approach to accounting for income by measuring 
whether or not defendants were reliant on relatives, friends, or the government for 
financial support and found that such reliance was related to higher chances of being 
incarcerated. Though these studies and others together lend some credence toward the 
idea that earnings are negatively associated with punishment severity, the dearth of 
research on the topic precludes firm conclusions.  
 Finally, a few other case characteristics have been used as proxies for SES in 
sentencing evaluations. Type of defense attorney is occasionally used as a rough indicator 
of defendants’ income and wealth; representation by a public defender or court-appointed 
attorney is presumed to signify an indigent defendant, while representation by private 
counsel requires at least some financial means (Skolnick, 1967). Sentencing studies that 
use type of attorney as a proxy for SES tend to find small but statistically significant 
effects of attorney type on sentencing outcomes (King & Johnson, 2016; Kutateladze et 
al., 2014; Nagel, 1969). Others have used income characteristics of the neighborhoods in 
which defendants were arrested (Kutateladze et al., 2014) or counties in which defendants 
live (Rehavi & Starr, 2014) as additional proxies for SES, likewise concluding that these 




Intersectionality in Sentencing Disparities 
In addition to observing a wide range of direct and independent effects of social 
demographics on sentencing, scholars have begun to recognize the need to examine 
interactive effects. The notion of intersectionality originated in black feminist 
scholarship, where Crenshaw (1989; 1991) and others argued that people’s identities are 
multidimensional, and each facet of a person’s identity helps construct their unique 
experiences and shape their treatment by others (Davis, 1981). For example, race and 
gender interact, such that black women have different experiences both from white 
women and from black men. In the context of the criminal justice system, this suggests 
that not all defendants of the same race/ethnicity, gender, or class have the same 
experiences and receive the same advantages or disadvantages during case processing, so 
it is important that sentencing research addresses the intersection of various racial/ethnic, 
gender, and class inequalities. Though the body of research focusing on intersectional 
disparities in formal punishment is still relatively sparse, it is steadily growing, and 
results generally indicate that the combined effects of various group memberships are 
impactful above and beyond the effects of each membership individually. 
To illustrate, a noteworthy portion of the literature on joint disparities in 
sentencing has been devoted to potential interactive effects between race and other 
defendant or case characteristics. One especially prevalent focus of study has been the 
intersection of gender and race, or what contemporary feminist scholars refer to as 
multiracial feminism (Burgess-Proctor, 2006). Research in this area indicates somewhat 
equivocally that gender and race may both exert contextual influences on each other, with 




Doerner & Demuth, 2010; LaFrentz & Spohn, 2006; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier et al., 2016), though some work instead finds 
that the gender gap is comparable across racial and ethnic groups (Bloch et al., 2014; 
Spohn & Beichner, 2000) or that racial gaps are comparable between male and female 
offenders (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
Building on this literature, the notion that age interacts with race and gender to 
procure harsh punishments for particular offenders has garnered considerable empirical 
support. Scholars repeatedly identify young black males, and occasionally young 
Hispanic males as well, as a group for whom age is especially impactful and for whom 
punishment is often the most severe (Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Nowacki, 2016; 
Steffensmeier et al., 2016; Spohn & Holleran, 2000). Steffensmeier and colleagues’ 
(2016) assessment of intersectional inequality in Pennsylvania produced solid evidence 
that both young black males and young Hispanic males received the harshest sentences, 
while young females and some of the oldest defendants received leniency. It is often 
posited that widespread stereotypes portraying young minority men as dangerous 
influence judicial decision-making and result in harsher punishments for young, minority, 
male offenders than any other offending group (Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier 
et al., 1998).  
The intersection of class with race/ethnicity and gender is infrequently explored in 
the sentencing literature, though select evaluations show some contextual differences 
among these social characteristics. Spohn and Holleran (2000) found that unemployed 
black and Hispanic males were more likely to be imprisoned than employed white males, 




evaluation of federal drug sentencing identified effects of employment status that were 
conditioned by race/ethnicity; employment benefited white defendants at sentencing but 
had no effect for blacks and Hispanics. Mustard’s (2001) study of the federal system 
found evidence that the white-Hispanic disparity was conditioned by education; the 
ethnic disparity was smaller among more educated defendants. Additional work on the 
joint influences of class, race, gender, and age may eventually explain more of these 
complex relationships. 
Methodological Limitations of Sentencing Disparity Research 
Overall, the research on disparities in sentencing has advanced greatly in recent 
decades, clarifying the extent of sociodemographic advantages and stimulating new and 
important inquiries into the treatment of various types of offenders in the criminal justice 
system. But sentencing research still has several methodological challenges. Some of 
these difficulties are specific to research on a single sociodemographic factor, while 
others characterize most or all of the research on race/ethnicity, gender, and SES 
disparities. The rest of this discussion emphasizes the latter type and focuses on how this 
dissertation project seeks to overcome some of these challenges. 
First, concerns about model misspecification due to omitted or poorly-measured 
variables permeate the sentencing literature. For example, among studies focusing on 
racial disparities, robust measures of SES, which is closely intertwined with race, are few 
and far between. As a result, it remains unclear whether observed racial disparities are 
truly due to racial group membership or whether they are in fact the result of biases 
against the lower class (Baumer, 2013; Mitchell, 2005). Because minority defendants also 




(Kutateladze et al., 2015), it is important to capture detailed information about 
defendants’ criminal histories in sentencing analyses.  
Similarly, critics of gender disparity evaluations often point to a lack of fine-
grained offense and criminal history information in sentencing research, arguing that 
sentencing leniency for women may be due to qualitative differences in male and female 
offending that are not captured in traditional court datasets (Bontrager et al., 2013; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1995). More specific offense type information helps inform this 
critique. Many also speculate that gender disparities may be due to “gender-related 
variables” such as marital status and responsibility for dependents that are often missing 
from analyses (Daly, 1989; Koons-Witt, 2002). As discussed previously, the biggest 
concern with studies of social class disparities is that they seldom fully capture 
defendants’ social class (Ulmer, 2012; Zatz, 2000). Incomplete measurement of the 
factors playing into each defendant’s social standing precludes a full and nuanced 
understanding of how status plays into sentencing outcomes. Additionally, virtually none 
of the work on race/ethnicity, gender, or SES inequalities account for prosocial or 
criminal attitudes, demeanor in the courtroom, remorse, or lifestyle characteristics such as 
residential stability and family life. These factors are not included in official court records 
but have the potential to significantly impact sentencing and even explain some part of 
observed social inequalities. 
This dissertation project improves upon previous sentencing inequality research 
first by including a wide variety of sentence predictors and addressing many of the 
concerns about omitted variable bias when modeling sentencing outcomes. Criminal 




incarceration, escape histories, institutional misconduct, and prior violence. Measures of 
employment, education, and financial stability all contribute to a more robust 
representation of SES, and family/marital statuses help clarify observed gender effects. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of variables capturing attitudes/orientations toward crime and 
lifestyle characteristics such as residential situation, leisure activities, criminal 
companionship, alcohol/drug problems, and mental health allows for much more nuanced 
assessments of the indirect pathways through which race, ethnicity, gender, and SES 
influence punishment. 
A second concern in the social inequalities literature is the small number of court 
systems from which sentencing data are drawn. Specifically, the majority of studies on 
sentencing disparities sample from only a few select states, most of which have 
sentencing guidelines, or from the federal court system. This tendency constrains the 
generalizability of findings from the research. Each state court system is unique (for one 
example of a way in which state courts vary, see Kauder and Ostrom’s (2008) profile of 
state sentencing guidelines), as is the federal court system, and disparities observed in 
one state’s courts may not be observable in another’s. This dissertation project focuses on 
sentencing in Connecticut state courts, which are not governed by any type of sentencing 
guidelines and have not been subjected to much empirical scrutiny (Gertz & Price, 1985; 
Zeisel & Diamond, 1977). 
The third issue relates to the limited incorporation of social inequality into 
sentencing policy evaluations, specifically the failure of evaluations to consider a wide 
range of potential social disparities associated with policy implementation. This point is 




policymaking. Evidence-based policymaking is based on the principle that decision-
making is better if it is informed by rigorous research. Policymakers put a premium on 
information that tells them how effective particular policies are and helps them determine 
how available resources can be used to maximize utility and do the most good (Head, 
2010; Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative, 2014). In practice, the evidence 
policymakers seek first and foremost is that which informs a policy’s return on 
investment (e.g. Drake et al., 2009). To illustrate, the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, run 
by the US Office of Justice Programs’ Bureau of Justice Assistance, maintains a primary 
goal of using evidence-based decision-making to improve public safety through the 
allocation of resources in cost-beneficial ways (La Vigne et al., 2014). Trapped by 
perennial budget constraints, policymakers want to identify and ultimately implement 
policies that are the most cost-effective. Financial costs, however, are not the only type of 
costs that a specific policy may incur. 
Policy evaluations do not typically factor in a sufficiently wide range of social 
costs when determining costs and benefits, likely because of the difficulties associated 
with collecting or obtaining the data necessary to evaluate these social costs. A few 
states, including Connecticut, have passed legislation mandating the consideration of 
racial impact statements, which assess the racial impact of proposed changes to 
sentencing and parole policies (London, 2011; Mauer, 2008). Aside from these racial 
impact statements, though, the potential for disproportionate impact on marginalized 
groups is seldom seriously considered. When it is, it is often as an afterthought (for 
exceptions, see Crawford et al., 1998; Miethe & Moore, 1985; Ulmer et al., 2007). The 




evaluates evidence-based sentencing focuses primarily on the overall predictive validity 
of risk assessment instruments and the impact that evidence-based sentencing will have 
on correctional populations and budgets (Hyatt et al., 2011; Ostrom et al., 2002; Ruback 
et al., 2016). The potential for social inequality to worsen as the result of evidence-based 
sentencing has not been assessed empirically (Laskorunsky, 2017). This dissertation 
project first and foremost targets this question, serving as an impact analysis for race, 
ethnicity, gender, and SES effects prior to the implementation of evidence-based 
sentencing in Connecticut. 
In sum, research on social inequality in punishment is prolific. The literature 
examining racial, ethnic, gender, and SES disparities has found that these 
sociodemographic factors exert both direct and indirect effects on sentencing. While legal 
factors such as criminal history and offense severity account for the majority of the 
variation in sentencing outcomes, the presence of these unwarranted disparities still raises 
concerns about fairness in the criminal justice system. However, research on punishment 
inequality is subject to a variety of limitations that leave ample room for improvement. 
This dissertation addresses these challenges by assessing both current social inequality 
and the potential effects of evidence-based sentencing on inequality in Connecticut. The 




CHAPTER 3: EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING 
 With over 1% of the American population housed in jail or prison (Carson & 
Anderson, 2016), the United States’ culture of mass incarceration has become 
unsustainable (Cullen et al., 2011), and excessive prison populations have incited 
demands for new sentencing policies that curb incarceration rates without jeopardizing 
historically low US crime rates (Warren, 2007; 2008).  From both sides of the political 
aisle, evidence-based sentencing has been touted as a promising response to these 
demands (Arnold & Arnold, 2015; Marcus, 2009). This chapter describes risk 
assessments and evidence-based sentencing, with special consideration of the risk 
assessment that is used in this study’s evaluation of evidence-based sentencing, the Level 
of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R). 
Risk Assessments 
Evidence-based sentencing is sentencing that relies on the use of actuarial 
assessments (Heilbrun, 2009). Evidence-based sentencing instruments are typically based 
on previous regression analyses linking recidivism rates with various offender and 
offense characteristics; each individual offender is assessed on variables that have been 
empirically associated with recidivism, such as criminal history and SES, and then item 
scores are summed to produce a score that serves as an indicator of overall reoffending 
risk. The foundation of evidence-based sentencing is the targeting of risk; risk 
assessments are intended to identify offenders’ risk of reoffending, and judges are 
expected to use those evaluations of risk to assign proper sentences.  
 The notion of offending risk is hardly foreign to the American criminal justice 




risk prediction in the criminal justice system, dating back to the late nineteenth century 
when states began adopting community supervision programs, like probation and parole, 
that were both assigned and terminated based on assessments of offenders’ risk of 
recidivism. What sets risk assessments used in contemporary evidence-based sentencing 
practices apart from past risk prediction techniques, advocates argue, is the incorporation 
of empirically sound, objective information about recidivism and interventions into risk 
calculations (Etienne, 2009; Marcus, 2009; Oleson, 2011; Warren, 2007). Rather than 
relying on potentially capricious intuitions and unsystematic judicial considerations of 
offender and offense characteristics to dictate sentences, evidence-based sentencing is 
intended to rely on social scientific evidence that can be used to maximize public safety. 
Bonta (1996) illustrates this distinction by characterizing three “generations” of 
risk assessments in the criminal justice system. First-generation risk assessments are 
quasi-clinical interviews in which criminal justice officials use offenders’ answers to 
unstructured questions to determine risk. These types of assessments, based solely on 
professional judgment, are still used in some jurisdictions today, but they have been 
replaced largely by second- and third-generation assessments. Second-generation risk 
assessments generally retain the interview format but improve upon their predecessors by 
incorporating actuarial instruments into decision-making. The corrections official is thus 
informed about offender characteristics that had been empirically shown to relate to risk 
of recidivism. However, second-generation assessments consist primarily of static risk 
factors that cannot be eliminated (e.g. age, criminal history, gender). While good 
predictors of recidivism, static risk factors only aid in managing offenders’ risk; they 




problem that third-generation risk assessments attempt to tackle. Third-generation risk 
assessments, also commonly referred to as risk-needs instruments, consider both static 
and dynamic risk factors in their evaluation. These assessments, which encompass 
several of the most popular risk prediction instruments in use, acknowledge that 
offenders’ circumstances and needs can change over time and that individual offenders’ 
risk can be reduced if the proper dynamic risk factors are addressed (Andrews & Bonta, 
2000; Oleson, 2011). Since Bonta’s (1996) original formulation, a fourth generation of 
risk assessments has been added to the fray. Fourth-generation risk assessments integrate 
case planning tools into the instrument; in addition to evaluating risk, they acknowledge 
and recommend supervision and intervention options (Andrews et al., 2006).  
Risk assessments were first introduced in the correctional system, as a means of 
evaluating incarcerated offenders’ risk of recidivism and potential for rehabilitation 
(Andrews & Bonta, 2000; Bonta, 1996), but their use has expanded into criminal 
sentencing. At least 20 states have now incorporated risk assessment instruments into the 
sentencing process in some way (Starr, 2014b). Its popularity in both courts and 
correctional systems may be due in part to the variety of identifications for which risk 
assessments can be useful. First, these assessments can be used to identify which 
offenders can be given non-custodial sentences without jeopardizing the safety of the 
community. For example, the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission developed a 
Risk Assessment Instrument designed to identify the best low-risk offender candidates 
for community supervision and alternative sanctions programming. The goal was to 
divert a full 25% of nonviolent offenders who would otherwise have been incarcerated 




particular is designed to increase resource optimization by reducing expenditures on 
those offenders who are least likely to require incapacitation in order to be crime-free.  
On the other side of the coin, risk assessments can be used to identify which 
offenders have a relatively high risk of future recidivism and pose the greatest threat if 
released (Bergstrom et al., 2009; Hyatt et al., 2011; Warren, 2007). Though evidence-
based sentencing programs are thought to be most effective among moderate and high-
risk offenders, this purpose is less often an explicit objective of risk assessment tools, as 
its inherent orientation toward harsh sentencing (even if for only a small proportion of all 
offenders) seemingly belies the shift in academic and policy rhetoric toward reduced 
sentences and alternatives to prison. Framing evidence-based sentencing as a means of 
mitigating sentences and reducing incarceration is often considered a more effective way 
to argue for it (Etienne, 2009; Starr, 2014b). Among third- and fourth-generation 
instruments that include dynamic risk and need factors, the assessments can also be used 
to identify offenders who are well-suited to particular rehabilitative treatments or 
restorative justice programming (Andrews & Bonta, 2000, 2002; Monahan & Skeem, 
2015; Warren, 2008). The development of numerous evidence-based alternative sanctions 
and community release conditions has pushed practitioners to consider the types of 
offenders for which each program is most effective, and risk-needs assessments can assist 
in the identification of suitable offenders.  
The distinct generations of risk assessments illustrate one set of ways in which the 
tools vary, but risk assessments can differ substantially in other ways, even within 
generational groupings. For instance, risk assessments may be intended to predict 




overall recidivism (Coulson et al., 1996; Skeem & Lowenkamp, 2016), while others may 
be used specifically to predict more specific types of reoffending such as domestic 
violence, general violence, property crimes, or drug offenses (Dutton & Kropp, 2000; 
Yang et al., 2010).  Risk assessments also have different target offending populations. 
Risk assessments have been developed for the general offending population, as well as 
for more specific groups such as juveniles, females, and sex offenders (Hanson, 1997; 
Hoge, 2002; Voorhis et al., 2010). Further, the domains included in risk assessment 
instruments vary both in number and type. The number of individual items/questions on 
risk assessment tools can range from less than 10 to over 100, and though there are some 
areas covered by most mainstream risk assessment tools (e.g. criminal history, antisocial 
behavior, substance abuse), other domains such as demographics, recreational activities, 
and neighborhood or residential characteristics appear less frequently (Oleson et al., 
2011). Other sources of variation may include the information collection methods (e.g. 
semi-structured interview, official record reviews, self-report surveys), the populations on 
which tools were initially validated (e.g. convicted male offenders, Canadian offenders, 
general population), and whether the tools are proprietary or available for public 
distribution. 
Pros of Evidence-Based Sentencing 
In spite of the numerous variations in risk assessment tools, the majority of these 
tools achieve comparable benefits and are subject to many of the same limitations. 
Generally, the use of risk assessments in sentencing is attractive for several reasons. First, 
it constitutes a data-driven, scientifically validated approach to sentencing (Etienne, 




decisions, so advocates argue that evidence-based sentencing can simply add a layer of 
precision to sentencing practices without constraining discretion (Kern & Bergstrom, 
2013; Oleson, 2011). Most risk assessment instruments contain only items that have been 
empirically shown to relate to recidivism, and the accuracy with which the instruments 
predict recidivism is generally tested using samples of convicted offenders before the 
instrument is fully integrated in sentencing (Ostrom et al., 2002). Thus, evidence-based 
sentencing offers a more rigorous version of risk prediction than what judges already use 
to make decisions. Bolstering this argument are reports that risk assessment instruments 
outperform human judgment, such that predictions made using risk assessments have 
greater predictive validity than clinical assessments (Andrews et al., 2006; Gottfredson, 
1961; Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1985; Sacks, 1976).  
A second advantage of evidence-based sentencing is its potential to reduce 
incarceration without endangering public safety. As discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, evidence-based sentencing is in part a pragmatic response to harsh sentences and 
mass incarceration in the United States; it is viewed as a method for decreasing reliance 
on the American prison system by diverting low-risk offenders away from incarceration 
(Marcus, 2009; Warren, 2007). Additionally, by matching offenders with punishment 
plans that will reduce their likelihood of reoffending, evidence-based sentencing can 
increase the resource efficiency of the criminal justice system and maximize its impact on 
crime. As a result, evidence-based sentencing also enjoys support from a broad swathe of 
the criminal justice community (Oleson, 2011; Warren, 2008). Sentencing judges in 
particular believe that evidence-based sentencing is worth pursuing as a mode of 




Relatedly, evidence-based sentencing is often lauded for its focus on public safety 
and rehabilitation rather than retribution (Warren, 2007). In a retributive framework, 
offenders are punished simply because they deserve it. The punishment’s primary 
function is to be the consequence of an offender’s behavior (Monahan & Skeem, 2016). 
This penal philosophy was one of several that contributed to punitive sentencing and the 
rise of mass incarceration in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Gertner, 2010). Now that 
incarceration rates are becoming unsustainable, utilitarian “smart on sentencing” 
approaches that emphasize crime reduction, public safety, and rehabilitation are taking 
center stage among academic and practitioner communities (Etienne, 2009; Marcus, 
2009; Warren, 2007). Evidence-based sentencing embodies this emerging ideology, 
representing the incorporation of risk reduction goals and rehabilitation back into 
sentencing. 
Finally, the use of risk assessment instruments introduces a mechanism for 
increasing objectivity and transparency in sentencing decisions. For decades, court actors 
have been called out for making decisions behind closed doors and then failing to justify 
them publicly, a complaint that erodes public trust in the criminal justice system and 
threatens its legitimacy (Bibas, 2006). The use of innovations that generate systematic, 
reproducible outputs, such as risk assessments that calculate risk scores, may thus appeal 
to those who are concerned about personal biases influencing courtroom outcomes. Much 
like sentencing guidelines that were intended to limit judicial discretion and curtail bias 
in sentencing, risk assessments can be viewed as an accessible decision-making ‘guide’ 
that promotes the use of open, objective offender evaluations. 




 At the same time, there have also been several criticisms levelled at the use of risk 
assessments. First, despite its potential to increase transparency, evidence-based 
sentencing often suffers from a lack of both transparency and public understanding. 
Because many risk assessment instruments were developed by private entities that 
retained proprietary rights, the factors and algorithms used to calculate risk scores cannot 
always be shared with the judges who use them and the defendants who receive them. 
This creates an aura of secrecy around evidence-based sentencing and can make it 
difficult for defendants, the public, and sometimes even court actors to trust risk 
assessments. One good example of this phenomenon occurred in Pennsylvania, where a 
risk assessment instrument was created to assist in the state’s parole decisions. In 
detailing the instrument’s development and implementation, Bergstrom and colleagues 
(2009) describe how the tool was not initially made public, which led to widespread 
public distrust and ultimately a loss of support for the parole system.  
A recent court case in Wisconsin also demonstrates this issue. In Loomis v. 
Wisconsin, Eric Loomis argued that using proprietary risk assessments to make 
sentencing decisions violates defendants’ constitutional right to due process; the 
proprietary nature of the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions (COMPAS), a risk assessment that a Wisconsin judge relied on to issue 
Loomis’ six-year prison sentence, prevented Loomis from challenging the validity and 
accuracy of the assessment and his sentence (State v. Loomis, 2016). Though the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that due process rights were not violated in the case (and 




dispute brought to light concerns about the use of proprietary risk assessments that may 
well spur other legal challenges in the future. 
 Second, some argue that risk assessments are too imprecise in their estimations of 
recidivism risk to warrant their use at sentencing. Like other predictive tools, recidivism 
risk assessments are not always accurate; empirical tests indicate that they have large 
margins of error, such that some offenders labeled “high-risk” by risk assessment tools do 
not recidivate while some offenders labeled “low-risk” do (Fass et al., 2008; Gendreau et 
al., 2002; Wong & Gordon, 2006). Inaccurately assessed defendants will either suffer 
needlessly or pose a significant risk to the public, so precision is paramount to the success 
of evidence-based sentencing. Because risk estimation can profoundly affect defendants’ 
and the public’s well-being through its influence on punishment, many scholars contend 
that these false positives and false negatives occur too frequently for comfort (Berk et al., 
2009; Berk & Bleich, 2014; Cooke & Michie, 2010; Harcourt, 2007; Hart et al., 2007). 
Third, evidence-based sentencing has been accused of being destructive of 
individualized justice. The American criminal justice system places great value on 
individualized sentencing, the idea that all characteristics of each offender and offense 
should be considered when making sentencing decisions. As Etienne (2009) notes, this 
concept has been enforced by the US Supreme Court on several occasions as a means of 
justifying both harsher and lighter sentences (see Williams v. New York and Woodson v. 
North Carolina). Risk assessment instruments, however, only consider defendants unique 
insofar as those defendants differ on the characteristics included as factors in the risk 
and/or needs scores. Defendants cannot be differentiated by characteristics that are not 




variety of offender characteristics cannot capture all the unique aspects of defendants and 
their cases that should be relevant to sentencing. This could be seen as amounting to a 
method of statistical profiling in which defendants are treated better or worse depending 
on group memberships that they often cannot change (Auerhahn, 1999; Hannah-Moffat, 
2005; Starr, 2014b).  
Additionally, over the course of the evidence-based sentencing process, court 
actors have a tendency to treat risks and needs as interchangeable concepts when the two 
should be considered separately (Hannah-Moffat, 1999). While risk factors signify 
increased likelihood of recidivism and are intended to inform risk management decisions, 
needs identify targets for treatment programs and are intended to inform risk reduction 
decisions, and ultimately, evidence-based sentencing is needed to reduce risk rather than 
just to manage it (Garland, 2003; Maurutto & Hannah-Moffat, 2006). Addressing 
defendants’ criminogenic needs is thus an important goal of evidence-based sentencing. 
However, unsatisfied needs are often regarded by judges and other practitioners as 
though they are risk factors; they are used to determine how risky each defendant is but 
not what treatments would be useful to reduce his/her risk (Hannah-Moffat, 1999). 
Evidence-based sentencing thus falls short of what it has the potential to accomplish. 
What is needed is a broader, more flexible approach to offender evaluation that 
incorporates both risk identification and risk reduction (Dowden & Andrews, 2000). Such 
an approach would use risk and needs identification to craft a treatment plan that protects 
the public in the short term but also rehabilitates the offender in the longer term.  
 Perhaps the most strongly voiced concern with evidence-based sentencing is its 




2005, 2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b,c). Empirical evidence 
suggests that offender characteristics such as race, gender, and SES correlate with 
reoffending, but these factors are not considered legally relevant variables for sentencing 
(Oleson, 2011; Starr, 2014b). This leads to an interesting tension between demands for 
effective risk prediction and the protection of constitutional rights. On one hand, some 
legal scholars vehemently condemn the incorporation of these variables into risk 
assessment calculations; Starr (2014b) argues, for instance, that using demographic or 
socioeconomic variables to arrive at risk scores and sentencing decisions is a serious 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, tantamount to overt discrimination. Work by 
Hannah-Moffat and colleagues demonstrates that risk and needs assessments are built on 
principles of the middle class that are both racialized and gendered (Hannah-Moffat, 
2009; Hannah-Moffat & Shaw, 2001). In other words, factors that increase participants’ 
risk scores may be “risky” characteristics for white, middle-class males but may actually 
not be indicative of greater recidivism or may be more commonplace among other 
populations. Moreover, even if demographic factors such as race, gender, and SES are 
not explicitly included in risk assessment instruments, they may indirectly impact risk 
scores and subsequent punishment through their relationship with other variables that 
appear in risk assessment instruments. For example, racial minority defendants have 
more extensive criminal histories than whites (Kutateladze et al., 2015). Because criminal 
histories occupy a starring role in many popular risk assessment tools, minority 





On the other hand, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of defendants, 
as well as variables through which those characteristics may operate indirectly, provide 
substantial contributions to the predictive validity of risk assessment tools. Without them, 
the effectiveness of the tools drops precipitously. Oleson (2011: 1396-7) ponders this 
issue in the context of race:  
If even something as quotidian as criminal history, a staple in traditional 
sentencing, can operate as a proxy for race, what variables are free from 
suspicion? Gender? Age? Family background? As each variable is discarded as 
antithetical to American legal values, the predictive value of the model dwindles 
until we are left with something no more robust than the best guess of a judge. 
(1396—7) 
There’s the rub. Excluding any factors that could be deemed constitutionally 
suspect would erode the predictive validity of risk assessment instruments, but without 
predictive capabilities, the instruments are of little value to the criminal justice system. If 
evidence-based sentencing does add to sociodemographic disparities in sentencing, 
adjustments will be needed to protect defendants’ constitutional rights and prevent further 
discrimination of marginalized groups of offenders.  
However, it is unclear whether or not evidence-based sentencing actually does 
exacerbate social inequality in sentencing (Laskorunsky, 2017). Scholars assume that risk 
assessment instruments would worsen disparities, but this has not been confirmed 
empirically (Heilbrun, 2009). The closest evidence suggesting that evidence-based 
sentencing may cause demographic disparities come from examinations of disparities in 
the predictive validity of risk assessment instruments. ProPublica, a non-profit 
investigative journalism organization, conducted such an evaluation on COMPAS. Using 
a sample of defendants from Broward County, Florida, Angwin and colleagues (2016) 




and white defendants. The researchers found that though a similar number of predictive 
errors were made for black and white offenders, the tool was more likely to wrongly label 
black offenders high-risk and to wrongly label white offenders low-risk. Though the 
findings from this evaluation cannot speak directly to social inequality in sentencing 
outcomes, they do suggest that risk assessments like COMPAS may be overestimating 
black defendants’ risk of recidivism and underestimating white defendants’, errors which 
could generate sentencing disparities under evidence-based sentencing schemes.
1
 
Whiteacre (2013) similarly evaluated risk classification errors in the Level of Service 
Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) and found that black offenders were more often misclassified 
than white or Hispanic offenders, though his results were somewhat sensitive to 
classification cutoff decisions and the outcomes being predicted. 
Due to the explicit inclusion of sociodemographic factors themselves as well as 
other factors that correlate with those demographic factors, the use of risk assessments at 
sentencing may widen punishment gaps for different race, ethnicity, gender, and SES 
groups. Demographic factors could directly influence risk assessment scores but could 
also operate indirectly through factors included in risk assessments. Conversely, risk 
assessments that incorporate a broad range of offender characteristics may have little to 
no effect on existing sentencing disparities or may even reduce them. Scholars theorize 
that court actors are forced to make processing and sentencing decisions under both time 
and resource constraints, which limits the information that can be obtained and used to 
inform decision-making (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). So it is possible 
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 It is important to acknowledge that Angwin and colleagues’ (2016) findings have been heavily contested 
by Northpointe, the proprietary owners of the COMPAS risk assessment (Dieterich, Mendoza, & Brennan, 
2016). The findings have likewise been rebutted by other researchers who argued that ProPublica’s 




that risk assessments could be a mechanism through which relevant factors that would 
not otherwise have been considered can impact sentencing and limit the influence of race, 
ethnicity, gender, and SES. It is this set of possibilities that this study tests, using 
evidence-based sentencing based on the LSI-R.  
The Level of Service Inventory-Revised 
 The Level of Service Inventory- Revised (LSI-R) is a popular third-generation 
proprietary risk assessment instrument developed by Canadian psychologists using 
analyses of Canadian inmates and professional judgments by Canadian probation officials 
(Andrews & Bonta, 1995). Originally titled the Level of Supervision Inventory 
(Andrews, 1982), the instrument started out as a guide for determining both appropriate 
levels and lengths of supervision for offenders in the correctional system. By the 1990’s, 
the tool had been revised and renamed to reflect its new emphasis on service and 
treatment provisions in addition to supervision. Among states that have not adopted their 
own state-specific instrument, the LSI-R is the most popular risk prediction tool for use 
in the court system (Andrews & Bonta, 2000; Casey et al., 2014; Olver et al., 2014).  
 The LSI-R is based on an approach to offender assessment known as the “Risk-
Needs-Responsivity” (RNR) model (Andrews et al., 1990). True to its name, the 
approach relies on three main principles related to the design and implementation of 
offender interventions. The risk principle requires that the level of service provided to 
each offender be matched to that offender’s individual risk of reoffending. High-risk 
offenders should receive more service, while low-risk offenders should receive less. This 
principle requires a valid and reliable method of predicting offender recidivism and 




offenders’ criminogenic needs should also be assessed and targeted with treatment. In 
contrast to static risk factors, criminogenic needs are dynamic factors directly linked to 
criminal behavior that can be altered with intervention. With the need principle, the RNR 
model departs from risk management approaches by aiming to reduce risk rather than just 
to manage it (Hannah-Moffat, 2005). The third principle, responsivity, dictates that 
offenders should receive cognitive behavioral treatment to maximize their ability to 
benefit from rehabilitative interventions, and that these interventions should be 
individually tailored to the learning style, motivations, and strengths of offenders 
(Andrews et al., 1990). This principle is derived from theories of cognitive social 
learning, which suggest that people learn differently and will learn the most if 
interventions attend to their personal learning styles (Andrews & Bonta, 2006). 
According to the responsivity principle, treatment providers must also account for 
offenders’ unique personal, cognitive, and social factors in order to maximize the effects 
of the treatment. The RNR model is highly influential and has been shown to reduce 
recidivism significantly when applied appropriately in rehabilitation programming 
(Andrews & Bonta, 2006), making it an asset to assessment instruments like the LSI-R. 
The LSI-R is a 54-item assessment designed to measure offenders’ propensity for 
future antisocial behavior. The items capture ten criminogenic domains, including 
criminal history, education/employment, financial characteristics, family/marital status, 
accommodations, leisure/recreational activity, criminal companions, alcohol/drug 
problems, emotional/personal attributes, and attitudes/orientations toward crime and the 
criminal justice system (Andrews & Bonta, 1995). Factors included in other risk 




offense type, history of physical or sexual abuse, and protective factors that reduce the 
likelihood of future offending. Each item in the LSI-R is scored in a yes/no format, and 
each “yes” (meaning risk factor is present) adds one point to the risk score. Higher 
composite scores, which range from 0 to 54, indicate that more criminogenic risk factors 
are present and the offender is at a greater risk for future criminal behavior. 
 Many evaluations of the LSI-R have been conducted to determine its predictive 
validity. Generally speaking, the LSI-R performs better than chance predictions and as 
well or slightly better than other risk assessment instruments (Andrews & Bonta, 1995, 
2006; Flores et al., 2006; Kroner & Mills, 2001). Gendreau and colleagues’ (1996) meta-
analysis of actuarial assessment instruments identified the LSI-R as the instrument with 
the highest recidivism correlation (r=.35), though only some of the comparisons achieved 
statistical significance. Most evaluations of the LSI-R, though, have been conducted 
using primarily white, male samples. Several scholars question the accuracy of the 
instrument for particular criminal subpopulations. A variety of studies have evaluated the 
predictive validity of the LSI-R for female offenders, and though female offenders 
sometimes receive lower composite scores than males (Coulson et al., 1996; Holsinger et 
al., 2006), a meta-analysis of these studies found similar effect sizes for male and female 
offenders, suggesting that the LSI-R is similarly predictive for males and females (Smith 
et al., 2009). Others have tested the efficacy of the LSI-R among racial/ethnic minority 
groups (Holsinger et al., 2006; Olver et al., 2014; Whiteacre, 2006), likewise finding that 
minority offenders earn higher scores but are subject to comparable predictive accuracy 




A meta-analysis capturing the predictive accuracy of various Level of Service 
scales, including the LSI-R, also identified few accuracy differences across offender 
demographic characteristics and outcomes (Olver et al., 2014). Interestingly, the authors 
of this meta-analysis did note that the accuracy of the scales was largest among Canadian 
samples and lowest among studies conducted in the United States, a finding that likely 
reflects the instrument’s original focus on Canadian offenders and differing crime 
dynamics between the U.S. and Canada. 
 Thus, the LSI-R can be considered an extensive, scientifically validated risk 
assessment tool. Substantial variation across risk assessment instruments precludes the 
use of any single instrument from being perfectly representative of evidence-based 
sentencing in the United States. Still, the LSI-R is a good instrument to use for an 
assessment of evidence-based sentencing because it is the most popular generic risk 
assessment tool and it incorporates a relatively large range of domains related to 
recidivism that could be sources of social inequality.  
This is the context that provides fertile ground for an evaluation of disparities 
resulting from criminal justice policy. Evidence-based sentencing has been heralded as a 
potentially important mechanism for reducing incarceration rates. It involves a data-
driven approach to risk evaluation, it purports not to endanger public safety while still 
limiting the use of prison, it turns the spotlight toward utilitarian punishment goals such 
as risk reduction, and it has the potential to increase objectivity and transparency in 
sentencing. At the same time, evidence-based sentencing is not well-understood by the 
public, risk evaluations are imprecise and sometimes improperly label offenders as “high 




profiling, risk assessments are often used only as risk management tools when they are 
also intended to inform risk reduction decisions, and evidence-based sentencing has the 
potential to exacerbate social inequality.  
The dissertation project focuses on this last concern using the LSI-R, which is a 
popular, well-validated risk assessment instrument that uses a wide variety of 
criminogenic factors to evaluate recidivism risk.  The setting for the evaluation is 
Connecticut, a state that does not currently have an evidence-based sentencing scheme in 
place. The next chapter discusses Connecticut and explains why Connecticut is a suitable 




CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH CONTEXT 
This study examines sentencing outcomes in a single state – Connecticut. Because 
it is frequently posited that individual sentencing decisions are influenced by social 
contexts, leading to important roles for both courtroom and community factors in 
sentencing disparities (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 2005), this 
sentencing evaluation would be incomplete without considering the context in which the 
sentencing decisions are made. This chapter describes the state of Connecticut generally, 
provides background on the courts and the development of its sentencing system, and 
then discusses aspects of the penal code and other statutes that are most relevant for the 
present study on evidence-based sentencing and social inequality. It concludes with a 
commentary about the suitability of Connecticut for this evaluation of evidence-based 
sentencing and social inequality. To provide a time-consistent context, it describes the 
state of Connecticut and its criminal justice system between 2008 and 2010, rather than 
the present day, when possible. 
Connecticut 
In 2010, Connecticut had a total population of 3.57 million people. It was the 
third-smallest state in the country but also the fourth most densely populated (US Census 
Bureau, 2012). Its resident population was 77.6% white, 10.1% Black or African 
American, and 3.8% Asian, with the remaining percentage identifying as another race or 
two or more races. 13.4% also identified as Hispanic or Latino (US Census Bureau, 
2010). These figures are comparable to the demographic makeup of the United States as a 
whole. In 2010, the US population was 72.4% white, 12.6% Black or African American, 




 Connecticut is one of the wealthiest states in the US, with a high median 
household income and low federal poverty rate (US Census Bureau, 2017). However, it is 
also one of the most socioeconomically unequal. Income inequality has increased across 
all states since the 1970s, but the income ratio of the top 1% to the bottom 99% in 
Connecticut has grown substantially, swelling to 42.6 and dwarfing the total US top-to-
bottom ratio of 25.3 in 2013 (Sommeiller et al., 2016). Income inequality also varies 
considerably across geographic regions in Connecticut; the top-to-bottom ratio ranges 
from 73.7 in Fairfield County, which contains four of the state’s largest cities, down to 
Windham County, which is the least populous county in the state (Sommeiller et al., 
2016).  
Connecticut has long been considered a liberal state. Between 2008 and 2010, 
Connecticut’s governor was Republican, but the state remained blue. Democrats held a 
firm majority in the state legislature, most of the US Senators and Representatives were 
Democrats, and Connecticut’s Electoral College votes went to Democrat Barack Obama 
in the 2008 Presidential election.  
Connecticut Courts and Sentencing Background 
Connecticut has no county governments, so all criminal justice functions except 
localized police services are provided by state agencies. Superior Courts hold original 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases in the state. The Superior Courts are divided into 13 
judicial districts (“JD’s”) and 20 geographical areas (“GA’s”). GA courts typically handle 
criminal arraignments, misdemeanors, and lower-level felonies, while serious criminal 




states, Connecticut has an intermediate Appellate Court and a Supreme Court that can 
review decisions from the lower courts. 
Prior to the 1980’s, Connecticut had an indeterminate sentencing system. Judges 
assigned a minimum and maximum term of punishment to each offender, but parole 
boards maintained authority over convicted offenders’ served sentence lengths through 
discretionary release decisions. Rehabilitation was the dominant sentencing ideology. In 
1981, Connecticut’s General Assembly abandoned indeterminate sentencing and shifted 
to a determinate sentencing model in which judges assigned fixed terms of imprisonment 
but retained the discretion to consider a range of sentence types specified in state statutes. 
Along with indeterminate sentencing went discretionary parole and the emphasis on 
rehabilitation, replaced with a supervised home release program managed by the 
Department of Corrections and a new emphasis on deterrence, consistency, and 
retribution (Legislative Program Review & Investigations Committee, 2005). The state 
continued making changes throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s. Mandatory minimums 
were established for various offenses. In 1993, discretionary parole was reinstated in a 
limited fashion; the Connecticut Board of Parole was given jurisdiction over offenders 
whose sentences were at least two years (Legislative Program Review & Investigations 
Committee, 2005).  
During this time, more offenders were sentenced to incarceration, and average 
prison sentences got longer. The Connecticut General Assembly implemented a truth-in-
sentencing policy for violent offenders, requiring violent offenders to serve 85% of their 
sentences before becoming eligible for parole. Persistent offender provisions and other 




“good time” credits were reduced by 20%, which increased time served by approximately 
the same percentage (Legislative Program Review & Investigations Committee, 2005).  
As a result, Connecticut’s prison population climbed dramatically. In 1985, only 5,422 
inmates were housed in Connecticut prisons (Connecticut Sentencing Task Force, 2009). 
By 2010, this figure had risen to 18,416 (Connecticut Department of Correction, 2010). 
In conjunction with the rise in prison population, the cost of the prison system 
skyrocketed. Correctional expenditures hovered around $81 million in 1985 and rose to 
over $666 million by 2010 (Connecticut Department of Correction, 2010; Connecticut 
Sentencing Task Force, 2009). Adding to Connecticut’s prison woes, racial disparities in 
the prison population increased. By the mid-2000’s, the state was incarcerating black 
offenders at a rate 12 times higher than white offenders, earning it the dubious distinction 
of having one of the largest racial gaps in incarceration in the country (Connecticut 
Sentencing Task Force, 2009). 
It was within this context that the state of Connecticut reevaluated the direction of 
its criminal justice system in the 2000’s. The Commission on Prison and Jail 
Overcrowding, originally created to oversee prison construction, changed course and 
began exploring mechanisms to reduce the prison population. In 2005, a Legislative 
Program Review and Investigations Committee was formed to review mandatory 
minimum policies, and among the Committee’s recommendations was the creation of a 
task force charged with assessing the state’s sentencing system and determining whether 
a formal Sentencing Commission was needed. This task force was created in 2006 by the 
Connecticut General Assembly and soon determined that Connecticut’s sentencing 




inefficiency and costliness of the system, and the social inequality associated with 
incarceration. It emphasized the need for “rational, data-driven sentencing policy” and 
recommended the establishment of a Connecticut Sentencing Commission that would 
develop “in-depth knowledge” of state sentencing practices and ultimately assist the state 
in “dedicating its limited resources in the most effective and efficient manner while 
ensuring and enhancing public safety and justice” (Connecticut Sentencing Task Force, 
2009: 8). Thus, Connecticut created a permanent sentencing commission, which would 
become active in 2011.  
In the years since the Connecticut Sentencing Commission was established, it has 
advanced Connecticut’s sentencing process in a number of ways. One of the most recent 
initiatives undertaken by the Commission involves a study of evidence-based sentencing. 
As envisioned by the Commission, the study is intended to describe a) how closely 
current sentencing practices in Connecticut fit with sentences that would have been 
issued in an evidence-based sentencing context and b) how closely risk and needs 
assessment scores fit with offenders’ subsequent recidivism patterns. The present study of 
social inequality and evidence-based sentencing is an extension of the study initially 
proposed by the Commission. 
Connecticut currently does not use any general risk assessments to inform 
sentencing decisions. That said, several different risk assessment tools are used in 
Connecticut’s adult and juvenile correctional systems. The Kingston Screening 
Instrument for Domestic Violence Offenders is widely used for the sentencing of 
domestic violence cases (Roehl & Guertin, 2000). Connecticut’s Court Support Services 




Planning Instrument for Women to evaluate risk and inform supervision and case 
planning decisions for Connecticut adult probationers (Millson et al., 2009). The 
Connecticut Board of Parole created its own Salient Factor Score, modeled off of a scale 
of the same name developed by the U.S. Parole Commission, to calculate inmates’ 
likelihood of recidivating after release from prison and more recently has used the LSI-R 
for the same function (Ratansi & Cox, 2007). The Treatment Program Assessment 
Instrument is also used by the Department of Correction to assess risk of recidivism, most 
notably violent recidivism, among offenders sentenced to at least six months of 
incarceration, and the Static-99 is used to measure the risk of sexual offending. The scale 
captures prior correctional commitments, age, and violent behavior. For juveniles on 
probation, CSSD uses the Brief Risk Assessment Tool, the Juvenile Assessment Generic, 
and occasionally a structured interview called Assessing Individual Motivation. These 
instruments are used to develop probation disposition, supervision level, and planning 
recommendations. Since 2008, the Connecticut parole system has used the Youth 
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions as its risk 
instrument (Kelly et al., 2013). Results from these various risk assessment instruments 
are not made available to sentencing judges in subsequent cases. 
Risk assessments are also presently used to guide pretrial release and bail 
decision-making. Since the 1980’s, CSSD has been tasked with making bail 
recommendations to minimize defendants’ risk of reoffending while on bail or failing to 
show up for court dates. These recommendations are based on a 14-item pretrial risk 
assessment scale that considers factors such as marital status, living arrangements, 




2015). Thus, Connecticut is well-versed in the incorporation of risk/needs assessments 
into criminal justice processing.  
Connecticut Penal Code and Relevant Statutes 
As in other states, criminal offenses in Connecticut are classified as either felonies 
or misdemeanors. However, Connecticut does not have sentencing guidelines to structure 
the punishments associated with these crimes. Instead, felonies, which include all 
offenses punishable by imprisonment for one or more years, are categorized based on 
offense severity as capital, class A (murder), class A, class B, class C, class D, and class 
E. There also a variety of unclassified (class U) felonies, which are assigned unique 
sentencing ranges within their statutory offense definitions. Class U felonies include 
arson murder, possession, sale, manufacturing, or distribution of illegal drugs, and a few 
firearm and weapons offenses. Misdemeanors, which include offenses punishable by 
imprisonment for no more than one year, are likewise divided in class A, class B, class C, 
class D, and class U. Each classification is associated with a set of minimum and 
maximum prison and probation sentences that provide some structure to sentencing 
decisions. These ranges are defined in Table 4.1. Compared to typical state sentencing 
guidelines ranges, Connecticut’s penalty ranges are quite broad. To illustrate, the prison 
penalty range for class B felonies in Connecticut is 1-20 years, and the prison penalty 
range for class C felonies is 1-10 years. The widths of these ranges provide ample room 
for judges to use their discretion in assigning appropriate sentences. 
There are a variety of additional sentencing policies, both formal and informal, 
that further impact judicial discretion during the sentencing process. First, Connecticut 




misdemeanors and unclassified offenses. These penalties range from a mandatory life 
sentence for capital felonies (and 25 years for select Class A felonies) down to a 
mandatory one-year prison sentence for some Class A misdemeanors. Despite the 
prevalence of these penalties, a 2005 report on Connecticut mandatory minimums 
indicates that very few offenders are actually sentenced under mandatory minimum laws; 
instead, there are informal “going rates”, or widely accepted penalties for specific crimes, 
that serve as the basis for plea negotiations and allow for the circumvention of mandatory 
minimum sentences (Legislative Program Review & Investigations Committee, 2005).  
The effects of mandatory minimum laws are also softened by Connecticut’s 
presumptive sentencing policy. Connecticut has two types of mandatory minimum 
sentences: traditional sentencing, and presumptive sentencing. In traditional mandatory 
minimum sentencing, judges cannot depart below the specific mandatory minimum 
prison term. In presumptive sentencing, the mandatory minimum penalty is the default 
sentence, but judges have an opportunity to impose sentences below the presumptive 
sentence if specific mitigating circumstances (referred to as “good cause”) are present.  
For example, the sale of narcotics by a non-drug-dependent person carries a 5-year 
mandatory minimum penalty unless the defendant is under 18, the defendant is mentally 
impaired, or a judge determines that the crime was nonviolent. The majority of offenses 
carrying presumptive mandatory minimums are drug offenses (Legislative Program 
Review & Investigations Committee, 2005). A full list of both traditional mandatory 




For felony offenses that do not carry a mandatory minimum sentence, judges have 
the discretion to suspend all or part of the incarceration sentence.
2
 In effect, this enables 
judges to issue probation sentences for many felony offenders. Connecticut additionally 
has sentencing enhancements that allow judges to issue sentences above classification 
ranges for certain offenses. These enhancements can be tacked onto offenses for which 
mandatory minimums have been triggered. Offense-related enhancements include 
sentencing penalties for offenders who commit a crime while released on bail for a prior 
offense, and for offenders convicted of carjacking, terrorism, or committing a class A, B, 
or C felony with a firearm or assault rifle. Penalty enhancements related to offenders’ 
criminal history are referred to as persistent offender penalties, and there are nine 
persistent offender categories in Connecticut’s sentencing laws. These categories govern 
persistent dangerous felony, dangerous sexual, serious felony, serious sexual, larceny, 
felony, DUI felony, bigotry/bias, and assault/stalking/trespassing/threatening offenders. 
For a persistent offender enhancement to be added, the offender must have previously 
been convicted of a specific offense and incarcerated for more than a year, or the 
defendant’s “history and character and the nature of the circumstances of the crime 
[must] indicate an extended period of incarceration and lifetime supervision serves the 
public interest” (Legislative Program Review & Investigations Committee, 2005: 14).  
Connecticut’s Suitability for an Assessment of Evidence-Based Sentencing 
Connecticut makes for an interesting location for a study on evidence-based 
sentencing and social inequality. Connecticut is more liberal and correspondingly less 
conservative than most other states in the US. Reducing demographic disparities, 
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especially racial disparities, has more consistently been a part of the liberal criminal 
justice reform agenda than the conservative one (Chammah, 2016; Democratic National 
Committee, 2017), which may mean that social disparities occupy a more prominent 
position in Connecticut’s sentencing reform discussions than other states’. That said, 
despite its demographic similarities to the US as a whole, racial disparity in imprisonment 
and income inequality are greater in Connecticut than in most other states, which may 
indicate that the state’s social ecology is less favorable toward marginalized groups than 
its political bent would suggest. 
With respect to its formalized sentencing practices, Connecticut exhibits more 
similarities to other states in the US. The development in the 1980’s of Connecticut’s 
sentencing system into a determinate scheme with mandatory minimums, truth-in-
sentencing laws, and greater sentencing structure was typical of state sentencing systems 
at the time; many other states made similar changes. This “tough on crime” approach led 
to harsh punishments in Connecticut that mirrored stiff sentences across the US. 
Likewise, many states have since transitioned back into primarily indeterminate 
sentencing schemes with active parole boards; 33 states, including Connecticut, currently 
run a more indeterminate sentencing system (Lawrence, 2015). 
Connecticut’s sentencing scheme also offers an opportunity to examine social 
inequality in a state without sentencing guidelines. Despite the fact that the majority of 
states do not have sentencing guidelines in place, most evaluations of extralegal 
sentencing disparities are conducted in states such as Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania 
that have sentencing guidelines (Griffin & Wooldredge, 2006; King & Johnson, 2016; 




guidelines enables this study to better capture social disparities due to individual 
decision-making in Connecticut’s current system. If the evaluation were conducted in a 
state with sentencing guidelines, it would be difficult to determine whether disparities 
observed in the current system were attributable to individual discretion or to differences 
triggered by the structure of the guidelines. Comparisons between disparities in 
Connecticut’s current sentencing system and disparities in an evidence-based system 
would likewise be less clear if sentencing guidelines were already in place. 
Finally, Connecticut has demonstrated a strong interest in using risk and needs 
instruments to guide criminal justice decision-making, making it an ideal state in which 
to conduct the present study of evidence-based sentencing. Its familiarity with the 
assessment of risk and its willingness to explore the various ways in which risk 
assessments may be useful in criminal courts help maximize the utility of the study for 
policy decision-making. The study can directly inform decisions about how to increase 
the effectiveness and fairness of sentencing, so the findings are most immediately 
beneficial if the Connecticut Sentencing Commission and the Connecticut General 
Assembly are open to an evidence-based sentencing policy. Given that the current study 
was set into motion as the result of a solicitation from the Connecticut Sentencing 
Commission for an evaluation of the viability of evidence-based sentencing, it is clear 




CHAPTER 5: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Applied principles from the decision theory literature serve as a guide for 
understanding sentencing decisions in the courtroom. The study of decision-making is a 
truly interdisciplinary enterprise. People make decisions and act on them in all aspects of 
life, which allows decision-making to be a subject of inquiry for a variety of disciplines, 
including political science, psychology, economics, philosophy, sociology, and legal 
studies (Slovic et al., 1977). Thus, considering insights from multiple disciplines can 
improve our understanding of decision-making both universally and in specific contexts, 
such as the criminal courtroom. In this case, sociolegal theories are embedded within 
concepts in behavioral economics, which is itself an integration of psychological and 
economics traditions, to explain sentencing decisions. This chapter describes a general 
decision theory framework for understanding human decision-making in conditions of 
uncertainty, then integrates behavioral economics and sociolegal perspectives on decision 
theory to provide explanations for why disparities may exist in Connecticut sentencing 
and why the integration of actuarial risk assessments may alter them. It concludes with a 
statement of the research aims for this study. 
Human Decision-Making and Choice Under Uncertainty: A Descriptive Framework 
People make decisions every day. Some decisions are simple, with full 
information and only a few clear-cut alternatives, while others are more complex, with 
missing information and countless fuzzy options. Decision theory is concerned with how 
a person arrives at his or her decisions (French, 1986). It seeks to identify the attitudes, 
beliefs, and desires that underlie a person’s choice and explain how that person used them 




Central to decision theory is the consideration of choice under uncertainty. Due to 
its roots in economics, mathematics, and even philosophy, much of classical decision 
theory assumes a rational decision-maker, such that choices are made logically with full 
information and well-defined preferences (French, 1986). However, full rationality is not 
a universally reasonable assumption. In many instances, the decision-maker has some of 
the relevant information but is also missing some or even most of it (Simon, 1957). It is 
the unknown factors that are relevant to a particular decision which constitute 
uncertainty; they are the things a decision-maker does not know but must know in order 
to make a perfectly rational decision. 
Uncertainty is a decidedly undesirable circumstance for decision-makers; people 
feel uncomfortable not knowing all information relevant to a particular decision they 
must make. There is some evidence that people experience greater levels of stress, both 
objective and subjective, when uncertainty is high (de Berker et al., 2016; Monat, Averill, 
& Lazarus, 1972). The idea can be demonstrated behaviorally as well; given conditions 
where rational subjects should be indifferent between two options in a choice set, subjects 
will choose the option with known risks over the option with unknown risks significantly 
more often than expected. This phenomenon, often referred to as ambiguity aversion, is 
well-documented in the empirical literature (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 1961; 
Keren & Gerritsen, 1999; Keynes, 1921). Thus, when presented with decisions that 
involve unknowns, decision-makers are motivated to find ways to reduce and otherwise 
cope with the uncertainty. 
According to Herbert Simon, in organizational contexts, some uncertainty can be 




but decision-makers will rarely be able to completely eliminate all the unknown elements 
relevant for a particular decision (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957). When 
confronted with a complex decision marked by conditions of uncertainty, the best that 
decision-makers can achieve is a bounded rationality that takes into account incomplete 
information and cognitive limitations. In this state of bounded rationality, decision-
making is suboptimal. Decision-makers look for “satisficing” solutions to problems, 
which aren’t necessarily the best, but are instead simply perceived to be good enough to 
achieve the intended goals.  
Decision theory identifies and prescribes a variety of methods for coping with 
uncertainty and identifying satisficing solutions (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 
1977). One concept discussed among these methods is heuristics, or rules of cognitive 
inference that help reduce the perceived (though not actual) complexity of a decision 
(Scholz, 1983). Heuristics are mental shortcuts; though they result in incomplete 
thinking, they also help reduce cognitive strain. Heuristics often have some level of 
validity, such that they can improve accuracy at least part of the time, but reliance on 
heuristics to make particular decisions may result in biases, or systematic errors in 
estimation and decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).   
As an example, one popular heuristic in prescriptive decision theory is RQP: 
reduce, quantify, and plug (Cohen et al., 1985; Janis & Mann, 1977). According to the 
general rules of RQP, when confronted with uncertainty, decision-makers should first 
reduce uncertainty by searching for as much relevant information as possible. Then they 
should quantify the magnitude of irreducible uncertainty (whatever uncertainty remains 




scheme that considers uncertainty as a factor that should be used to determine the best 
available decision. Though this rather rigorous heuristic may be useful in some instances, 
its implementation is unrealistic in especially complex situations; when environmental 
uncertainty is very high, collecting additional information may not be feasible due to time 
and resource constraints, or it may reduce uncertainty by only a negligible amount. 
Instead of using mechanical optimization formulas to make decisions under uncertainty, 
Simon and other scholars suggest that decision-makers more often use simpler heuristics, 
ones with fewer steps that require less cognitive effort to complete (Simon, 1957; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These heuristics can sometimes even be triggered 
automatically and below the level of consciousness (Kahneman, 2011).  
This is the general framework in which insights from the behavioral economics 
and sociolegal perspectives can be integrated to explain judicial decision-making in the 
absence of an evidence-based sentencing scheme. In conditions of uncertainty, decision-
makers are constrained to using a bounded rationality that produces suboptimal decisions 
and precipitates the use of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, in order to ease the cognitive 
load. Because the criminal courtroom is characterized by high levels of uncertainty, it is 
an especially interesting setting in which to consider this perspective on decision-making. 
In the next section of this chapter, several specific heuristics are discussed and linked to 
sociolegal theorizing where appropriate to explain sentencing patterns in Connecticut. 
Explaining Sentencing Disparities in Connecticut 
Connecticut does not have sentencing guidelines. Instead, the hallmark of 
Connecticut’s current sentencing structure is broad offense categories associated with 




circumstances of the offense undoubtedly provide context that can assist judges in 
determining where in the prescribed punishment range an offender should be sentenced, 
but the precise role that these factors play in sentencing is not formally dictated by law. 
Thus, judicial discretion in Connecticut’s system is less constrained than judicial 
discretion in other states; judges have the power to assign a relatively wide variety of 
sentences to offenders that have similar case characteristics. This freedom, combined 
with the uncertainty inherent in determining appropriate sentences, creates ample room 
for judges to incorporate heuristics into their decision-making process. 
The judgment heuristic acknowledges that people are often required to form an 
impression of something or someone in order to make a decision. This impression can be 
thought of in terms of a specific question that it answers. If, however, there is no 
satisfactory answer to the question that relies on little uncertainty and can be found with 
relative ease, decision-makers may opt instead to answer a related question that is more 
easily answered. The answer to the easier question then serves as a substitute for the 
(unknown) answer to the more complex question, saving the decision-maker some 
cognitive effort (Kahneman, 2011).  
The concept of the judgment heuristic has straightforward applications in judicial 
decision-making. Sentencing judges are asked to assign appropriate sentences to 
offenders, and the appropriateness of each sentence is determined by a wide variety of 
factors that may differ from case to case. This makes the sentencing task a very complex 
undertaking. In order to make the best possible decision in a case, the judge must assess 
and then incorporate the answers to a variety of questions, including but not limited to 




recidivate in the future?”. These are difficult questions to answer, as the judge has only 
limited information regarding the offense and the offender and cannot know exactly what 
will happen in the future. There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding her decision to 
assign a particular sentence. To cope with this uncertainty, the judge may use the 
judgment heuristic to inform her impression of the appropriate sentence. Rather than 
answering the question “How much punishment does this offender deserve?”, for 
instance, the judge may instead answer the question “How much punishment does this 
offender look like he deserves?”. Rather than answering the question “Will this offender 
recidivate in the future?”, the judge may instead answer the question “How much does 
this offender look like a recidivist?”. These substitutions generate more readily available 
impressions that can then be used to inform the sentencing decision. 
Two specific examples of the judgment heuristic that are particularly useful for 
understanding judicial discretion in a largely unregulated sentencing system are the 
closely related availability and representativeness heuristics. When using the availability 
heuristic, decision-makers evaluate the likelihood that an event has occurred or will occur 
by relying on the ease and speed with which examples of that event come to mind 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Thus, the decision-maker uses the answer to the question 
“Can I think of times when this event has happened before?” as a substitute for the 
answer to the harder question “What is the likelihood of this event happening?”. In a 
similar fashion, people using the representativeness heuristic evaluate the likelihood of an 
event being in a certain class by assessing the degree to which that event is similar to 
others in that class (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In this case, the substitute question is 




The availability and representativeness heuristics can be readily applied in a 
judicial decision-making context. When sentencing judges use the judgment heuristic to 
avoid answering questions riddled with uncertainty, such as “Will this offender recidivate 
in the future?”, they may use either or both of these heuristics to subconsciously choose 
the questions they substitute in. Using the availability heuristic, a judge may answer 
whether or not the offender will recidivate by thinking of other similar offenders who 
have recidivated before. Similarly, a judge may use the representativeness heuristic by 
assessing how much the offender resembles what the judge perceives to be the typical 
recidivist. If the judge can easily retrieve several instances of similar offenders who 
recidivated, or if the offender’s characteristics align with the characteristics of what the 
judge would think of as a typical recidivist, the judge may believe that the offender is 
very likely to recidivate and issue a harsher sentence accordingly. 
Predominant sociolegal perspectives on courtroom decision-making map onto this 
behavioral economics discussion rather seamlessly. In fact, Albonetti’s (1991) causal 
attribution theory begins with virtually the same premise, drawing on March and Simon’s 
(1958) ideas of uncertainty avoidance and bounded rationality in organizational settings 
(Simon, 1957).  Albonetti further traces their perspective by arguing that in the 
courtroom, sentencing judges manage high levels of uncertainty by building ‘patterned 
responses’ that take into account past experiences, attitudes, and believed stereotypes (see 
also Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980). This stereotyping, which refers to the process of drawing 
inferences about individuals based on their membership in a certain group or class 
(Lippman, 1922), is very similar to the use of availability and representativeness 




characteristics of a single person or event. Arguably, the stereotyping process is an 
example of heuristics in action, such that decision-makers who employ stereotypes are 
simply using cognitive rules such as “If this person has the same feature(s) as the group, I 
will assume this person behaves like I believe other members of the group behave.” 
Causal attribution theory links the idea of stereotypes with literature on causal 
attributions, which suggests that judgments of causality are based on personal and/or 
environmental factors that influence behavior (Carroll & Payne, 1976; Hawkins, 1980; 
Shaver, 1975).  Decision-makers rely on their assessments of these factors to determine 
the extent to which a person’s behavior is due to disposition rather than situational 
influences. The use of personal characteristics to infer behavioral causality can then result 
in decisions that consistently stereotype certain groups as being prone to a behavior. 
Thus, Albonetti (1991) theorizes:  
Based on the work on uncertainty avoidance and causal attribution in punishment, 
judges would attempt to manage uncertainty in the sentencing decision by 
developing “patterned responses” that are themselves the product of an attribution 
process influenced by causal judgments. Judges would rely on stereotypes that 
link race, gender, and outcomes from earlier processing stages to the likelihood of 
future criminal activity. (250) 
 This theory can explain why there may be sociodemographic disparities in 
Connecticut sentencing outcomes. If judges associate certain racial, ethnic, gender, and 
socioeconomic groups with recidivism, then those associations will be reflected in 
sentencing decisions that are determined in part by offenders’ likelihood of recidivism. 
Offenders who are members of groups that judges associate with recidivism, such as 
racial and ethnic minorities, would be expected to receive longer sentences, on average. 
 Steffensmeier and colleagues’ (1993; 1998) focal concerns theory expands upon 




sentencing outcomes. Rather than focusing solely on offenders’ likelihood of recidivism, 
Steffensmeier and colleagues suggest that judges have three focal concerns when 
determining appropriate punishments. The first of these is blameworthiness; judges 
determine how deserving offenders are of punishment by evaluating both the culpability 
of the offender and the seriousness of the offense. The second concern is community 
protection. This concern encompasses offenders’ likelihood of recidivism, which is the 
primary focus in Albonetti’s (1991) causal attribution theory, but also incorporates their 
potential dangerousness. Finally, the third category is referred to as practical constraints. 
This category includes both organizational concerns, such as jail and prison capacities, 
and individual concerns, such as offenders’ ability to serve time in prison.  
 Steffensmeier and colleagues (1993; 1998) argue that these three concerns guide 
judges’ sentencing decisions, and stereotypes that relate sociodemographic factors to any 
of the three concerns will lead to differential punishments. In the spirit of the sociological 
tradition, the authors discuss the cultural context in which stereotypes linking 
characteristics such as race, gender, and socioeconomic status to criminality emerge. 
Racial minorities, they suggest, and especially young black men, are portrayed in 
American culture as deviant, dangerous, unstable, and drug-involved (Gibbs, 1988). 
Frequent depictions by media mass of young black males as violent criminals perpetuate 
negative stereotypes about the group in the eyes of the public (Entman, 1992; Oliver, 
2003).  
 Similar observations can be made about stereotypes relating groups other than 
young black males to criminal behavior. Much like African Americans, Hispanic 




and trafficking (Curry & Corral-Comacho, 2008; Richey-Mann et al., 2006), and violence 
(Beckett & Sasson, 2003; Holmes et al., 2008; Welch et al., 2011). They are also often 
stereotyped as illegal immigrants (Curry & Corral-Comacho, 2008). Young men, due to 
their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, may likewise invoke attributions 
of criminality and guilt (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Nagel & Hagan, 1983), and 
characteristics of low SES, such as little educational attainment and unemployment, are 
likewise correlated with crime and may therefore lead to attributions of criminality and 
criminal responsibility (Freeman, 2006; Green, 1970; Thornberry et al., 1985). These 
typifications make it easier for decision-makers to associate minorities, men, and low-
SES individuals with factors related to sentencing such as blameworthiness, 
dangerousness, recidivism, and ability to serve prison time. Despite good intentions and 
sometimes even anti-bias training, judges may still be susceptible to allowing these 
stereotypes to influence their decisions. 
 Thus, sociolegal approaches to characterizing courtroom decision-making, such as 
causal attribution theory and focal concerns theory, complement behavioral economics 
perspectives by providing the theoretical link between sentencing disparities and 
decision-makers’ tendency to use heuristics to make difficult choices. The combination of 
these approaches explains why one might observe extralegal disparities related to 
race/ethnicity, gender, and SES in sentencing outcomes in Connecticut.  
Altering Patterns of Disparity Using Evidence-Based Sentencing 
 Additional theorizing is needed to explain why providing risk assessment 
information to judges at the time of sentencing could be expected to alter sentencing 




to acknowledge explicitly that judges evaluate offenders’ risk of recidivism regardless of 
whether they are provided with actuarial risk assessments. Utilitarian perspectives on 
punishment emphasize the importance of linking punishment severity to offenders’ 
likelihood of future criminal behavior (Spohn, 2009; von Hirsch, 1976). Perceptions of 
offender risk occupy a prominent position in sociolegal theories of punishment; causal 
attribution theory posits that it is attributions relating sociodemographic characteristics to 
risk of recidivism that lead to disadvantages at sentencing, while focal concerns theory 
specifies “community protection”, which encompasses offenders’ risk, as one of the three 
primary concerns judges have when issuing sentences (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1998). Interviews with judges in Pennsylvania also indicate that risk of future 
criminal involvement is a key consideration when punishment decisions are made 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). 
 Moreover, judicial perceptions of offenders’ risk are likely informed in part by 
factors captured in actuarial risk assessments even in the absence of evidence-based 
sentencing. The LSI-R, for example, captures information about a variety of aspects of 
offender’s criminal history, ranging from prior convictions and incarcerations to more 
unique aspects such as institutional conduct and escape history, that are available in 
judges’ case files. Information represented in other LSI-R domains, such as employment 
status, residential stability, mental health status, and alcohol/drug problems, may also be 
known to judges at sentencing. This information may be provided in case files, but it may 
also be learned through questioning, or judges may be able to infer it through observation 




 The incorporation of actuarial risk assessment information into sentencing effects 
a change in the way that judges formulate their perceptions of offenders’ risk. Even 
without actuarial assessments, judges conduct informal risk evaluations. Some elements 
of recidivism risk may be known to judges at sentencing, but there is still much 
uncertainty surrounding how likely each offender is to recidivate. This uncertainty invites 
judges to supplement their knowledge of case information with stereotypes when 
evaluating risk. The addition of actuarial risk information, though, should reduce judges’ 
uncertainty about offender risk, thereby reducing judges’ need to rely on stereotypes to 
inform their risk perceptions. In this way, introducing actuarial risk assessments may 
reduce the amount of sociodemographic disparities attributable to judicial decision-
making; less reliance on stereotypes may translate to less of a disadvantage at sentencing 
for often-stereotyped groups.  
At the same time, even as actuarial risk assessments decrease the use of 
stereotypes and reduce disparities in sentencing due to individual judicial decision-
making, they may also introduce their own structural disparities into the sentencing 
process. Many predictors of recidivism that are captured in actuarial risk assessments also 
correlate with sociodemographic characteristics (Hannah-Moffat, 2005, 2009, 2013; 
Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b), which can lead to higher risk assessment scores 
for certain groups. Prior research provides evidence in support of this possibility; black, 
Hispanic, male, and low-SES offenders receive higher average risk scores on some risk 
assessment instruments (Manchak et al., 2009; Monahan, Skeem, & Lowenkamp, 2017; 




scores will translate into perceptions of offenders in those groups as riskier, and will lead 
to harsher punishment for those offenders at sentencing. 
 Thus, this discussion distinguishes between two potential sources of disparity in 
sentencing. The first source is judicial discretion; the use of stereotypes may translate into 
punishment disadvantages for some offenders. This source of disparity is posited to be 
influential particularly in Connecticut’s current sentencing system, where judges are not 
provided with risk assessment information and uncertainty regarding offenders’ risk of 
recidivism is high. The second potential source of disparity is structural; here disparities 
are not due to individual decisions made by judges, but are instead attributable to 
institutionalized sentencing policies that favor some offenders over others. In 
Connecticut, actuarial risk assessment information may be a structural source of disparity 
in sentencing, because certain groups of offenders will receive higher risk scores. Though 
the implementation of evidence-based sentencing in Connecticut may reduce disparity 
attributable to judicial decision-making, it may also introduce a new structural source of 
disparity in punishment. This dual effect makes it unclear whether net social inequality 
would increase or decrease under an evidence-based sentencing scheme. 
 Additionally, the introduction of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing has the 
potential to increase the impact of risk evaluation on punishment. To understand this 
possibility, it is useful to place risk assessment scores in the framework of what Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008) refer to as “choice architecture”, or the design of the context in 
which decisions are made. As Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 3) note, “small and apparently 
insignificant details can have major impacts on people’s behavior.” Large, noticeable 




as the order in which choices are presented or the decision aids that are provided are both 
part of a decision’s choice architecture and can both influence the resultant decision 
(Johnson et al., 2012). Small, seemingly nonintrusive aspects of the choice architecture 
are referred to as “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein). Nudges can alter people’s decisions in a 
predictable fashion, but they do not go so far as to limit the number of available options 
or change decision-makers’ incentives. To borrow Thaler and Sunstein’s example, 
“Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not” (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008: 6). 
Risk assessment scores can be viewed as a nudge in the choice architecture of 
judicial decision-making. Even if judges are not required to use the risk score information 
in their decision-making, the fact that they have access to a score that represents 
defendants’ risk level makes the likelihood of recidivism more salient as a sentencing 
determinant. Risk scores therefore prompt judges to weight defendants’ risk of recidivism 
more in their decision-making. When judges are presented with defendants’ risk scores, 
they may even feel compelled to fall back on deterrence and/or incapacitation (two 
purposes for which risk of recidivism is informative) as the primary goal of the sentence, 
displacing other concerns such as retribution. The highlighting of defendants’ recidivism 
risk, as well as the subtle emphasis on forward-looking purposes of punishment like 
deterrence and incapacitation, will nudge judges to alter their decision-making calculus 
and produce sentences that are more heavily impacted by risk evaluation.  
 Evidence-based sentencing has great potential to alter judicial decision-making 
and patterns of social inequality in Connecticut. The reduction of uncertainty in risk 




inform sentencing while simultaneously introducing structural sources of 
sociodemographic disparities. Risk assessments may also increase the salience of 
recidivism risk and encourage judges to place more value on risk evaluation in the 
decision-making process. With this theorizing in mind, it is important to observe both 
current patterns of disparities in Connecticut and how the implementation of evidence-
based sentencing would shape them. 
Statement of Research Aims 
The first general research aim in this study is to address the possibility that 
extralegal disparities exist in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme, and to assess 
whether or not they are related to legal case characteristics and additional factors 
captured in risk assessments. Taken altogether, behavioral economics principles 
complemented by sociolegal theorizing suggests that sociodemographic disparities in 
sentencing outcomes are in part the result of judges’ use of heuristics and stereotyping to 
reduce uncertainty regarding appropriate punishments. Shackled by time constraints and 
incomplete information, judges make attributions about offenders based on observable 
characteristics such as race/ethnicity, gender, and SES and then use those attributions to 
inform sentencing decisions. Some groups, including racial and ethnic minorities, males, 
and low-SES people, are more likely to be stereotyped as possessing undesirable qualities 
(criminality, violence, etc.), which in turn leads to judges issuing them harsher sentences. 
The first research question speaks to this possibility. 
RQ1: To what extent are there aggregate sociodemographic disparities in 




Aggregate, or unconditional disparities in sentencing may result from factors 
other than just stereotypes, however; past research tends to conclude that the bulk of the 
variation in sentencing outcomes is due to differences in legal factors such as offense 
seriousness and criminal history (Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 2000). Still, scholarship sometimes 
observes small but significant disparities in sentencing according to race, ethnicity, 
gender, and socioeconomic status even after accounting for legal and case processing 
factors (Baumer, 2013; Bontrager et al., 2013; D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993; Spohn, 
2000; Zatz, 2000). In light of these findings and the combination of behavioral economics 
and sociolegal theorizing, the second research question considers whether or not 
disparities in sentencing outcomes will still be observed after accounting for legal factors 
and case processing variables. 
RQ2: To what extent can aggregate sociodemographic disparities be explained by 
legally relevant offense and case characteristics? 
It is also possible that sociodemographic disparities may emerge through other 
indirect pathways that are not always modeled in sentencing evaluations. Scholars posit, 
for example, that family characteristics such as marital status influence judicial decision-
making by altering perceptions of both the harshness of a prison sentence (due to 
separation from family) and defendants’ informal social control, leading to an advantage 
at sentencing for married offenders as well as women (Bickle & Peterson, 1991; Daly, 
1989; Freiburger, 2010). These variables are either missing or incompletely captured in 
much sentencing research. Additionally, the study captures several unique variables for 
which there has been less theorizing that may also impact sociodemographic disparities in 




study capitalizes on the wide variety of domains captured in the LSI-R risk assessment 
instrument to account for these factors and substantially reduce the potential for omitted 
variable bias that often plagues traditional sentencing research. Once the full battery of 
extralegal factors is considered, it is possible that sociodemographic disparities will be 
rendered insignificant; racial/ethnic, gender, and SES disparities may be fully explained 
by a combination of legal, case processing, and LSI-R risk factors. On the other hand, 
residual disparities may remain, as the factors included in this study cannot capture 
stereotyping effects that influence judges’ perceptions of blameworthiness, community 
protection, and practical considerations.  
RQ3: To what extent can observed sociodemographic disparities be explained by 
additional factors captured in risk assessment scores that are not often 
represented in sentencing evaluations? 
  These research questions are designed to facilitate a stepwise assessment that can 
first identify aggregate sociodemographic disparities before attempting to account for 
them using legal and extralegal factors. In this way, the first phase of the study expands 
on other work, such as Spohn’s (2008) and Ulmer and colleagues’ (2016) research, that 
identifies legal and extralegal mechanisms that mediate sociodemographic 
disproportionality in sentencing. This study advances that literature by considering a 
variety of defendant characteristics often identified as potentially important predictors of 
sentencing but rarely captured in sentencing evaluations. 
The second general research aim in the study is to assess whether sentencing 
outcomes based on additional information from risk assessments are likely to mitigate or 




based sentencing would generate sociodemographic (particularly racial) disparities in 
sentencing because the correlates of recidivism captured in risk assessment instruments 
such as the LSI-R are also related to defendants’ demographic characteristics (Hannah-
Moffat, 2005, 2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b). For example, even 
though race and ethnicity may not be an explicit consideration in the LSI-R, if black and 
Hispanic defendants are more likely to spend their free time engaging in unstructured 
activities or have primarily criminal companions, then race and ethnicity may operate 
indirectly through these factors, which are explicitly considered, and generate disparities 
in risk assessment scores. Prior research indicates that these concerns may be well-
founded; a few studies observe that black, Hispanic, male, and low-SES offenders receive 
higher risk scores from validated risk assessment tools (Manchak et al., 2009; Monahan, 
Skeem, & Lowenkamp, 2017; Skeem & Lowenkamp, 2016; Skeem, Monahan, & 
Lowenkamp, 2016).
3
 The next research question addresses this prospect. 
RQ4: To what extent are there sociodemographic disparities in LSI-R composite 
and domain scores? 
Because evidence-based sentencing entails the incorporation of risk scores into 
sentence decision-making, sociodemographic disparities in risk assessments like the LSI-
R may translate into sociodemographic disparities in evidence-based sentencing 
outcomes. Other legal considerations such as offense classes, criminal records, and 
mandatory minimum penalties would undoubtedly continue to influence sentencing 
outcomes in an evidence-based system, most likely retaining their positions as the most 
powerful predictors, but risk scores may still shape patterns of disparity in sentencing.  
                                                          
3
 Results for gender differences, though, are somewhat mixed. A few studies find that women receive 




By examining patterns of sociodemographic disparity in a simplified evidence-
based sentencing scenario, this possibility can be investigated. Connecticut has not 
implemented an evidence-based sentencing scheme, so evidence-based sentences cannot 
be observed. They would represent a counterfactual to the sentences that were actually 
issued to offenders during the study period. However, evidence-based sentences can be 
simulated, which enables the researcher to offer preliminary predictions about what 
patterns of disparity would look like if Connecticut did incorporate the LSI-R into 
sentencing. The fifth research question therefore addresses whether simulated sentences 
based on risk assessment scores are likely to result in sociodemographic disparities.  
RQ5: To what extent are there sociodemographic disparities in simulated 
evidence-based sentencing outcomes? 
 The final research question in this study addresses the oft-mentioned concern that 
evidence-based sentencing may actually make extralegal disparities in sentencing worse. 
Several scholars have argued that incorporating risk assessments into sentencing would 
result in harsher sentences for certain groups relative to others (Hannah-Moffat, 2005, 
2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b). These disparities could be due to 
the indirect influence of membership statuses on other risk factors, such as the association 
between race and prior criminal history.  
However, to the researcher’s knowledge, the efficacy of this argument has not 
been assessed empirically. It is indeed possible that in Connecticut, the incorporation of 
risk assessments would result in wider sentencing gaps based on race, ethnicity, gender, 
and SES. Black, Hispanic, male, and low-SES offenders may receive even harsher 




empirical literature on sociodemographic disparities in non-evidence-based sentencing 
systems indicates that disparities exist in at least some circumstances (Baumer, 2013; 
Bontrager et al., 2013; Spohn, 2000), it is also possible that evidence-based sentences 
would result in similar or even smaller disparities. Risk assessments like the LSI-R 
consider such a wide range of risk factors that the impact of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
SES may be diluted. This study will thus inform this debate by determining whether the 
use of risk assessments at sentencing has the potential to exacerbate or alleviate 
disparities.  
RQ6: To what extent do sociodemographic disparities have the potential to be 
larger or smaller if Connecticut transitioned to an evidence-based sentencing 
system? 
In conclusion, this study will assess disparities in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing system as well as consider the potential impact of a shift toward evidence-
based sentencing, by evaluating disparities in a simulated evidence-based sentencing 
scenario. Based on theorizing and prior research, it is probable that sentencing disparities 
will be apparent in both Connecticut’s current system and in the evidence-based scenario, 
but it is less clear in which system the disparities might be greater. The next chapter 





CHAPTER 6: DATA AND METHODS 
 One of the several ways in which this dissertation contributes to the courts 
literature is by introducing a unique dataset that combines official court records with 
detailed information on LSI-R risk assessments administered at or near the time of 
sentencing. This chapter begins by describing the various types of data that are used in 
the project. It then discusses the dependent, independent, and control variables used in 
analyses before concluding with an outline of the analytic strategy that is used to evaluate 
the research questions laid out in the previous chapter. 
Datasets 
 The data for this project were derived from a series of four separate datasets 
provided to the researcher by the Connecticut Judicial Branch Court Support Services 
Division (CSSD), a division of the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch that provides, 
among other operations, administrative services and research development.
4,5
 The first 
dataset in this collection (hereafter referred to as “case data”) constitutes a full history of 
court verdicts for any offender processed in a Connecticut Superior Court for a criminal 
offense at least once during fiscal years 2008-2010. The unit of analysis in the dataset is 
one case, which is defined as one verdict date for one offender.
6
 Each offender 
                                                          
4
 After consulting with a representative from the Connecticut Judicial Branch, the researcher is confident 
that the data recorded in this study’s datasets are valid and accurately reflect the characteristics of each 
offender, offense, sentence, and risk assessment. 
5
 The researcher was provided with a total of 17 separate datasets in order to conduct the evaluation of 
evidence-based sentencing initially solicited by the Connecticut Sentencing Commission (see page 51). 
Only four of them are needed to conduct the dissertation project. 
6
 The original unit of analysis in the case data was a single charge. Thus, if Offender A was given a verdict 
for three different charge counts on a single date, each count constituted a single observation in the dataset, 
and Offender A was represented in three different observations. Using the “reshape” command in STATA 
14.2, the researcher reorganized the dataset to generate a new dataset in which the unit of analysis is a 
verdict date for a single offender. After the transformation, Offender A’s three count verdicts issued on the 
same day are represented in a single observation. If Offender A was issued a verdict for a fourth charge on 




represented in the case data may have court cases processed prior to FY 2008 or after FY 
2010 included in the dataset, but all offenders represented have at least one court case 
processed during FY 2008-FY 2010 that are included. For each observation, the case data 
contains information regarding charging information, offense statutes, court dispositions, 
and sentences issued. Court cases processed prior to FY 2008 were used to generate a 
count of all prior convictions in the state of Connecticut for each offender in the dataset. 
Cases processed after FY 2010, cases processed in juvenile court, cases that did not result 
in a conviction, and cases for which the most severe charge was a violation of probation, 
infraction, or traffic violation were also removed. This removal culled the dataset from 
658,545 cases to 103,117 cases. 63,521 unique offenders are represented in the case data. 
The second dataset (“statute data”) includes information about each criminal offense 
described in the Connecticut penal code. Specifically, the statute data include the name, 
statute number, type, class, seriousness, and general offense category for each unique 
offense. 
 The third dataset is an offender population list (hereafter referred to as 
“demographic data”) that includes the unique identification numbers of all offenders 
processed through the Connecticut Judicial Branch during the study period.  The 
demographic data also contains demographic information, specifically race/ethnicity, 
gender, and age, for each offender. 70,220 offenders are represented in this dataset. 
The fourth dataset (“LSI-R data”) is data on all LSI-R risk assessment evaluations 
administered to offenders by trained probation officers or other staff at the CSSD. In the 
LSI-R data, each observation is a single risk assessment. Offenders appear more than 




during, or after the study period. Risk assessments may be conducted as part of 
presentence investigations, or they may be conducted as intake, reassessment, or 
discharge evaluations during a probation sentence. The LSI-R data capture individual 
item scores, domain-specific subscores, and composite risk scores, as well as the date the 
risk assessment was administered and information about educational attainment, marital 
status, and employment. The dataset initially represented 207,572 assessments, but 
89,198 were removed because they were administered more than one year before or after 
the study period, and 2,998 were removed due to missing information on one or more 
LSI-R item scores, leaving 115,276 eligible risk assessments in the dataset. 
Data Compilation 
The first time each offender is charged with a crime in a Connecticut criminal 
court, he/she is assigned a unique identification number catalogued in the Connecticut 
Case Management Information System (CMIS). This ID number follows the offender 
throughout subsequent Connecticut court cases, such that each offender is intended to 
receive only one ID number per lifetime. This ID number is included in the case data, 
demographic data, and LSI-R data and serves as the primary linking variable for these 
datasets.  
Figure 6.1 shows a diagram of the data linking process. The researcher began the 
compilation procedure by linking case data to statute data using statute codes. In effect, 




charge for each case in the case data.
7
 In the next step, the researcher used ID numbers to 
link demographic data to each case represented in the case data.  
The researcher then linked LSI-R data to the augmented case data. In the LSI-R 
data, risk assessments are associated with ID numbers but not court cases. Because a 
single ID number could be associated with multiple risk assessments and/or multiple 
court cases, the researcher used a three-step approach to match risk assessments to 
particular conviction dates. In the first step of this process, the researcher linked every 
risk assessment administered to each offender during the study period to every court case 
for that offender during the study period. To illustrate, if an offender received three risk 
assessments and was convicted on two different days during the study period, the 
procedure yielded six observations for that offender. In the second step of the process, 
assessment-conviction pairings were dropped if the assessment occurred more than one 
year (365 days) prior to or after the conviction. In Connecticut, risk assessments are 
considered valid for one year; as a result, a risk assessment administered less than one 
year prior to the verdict can be used as part of the pre-trial investigation and considered 
current (B. Sperry, personal communication, 1/28/2018). Removing assessments that 
occurred over one year away from their associated verdicts ensures that this study 
remains consistent with Connecticut’s risk assessment expiration policy.
8
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 Unclassified felonies and misdemeanors were not assigned an offense type in the statutes data, so the 
researcher manually categorized unclassified felonies and misdemeanor offenses into the broad offense 
type categories used in this project. Nearly all of the unclassified offenses were drug offenses. 
8
 Supplementary analysis indicates that LSI-R risk assessment scores may change over time within 
offenders. Using all offenders in the full LSI-R dataset who were administered more than one risk 
assessment (n=35,629), the researcher identified the distribution of score differences over time [difference 
= (score at time T2) – (score at time T1)]. Among all offenders, the mean difference is -1.00 with a 
standard deviation of 6.00, indicating a slight average decrease in LSI-R scores over time but substantial 
variation around this point estimate. Descriptive statistics partitioned by time elapsed indicate that there is 




The third step in the matching process involved identifying and selecting from 
among instances where a single conviction date was still paired with multiple risk 
assessments. Some offenders received more than one risk assessment during a single 
sentence term, while others were administered risk assessments both before and after 
their conviction dates. For example, an offender could receive an intake assessment, two 
reassessments, and a discharge assessment for the same probation sentence. Or an 
offender could receive one risk assessment six months prior to their conviction date 
(perhaps as a discharge interview following a previous probation term) and then receive a 
second intake assessment for the current probation term.  Because this project focuses on 
the influence of risk assessments administered at or near the time of sentencing, only the 
closest assessment linked to each conviction date was retained for analysis. 
Dependent Variables 
 The primary outcome used in this project represents the punishment given to each 
defendant.
9
 This variable, incarceration length, captures the number of months of 
incarceration ordered for each offender following a conviction.
10
 For offenders who 
received a split sentence, this variable is measured as the length of the incarceration term, 
irrespective of the length of probation. For offenders who did not receive a sentence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than when the assessments are more than one year apart (s.d.=6.16), though variation is noteworthy in both 
groups. 
9
 Because the case data were originally organized such that each charge was its own observation, each 
conviction was assigned its own sentence in the original dataset. Some offenders with multiple convictions 
on a single verdict date had a sentence associated with only one of those convictions (the remaining 
convictions had been assigned a 0 for all sentence length variables), while other offenders with multiple 
convictions on a single verdict date had different sentences associated with each conviction. After the case 
data was transformed to allow for each observation to be one offender rather than one charge, the 
incarceration lengths for each count on a single date were summed to produce a single incarceration 
sentence issued to one offender on one date. A variable identifying concurrent and consecutive sentences 
was used to identify and keep only the longest concurrent sentence for each verdict date. 
10
 In the case data, the researcher is unable to distinguish sentences of incarceration from sentences of full 
time served, where the entirety of an offender’s incarceration sentence was served in pretrial detention. 
Sentences of time served are therefore treated as incarceration sentences, and the amount of time served is 




involving any incarceration, this variable is measured as 0. In all analyses, incarceration 
encompasses both jail and prison sentences. This study’s modeling strategy (discussed 
below) models two distinct components of this single variable: whether or not the 
sentence length is measured as 0, which captures the decision to incarcerate as a binary 
in/out outcome, and the value of the sentence length in cases where the value is greater 
than 0, which captures the sentence length decision. 
 A second dependent variable is used in one phase of the project. This variable, 
composite LSI-R score, is measured as an interval variable ranging from 0 to 54. It can be 
understood as a composite of the 10 LSI-R domain scores detailed throughout this 
chapter (see Appendix B). A higher score indicates a higher risk of recidivism.  
Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variables in these analyses are several demographic 
characteristics often implicated for their extralegal influences on punishment outcomes. 
Race/ethnicity is measured as a series of dichotomous variables capturing whether the 
defendant is black, Hispanic, or Asian.
11
 Whites are used as the reference category in all 
models. These racial/ethnic categories are mutually exclusive.
12
 Gender is captured as a 
dichotomous variable in which females are measured as 0 and males are measured as 1.
13
  
Socioeconomic status is measured using several variables, most of which are drawn 
directly from the LSI-R risk assessment administered to each defendant. Though 
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 The dataset also included 66 American Indian or Alaskan native offenders, who were excluded due to 
their infrequent occurrence in the data. 
12
 Multi-racial defendants may have unique experiences in the criminal justice system and be subject to 
unique treatment during sentencing, and it is possible that some of the defendants in this project’s sample 
identify as more than one race or ethnicity. Racial/ethnic information was provided to the researcher in a 
mutually exclusive format, however, such that multi-racial defendants cannot be identified in these data. 
13
 Race, ethnicity, and gender dummies are used as individual indicators as well as components of 
interaction terms capturing the effect on punishment of being a young minority male, a group which prior 




socioeconomic status has been operationalized using a wide variety of factors and 
combinations of factors, it is generally acknowledged that socioeconomic status is 
determined by a combination of education, occupation, and income (Grusky, 2001). 
Taking advantage of the breadth of variables included in the LSI-R, this project is able to 
include measures that touch on all three of these socioeconomic status dimensions.  
Education is captured using a set of four dichotomous variables indicating 
whether the defendant has completed tenth grade, has a high school degree, has 
completed at least some college, or has obtained some post-graduate education. 
Completion of less than a tenth-grade education serves as the reference category. 
Employment is captured using two dichotomous variables indicating whether the 
defendant was employed or a student full-time at the time of sentencing, and whether the 
defendant was employed or a student part-time at the time of sentencing. Unemployed 
non-students and other non-working offenders are the reference category.
14
 Financial 
situation is captured using two variables. The first finance variable is a dichotomous 
measure that indicates whether the defendant was reliant upon government assistance at 
the time of sentencing. The second finance variable is a 4-point ordinal “problems” scale 
indicating whether the defendant has a satisfactory financial situation with no need for 
improvement (coded as 0), a relatively satisfactory financial situation with some room for 
improvement evident (coded as 1), a relatively unsatisfactory financial situation with a 
need for improvement (coded as 2), or a very unsatisfactory situation with a very clear 
and strong need for improvement (coded as 3).
15
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 The two employment measures are drawn from CSSD official records rather than from LSI-R risk 
assessment items. 
15
 This financial satisfaction variable is more subjective than a traditional financial measure such as income 





Legal and Case Processing Variables. In order to provide a more detailed 
picture of sentencing disparities, the analyses also include several legally prescribed 
sentencing predictors and case processing factors that have been empirically shown to 
predict sentencing outcomes and may account for some portion of observed 
sociodemographic disparities in sentencing. Offense type is captured using five 
dichotomous variables indicating whether the most serious conviction offense is a 
violent, property, drug, sex, or weapons offense. Public order offenses are used as the 
reference category. Offense seriousness is measured in a series of eleven dichotomous 
variables that represent the offense severity classification system used by the Connecticut 
Judicial Branch (see p. 52, Table 4.1).  Offenses may be labeled as a class A (murder), A, 
B, C, D, E, or U felony, or as a class A, B, C, D, or U misdemeanor.
16
 Class A 
misdemeanors are the modal category and serve as the reference group.  
In an effort to better capture the nuances of criminal histories and measure their 
impact on sentencing outcomes, the analyses employ two separate measures of criminal 
history. The first measure is a count variable indicating the number of prior adult 
conviction dates each offender had in Connecticut, drawn from the Connecticut Judicial 
Branch’s administrative data. This count is right-censored at 12.
17
 The second measure of 
criminal history is the criminal history domain score, drawn directly from each offender’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
structure. The measure also taps into other aspects of defendants’ economic well-being, including financial 
security, wealth, and access to resources (Sumarwan & Hira, 1993). 
16
 Capital felony offenses were removed from the dataset to avoid identification, per the Connecticut 
Sentencing Commission’s request (n=4, though only 2 had complete data and would have been included in 
the final dataset). 
17
 Though there was no clear drop-off point in the distribution of prior convictions, censoring was needed; 
the maximum number of prior convictions was 161. The researcher chose 12 because this was the point at 
which the number of cases with each value fell below 1% of the total sample. This decision led to 4.5% of 





LSI-R risk assessment. The criminal history score ranges from 0-10 and is calculated 
using ten LSI-R items that capture prior and current adult convictions, juvenile arrests, 
incarceration history, institutional escape history, institutional misconduct, past 
supervision violations, and history of violence. A full list of the items used to construct 
the criminal history score is available in Appendix B. This score is much more 
comprehensive in its consideration of past behavior than the number of conviction counts 
and is used to complement the more traditional conviction count measure. 
The number of current convictions is measured as a count variable and capped at 
5.
18
 To approximate the potential effects of having committed an offense while under 
criminal justice supervision, the analyses also incorporate a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the defendant was charged with a violation of probation in addition to 
the primary offense.
19
 Mandatory minimum application is captured using a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether or not the most severe offense committed is associated with a 
traditional or presumptive mandatory minimum. To account for potential period effects, 
two additional dichotomous variables indicate whether the conviction occurred in FY 
2009 or FY 2010. FY 2008 serves as the reference group. 
Prior literature highlights the presence of a plea discount, such that defendants 
who plead guilty receive lighter sentences than comparable defendants who are convicted 
at trial (Abrams, 2011b; King et al., 2005). In this study, the researcher is unable to 
directly capture mode of conviction. However, these analyses do use three measures to 
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 Without censoring, the number of current convictions ranged from 1 to 31. As was the case for prior 
convictions, the cap for current convictions was set at 5 because this was the point at which the number of 
cases with each value fell below 1% of the total sample. This decision led to 1.8% of the sample being 
censored. Sensitivity analyses indicate that the study’s findings are not affected by this decision. 
19
 Probation violations are included in the analysis only if they constitute new offenses; violations of 





approximate plea bargaining. Count bargaining is measured as a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether defendants received fewer conviction counts than charge counts. If 
any counts were dropped between charging and conviction, this variable is labeled 1; 
otherwise, the variable is counted as 0. Charge bargaining is measured using two 
variables. First, charge reductions are measured as a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether defendants’ highest conviction offense falls into a lower offense severity 
category than their highest charged offense. If the highest conviction offense severity is 
lower than the highest charge offense severity based on Connecticut’s offense severity 
classification, the variable is labeled 1; otherwise, the variable receives a value of 0. 
Second, to capture plea deals in which mandatory minimums are avoided, a dichotomous 
variable will indicate whether or not defendants’ filing charges involved a mandatory 
minimum but their conviction charges did not. For offenders who were charged with a 
mandatory minimum offense but were not convicted of one, this variable is labeled 1. For 
all other offenders, this variable is measured as 0.
20
  
Risk Factors. In addition to the legal and case processing variables, a wide range 
of other defendant risk factors are included as sentencing predictors. Age at sentencing is 
represented using a set of categorical variables indicating whether the offender is age 18-
24, 25-34, 35-44, or 45+. 18-24 year-old offenders will be the reference group. This 
ordinal measure of age is used because it allows for nonlinear relationships to 
characterize age disparities (Steffensmeier et al., 1995). The inclusion of several domain 
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 It is possible that charges may be reduced or counts/mandatory minimum may be dropped due to 
circumstances other than plea deals; for instance, prosecutors may drop charges of their own accord or 
judges may throw out charges due to insufficient evidence. There are also other forms of plea bargaining, 
such as fact bargaining and sentence bargaining, that are not captured in these measures, and defendants 
may plead guilty without obtaining any concessions in return. Still, the prominence of count and especially 
charge bargaining are well-acknowledged in the empirical literature (Ball, 2006; Piehl & Bushway, 2007, 
Shermer & Johnson, 2010), and it is expected that these measures will together create the best 




scores drawn from the LSI-R risk assessment makes the evaluation of Connecticut’s 
current sentencing scheme particularly unique, because these scores introduce defendant 
characteristics that are very rarely available in sentencing evaluations but may play a 
pivotal role in explaining sociodemographic disparities. Domain scores are constructed 
using two or more LSI-R items. Each item contributes either 0 points or 1 point to the 
domain score; thus, the minimum domain score is 0 and the maximum domain score is 
equal to the number of items in that domain. A higher domain score indicates a less 
satisfactory or less desirable situation.  
A full list of the items used in the calculation of each domain in the LSI-R is 
available as Appendix B.
21
 The family and marital domain is comprised of four items that 
cover dissatisfaction with marital situation, non-rewarding parental and other relative 
situations, and criminal family members. Because the family and marital domain of the 
LSI-R does not include an explicit indicator of marital status (but marital status is 
recorded at the time of the assessment), a supplementary dichotomous variable indicates 
whether or not the offender is married. 
The accommodation domain is comprised of three items that cover living 
arrangement satisfaction, residential stability, and whether defendants live in a high crime 
neighborhood. The leisure/recreation domain is comprised of two items that cover 
participation in organized activities and whether or not defendants could make better use 
of their time. The companions domain is comprised of five items that capture social 
isolation as well as how many criminal and anti-criminal friends and acquaintances the 
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 Two of the ten risk domains are discussed above; the criminal history domain score is grouped with other 
legal factors, and the two questions that comprise the financial domain are both used as indicators of SES. 
Additionally, because education and employment are both used as indicators of SES, the 




defendant has. The alcohol and drug domain is comprised of nine items that cover past 
and present alcohol/drug problems, family alcohol/drug problems, law violations and 
interference with school/work, and medical treatment for drug/alcohol problems. The 
emotional/personal domain is comprised of five items that cover mental health 
interference, past and present treatments, and psychological assessments. The 
attitudes/orientations domain is comprised of four items that cover defendants’ attitudes 
toward crime, toward convention, toward their own sentences, and toward criminal 
justice supervision. 
Finally, many offenders were convicted in a Connecticut superior court more than 
once during the study period, which means they appear more than once in the dataset. To 
capture the effect of repeat appearances in the dataset (which could be construed as a 
post-hoc indicator of risk), a dichotomous variable indicates whether the offender has a 
previous case included in the dataset. This variable is recorded as 0 if the case is the 
offender’s first appearance during the study period, and 1 otherwise.  
Analytical Strategy 
Phase 1. The analyses for this project are divided into three phases. In Phase 1, 
three-part stepwise regression analyses are used to evaluate sociodemographic disparities 
in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme. For all analyses, the in/out decision is 
modeled using the logistic regression component of a negative binomial hurdle model, 
and incarceration length is modeled using the count component (a zero-truncated 
negative binomial regression) of the same hurdle model.  
Criminologists have grappled with the issue of how to properly model 




(OLS) regression are not typically met in incarceration sentence data, which are often 
characterized by an extreme positive skew, heteroscedasticity in which the variance 
increases with the mean, and a bound at 0. The application of OLS to sentencing data can 
therefore lead to biased estimates. Log-transforming sentence lengths in order to account 
for the distribution’s skew and heteroscedasticity before running OLS is a common 
practice (e.g. Fischman & Schanzenbach, 2012; Spohn & DeLone, 2000; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1998), but there is some evidence that this strategy still results in biased estimates in 
the presence of severe heteroscedasticity (Hilbe, 2014; Santos Silva & Tenreyo, 2006).  
It is also important to consider the potential for selection bias into incarceration in 
sentence length evaluations (Berk, 1983), and many scholars have used two-stage models 
with a Heckman correction to address this possibility (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001; 
Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). However, execution errors such as the frequent failure to 
incorporate an exclusion restriction, which specifies at least one variable that affects 
selection into incarceration but does not affect incarceration length, are highly 
problematic and may outweigh any benefits obtained from the model (Bushway, Johnson, 
& Slocum, 2007). The Tobit regression model, which treats 0’s as evidence of censored 
observations, is another model that has been used to address this selection concern 
(Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Kurlychek & Johnson, 2004). However, the Tobit model 
assumes that censored observations have “true” but unobservable values at or below the 
censoring point. In the context of sentencing, this assumption would suggest that many 
cases receiving 0 days of incarceration have true values below 0, which is conceptually 
problematic. Moreover, the Tobit model assumes that the same underlying causal 




and sentence length decisions, which may not be the case (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 
2001). 
Hester and Hartman (2017) conceptualize sentence lengths as event counts, 
capturing the number of months an offender is sentenced to incarceration. Just like event 
counts, sentence lengths are positive values, bounded at 0, with a variance that increases 
with the mean. Because incarceration sentences can be considered a count variable with a 
large number of 0’s, Hester and Hartman argue that mixture models such as the hurdle 
and zero-inflated models can be useful for modeling them. Both hurdle and zero-inflated 
models account for excess zeros by linking a binary model with a count model. The zero-
inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model assumes there are two distinct processes that 
can lead to defendants receiving an outcome value (in this case, an incarceration sentence 
value) of 0. First, some observations may be ineligible for a positive outcome value. 
These observations can be thought of as “certain zeros”- they would not under any 
discretionary conditions be assigned a positive value. In the second process, observations 
are eligible for a positive value, but they may be given a 0 anyway. The ZINB accounts 
for these two disparate processes by first modeling the likelihood that each offender is a 
“certain zero” with a binary model (the “inflation” logit or probit model), then separately 
predicting the sentence length for offenders who are not certain zeros with a negative 
binomial model (the “count” model).  
On the other hand, the hurdle model assumes there is a single threshold or 
“hurdle” that must be overcome in order for an observation to obtain a positive count. In 
the case of sentencing data, this translates to a threshold that must be met in order for a 




model (a logit or probit regression) predicts observations that have zero counts (i.e. are 
not sentenced to incarceration), and then a zero-truncated count model predicts the 
outcome (sentence length) for observations that have met the threshold. The two models 
are connected using a log-likelihood that is the sum of the logs of the probabilities that 
the outcome is 0, 1, and a positive count (Hilbe, 2014). As Hester & Hartman note, this 
modeling strategy is consistent with prior theorizing on judicial decision-making that 
suggests sentencing is a two-step process: first judges determine whether or not to 
incarcerate each offender, then they determine the sentence length for offenders whom 
they feel need to be incarcerated (e.g. Spohn & Cederblom, 1991). As Hester and 
Hartman (2017) also mention, the estimates derived from hurdle and zero-inflated models 
are often very similar, but the assumptions underlying each model are quite different and 
must be considered carefully before one is selected for analysis. 
For this study’s analyses, the researcher argues that the single threshold 
assumption required to model an outcome using a negative binomial hurdle model is 
reasonable. All cases in the sample are legally eligible for an incarceration sentence; even 
offenses in the lowest offense severity class, Class D misdemeanors, can be penalized 
with one month of incarceration without any required justification from the sentencing 
judge. Therefore, in all cases where an alternative sanction is issued, the sentence can be 
interpreted as the result of judicial discretion. The judge chose to grant leniency and not 
issue an incarceration sentence. There is plenty of evidence for this process; within every 
individual offense class or prior record group, some offenders were incarcerated and 




offender can be assigned a non-incarceration sentence, then, the negative binomial hurdle 
model is appropriate for this study’s analyses.
22
   
In this study’s analysis, the jointly captured in/out and incarceration length 
decisions are regressed first on the primary independent variables, which capture 
defendants’ race, ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status. This first model does not 
include any control variables. Because the data account for cases processed in courtrooms 
all over the state of Connecticut, and cases that go through one courtroom may be more 
similar to each other than they are to cases in other courtrooms, the analysis also adjusts 
for correlated error by clustering cases by the courtroom in which they were processed. 
The coefficients for each of the key predictors in this first model represent naïve 
aggregate sociodemographic disparities in sentencing outcomes (RQ1).  
 In the next step of the stepwise regression analyses, the researcher builds upon the 
disparity model by adding legal variables and case processing factors as predictors.
23
 
These additions determine how much sociodemographic disparity in the in/out and 
sentence length decisions can be accounted for by these characteristics (RQ2). In the final 
step of the stepwise regressions, the risk domain scores drawn from the LSI-R risk 
assessment are also added to the model. These risk domain scores, which represent a 
range of unique offender characteristics, have the potential to greatly improve the 
explanatory power of the sentencing model and to address how much of observed 
sociodemographic disparities are due to differences in seldom-captured risk factors such 
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 Supplemental analyses [results not shown] indicate that using a zero-inflated negative binomial model 
rather than a hurdle model does not substantially alter conclusions in this study. 
23
 Because all Class A felony murders are subject to a traditional mandatory minimum incarceration 
sentence, the binary indicator of felony murder perfectly predicts the decision to incarcerate in the logistic 
regression component of the hurdle model. This indicator and the eight felony murder cases are therefore 





as residential stability, leisure activities, criminal companions, alcohol/drug problems, 
and attitudes toward the criminal justice system (RQ3). 
Phase 2. The second phase of the project evaluates disparities in LSI-R scores and 
then constructs and evaluates disparities in evidence-based sentences. First, descriptive 
statistics demonstrate whether or not there are unconditional differences in LSI-R 
composite and domain scores for each racial/ethnic, gender, education, employment, and 
financial group. Regression analyses, specifically ordinary least squares regression and 
ordered logistic regression, then assess how much of these disparities remain once other 
sociodemographic characteristics have been accounted for (RQ4).
24
 This process shows 
the magnitude of the disparities in LSI-R composite scores and identifies the domains 
that contribute most to those overall disparities. 
In order to provide some indication of the extent to which disparities in LSI-R 
scores may translate into disparities in evidence-based punishment, the rest of Phase 2 
simulates sentences in a simple evidence-based scenario and evaluates disparities in 
them. Each offender in the study sample is assigned a simulated evidence-based sentence 
based solely on legal characteristics, case processing factors, and LSI-R composite 
scores. To understand how these simulated sentences are determined, it is useful to first 
consider two assumptions on which the construction procedure used in this study relies.  
The first assumption is that each offender processed in a Connecticut superior 
court has a single latent risk of recidivism that is approximated by judges at the time of 
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 The distribution of LSI-R composite risk scores approximates a normal distribution, with a mean of 26.2, 
a slight left skew (skewness=-.25), and a slightly flat curvature (kurtosis=2.75). The researcher therefore 
finds ordinary least squares regression to be appropriate for this outcome. On the other hand, though 
individual domains may have as many as 10 unique values within them, none of the domain distributions 
achieve normality, so ordinary least squares is inappropriate and the researcher uses ordered logistic 




sentencing and by scores on the LSI-R, albeit with different levels of precision. Though 
the LSI-R may incorporate more risk factors into its scoring than judges incorporate into 
their risk perceptions, both evaluations tap into the same underlying risk characteristic. 
Under this assumption, LSI-R scores can be used as a proxy for judges’ risk evaluation in 
the absence of evidence-based sentencing. In Connecticut’s current system, where 
offenders are administered LSI-R risk assessments but judges are not provided with LSI-
R information at the time of sentencing, the relationship between LSI-R scores and 
punishment approximates the relationship between offender risk and punishment. 
The second assumption is that the integration of actuarial risk assessments into 
Connecticut sentencing would not alter the role that a) legal/case processing 
characteristics and b) risk evaluation play in the formation of punishment decisions. In 
other words, the introduction of actuarial risk assessments into sentencing would affect 
punishment only by changing the precision of judges’ risk perceptions. It would not 
change how much weight is given to legal and case processing characteristics or to risk of 
recidivism in the judicial decision-making process. With this assumption in place, 
estimates of the relationship between legal/case processing factors and punishment, and 
the relationship between offender risk and punishment, in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing system can be extrapolated to relationships among those same variables in the 
simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario. 
These two assumptions may be tenuous. First, it is possible that judges 
conceptualize offender risk differently than the LSI-R captures it, which would mean that 
the two appraisals are not necessarily tapping into the same latent characteristic. 




sentencing is expected to strengthen the role that risk plays in determining appropriate 
sentences. Assessment scores may serve as “nudges” that increase the salience of risk 
evaluation and encourage judges to weight offender risk more heavily and other factors 
less heavily in their punishment decisions.  
Therefore, it is important to consider how simulated patterns of disparity should 
be different if these assumptions are not met. If the first assumption does not hold, and 
judges’ risk evaluations do not estimate the same latent risk characteristic that the LSI-R 
does, the observed relationship between LSI-R scores and punishment in Connecticut’s 
current system is likely to underestimate the strength of the relationship between 
recidivism risk and punishment, biasing it toward 0. Elements of perceived risk that 
judges consider but that the LSI-R does not will not be captured in the risk-punishment 
relationship, and the observed relationship will not be as strong as it should be. The 
relationship between risk and punishment in Connecticut’s current system will be 
estimated conservatively. 
If the second assumption does not hold, which is possible because evidence-based 
sentencing is expected to increase the impact of risk on punishment decisions, then using 
the relationship between risk and punishment in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme 
to approximate the same relationship in a simulated evidence-based scenario will result in 
an underestimation of the risk effect in simulated evidence-based sentences. The 
introduction of risk assessments may increase the salience and importance of risk at 
sentencing, but this study’s modeling strategy is unable to account for that possibility. 
The relationship between risk and punishment will be weaker in the simulated evidence-




disparities in the simulated sentences are dependent upon the risk-punishment 
relationship, which means that if the risk-punishment relationship in evidence-based 
sentencing is estimated conservatively, disparities in the simulated evidence-based 
scenario are likely to be conservative as well. 
With these assumptions in mind, the first step in creating an evidence-based 
sentence scenario is to estimate the effects of legal/case processing factors and risk on 
punishment in Connecticut. Incarceration lengths in Connecticut’s current system, for 
which all non-incarceration sentences are assigned a value of 0, are first regressed on all 
legal and case processing variables as well as composite LSI-R risk assessment scores 
using a negative binomial hurdle model. This model yields estimates of the associations 
between legal/case processing factors and punishment and LSI-R scores and punishment 
in Connecticut’s current system. As described above, the relationship between LSI-R 
scores and punishment can be treated as a proxy for the relationship between risk and 
punishment even when judges are not provided with LSI-R scores at sentencing. 
Because the study also assumes that the strength of these associations will not 
change if risk assessments are incorporated into sentencing, they are used to generate an 
evidence-based sentencing scenario in Connecticut. Using post-estimation commands, the 
researcher derives predicted incarceration probabilities from the model that can be used 
to assign each case a probability of incarceration. These probabilities represent the 
likelihood that each offender would be assigned an incarceration sentence if the only 
determinants of punishment were legal/ case processing factors and risk of recidivism, as 
captured by the LSI-R. This set of conditions results in simulated sentences that do not 




decision-making for certain types of offenders (e.g. for minority offenders), this would 
not be reflected in the simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario. 
Using the predicted probabilities, each offender is hard-classified as receiving 
either an incarceration or non-incarceration sentence in the evidence-based scenario. 
Hard classification employs a threshold rule; all offenders who are assigned a probability 
of incarceration that is greater than .5 are assigned incarceration, while all offenders who 
receive a probability of incarceration that is less than or equal to .5 are assigned 
probation. This ensures that offenders who are statistically more likely to be incarcerated 
than to be sentenced to an alternative sanction are assigned evidence-based incarceration, 
and vice versa.
25
 Thresholds of .4 and .6 are used as alternative specifications in the 
analyses, to evaluate the effects of the threshold decision on the study’s findings. 
After every offender has been assigned an incarceration or non-incarceration 
sentence in the simulated evidence-based scenario, the researcher uses a second post-
estimation procedure to generate a predicted incarceration length for each case. Offenders 
who were assigned incarceration are then ascribed their predicted sentence length. 
Predicted sentence lengths are recorded in a new variable, evidence-based incarceration 
length. Offenders who were assigned an alternative sanction are ascribed a 0 as their 
evidence-based incarceration length. 
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 Because non-incarceration sentences are substantially more common than incarceration sentences in this 
sample, it is expected that most groups will be assigned a <.5 probability. This decision rule will likely 
result in a greater proportion of offenders being assigned alternative sanction sentences than are observed in 
the actual case data. However, the researcher argues that this consequence may serve as an advantage and 
increase the utility of the project. Evidence-based sentencing is touted as a method for reducing the use of 
incarceration by diverting offenders away from incarceration, and evidence indicates that states that have 
already implemented evidence-based sentencing do use it to reduce incarceration (Marcus, 2009; Warren, 
2007). By assigning more alternative sanction sentences in the evidence-based scenario, the project models 




Though mandatory minimum penalties may not be used frequently, they may 
have meaningful impacts on sentencing outcomes for offenders who are subject to them. 
To account for mandatory minimum sentencing in the evidence-based scenario, all 
offenders whose highest conviction charge is subject to a mandatory minimum penalty 
have their evidence-based incarceration length raised to meet the mandatory minimum. 
For example, if an offender received an initial evidence-based sentence of probation but 
was subject to a mandatory minimum penalty of one year of incarceration, the offender’s 
predicted evidence-based sentence is bumped up to one year of incarceration for the 
analysis. Offenders subject to a mandatory minimum whose evidence-based incarceration 
lengths are already greater than the mandatory minimum penalty do not have their 
evidence-based sentences altered. 
This procedure yields a set of simulated evidence-based sentences based on 
legal/case processing factors and LSI-R risk scores. Again, it is important to note that this 
simulation procedure entirely ignores the role of judicial discretion in determining 
punishment; in the evidence-based scenario, only the prescribed legal, case processing, 
and risk factors affect sentencing outcomes. Because discretion is such an integral part of 
decision-making throughout the criminal justice system, however, the evidence-based 
scenario depicted in this study is not a realistic one. It is extremely unlikely that judges 
would cede all individual discretion in response to the introduction of actuarial risk 
assessments at sentencing. Therefore, the evidence-based scenario in the study cannot be 
treated as an accurate counterfactual to the observed sentences issued to offenders in the 
study’s sample. If Connecticut were to implement an evidence-based sentencing scheme, 




based sentences would fail to map perfectly onto the sentences assigned in this study’s 
evidence-based sentencing scenario. In short, there is error in the construction of the 
evidence-based scenario. 
Rather than representing actual evidence-based sentences, the evidence-based 
scenario can instead be used to demonstrate how LSI-R scores can be expected to impact 
punishment outcomes independent of judicial discretion. This information is useful for 
understanding how differences in risk scores may translate into differences in punishment 
and punishment disparities. With this idea in mind, the outcomes generated in the 
evidence-based sentencing scenario in this study can be assessed for sociodemographic 
disparities. To establish the magnitude of disparities in evidence-based sentences, the 
evidence-based in/out decision and evidence-based incarceration length are regressed on 
race, ethnicity, gender, and SES variables, again using a negative binomial hurdle model. 
The coefficients in this model represent aggregate sociodemographic disparities in 
simulated evidence-based scenario (RQ5).   
Phase 3. In the final phase of the project, the aggregate sociodemographic 
disparities in actual sentences identified in Phase 1 are compared to the aggregate 
sociodemographic disparities in the evidence-based scenario simulated in Phase 2. 
Because the two outcomes, actual sentences and evidence-based sentences, are recorded 
for the same sample of offenders, it is likely that errors in the two models will be 
correlated. The researcher therefore uses seemingly unrelated estimation to combine the 
estimation results from the two hurdle models, allowing for unbiased comparisons 
between models.
26
 Chi-square tests are used to test for the equality of coefficients across 
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 Seemingly unrelated estimation (“suest” in Stata) combines the estimation results from two separate 




models for each independent variable in the logit and count components of the hurdle 
models. To illustrate, the effect of being black on the probability of receiving an actual 
incarceration sentence is tested against the effect of being black on the probability of 
receiving a simulated evidence-based incarceration sentence. Likewise, the effect of 
being black on actual incarceration length is tested against the effect of being black on 
simulated evidence-based sentence length. These tests address whether sociodemographic 
disparities in the simplified evidence-based scenario are larger, smaller, or approximately 
equal to disparities in Connecticut’s current sentencing system.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(co)variance matrix is estimated using both models simultaneously, it accounts for correlated error terms 
between the two models and allows the user to conduct unbiased tests for cross-model hypotheses. Note 
that because the equations were not estimated simultaneously in a single system, this procedure does not 
increase efficiency. Its advantage in this analysis is its allowance for unbiased tests of equality across 




CHAPTER 7: DATA COMPILATION & DESCRIPTIVES 
This chapter first details match rates resulting from the linking procedures used to 
connect case data with offense statute information, offender demographics, and risk 
assessment scores. It then describes the sample using descriptive statistics related to 
independent, dependent, and control variables, and considers the extent of sample 
selection resulting from the linking procedures. 
Dataset Compilation Results 
Dataset match rates are listed in Table 7.1. Each row represents one step in the 
matching process. The first step in the data compilation process links case data to statute 
data. This yields a 100% match rate for the case data; every conviction charge included in 
the case data was assigned offense and severity information. 
Demographic data is then added to the case data using ID numbers. Again, 100% 
of the cases represented in the case data are matched to offender demographic 
information in the demographic data. However, only 90% of the offenders represented in 
the demographic data are matched to any case data. Of the 6,699 offenders represented in 
the demographic data who are not matched to any case data, 2,384 (36%) have cases in 
the study period that were removed because they were processed in juvenile court, did 
not result in a conviction, or had a most severe charge of a capital felony, violation of 
probation, infraction, or traffic violation. An additional 2,239 (33%) only had cases 
outside the study period, and the remaining 2,076 (31%) cannot be linked to any 
conviction information inside or outside the study period. Offenders in the latter two 
groups are likely unmatched because of CSSD’s data extraction procedure; the case data 




separate databases at the CSSD, and a failure to pair results in case data that is missing all 
offender, charge, and verdict information (B. Sperry, personal communication, 
1/25/2018). The case data received by the researcher contains 7,023 such charges. It is 
unclear whether the failure to pair systematically affected any particular types of charges 
or cases. 
The third data merge links LSI-R risk assessment information to the case data. As 
explained on pages 74-75, this linking procedure has three steps: offender ID numbers are 
used to link every risk assessment administered to one offender to every court case that 
offender had during the study period, then case-risk assessment pairings with more than a 
one-year difference between the assessment and conviction dates are removed, then for 
conviction dates still associated with multiple risk assessments, only the case-risk 
assessment pairing with the shortest time between the conviction and assessment dates is 
retained. This procedure yields a full dataset in which each case is represented once, but 
one risk assessment can be paired with multiple cases. 
Unlike the prior linking procedures, connecting LSI-R data to the augmented case 
data does not yield a 100% match rate for offenders in the case data; 35,591 cases (35%) 
representing 19,912 offenders are not ultimately matched to a risk assessment and are 
therefore excluded from all analysis.
27
 Given the procedure used to link risk assessments 
to particular cases, failures in this match are due to two reasons. First, 22,124 cases 
representing 15,330 offenders are not paired with any risk assessments from the LSI-R 
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 Attempts to use other risk assessments conducted by the Connecticut DOC in place of LSI-R scores in 
cases where offenders are not matched to a completed LSI-R risk assessment yield only 2,400 additional 
matched cases. The researcher opts not to use this strategy to increase the sample size and reduce any 
selection effect because a) DOC risk scores are captured on a 0-5 scale and do not allow the same level of 
precision in risk calculation that the LSI-R does, and b) DOC risk assessments do not provide information 
about any dimensions of SES, which means that all cases with a DOC risk assessment but no LSI-R 




data, meaning that 15,330 offenders do not have complete information on any risk 
assessment conducted during or within one year of the study period. Second, 13,467 
cases representing 4,582 offenders are removed from the dataset because the offenders in 
those cases were only administered a risk assessment more than one year away from the 
conviction date. 
This 65% match rate is not entirely surprising; CSSD began introducing key 
performance indicators, including risk assessment timeliness measures, in 2010 and 
found in that year that initial compliance with the risk assessment policy was in the “mid-
70% range” (B. Sperry, personal communication, 1/11/2018). Moreover, CSSD 
administered the LSI-R to offenders as part of either pre-sentence investigations or 
intake/reassessment/discharge interviews for probation sentences, not as part of 
intake/reassessment interviews for incarceration sentences. Offenders assigned lengthy 
prison sentences, then, should be less likely to have received an LSI-R risk assessment 
within one year of their conviction date.  
Following the data linking process, there are 67,526 cases in the case data with 
complete risk assessment information. However, data on an independent or control 
variable in the case data is missing for 474 cases, and there are only 66 cases with Native 
American/Alaskan native offenders in the dataset. Additionally, as described in Footnote 
16, there are 2 capital felony cases in the dataset with complete LSI-R data. These cases 
are all excluded from the dataset, resulting in a final sample size of 66,984 cases 





Descriptive statistics for the final sample are detailed in Table 7.2. One-third of 
the cases in the final sample resulted in an incarceration sentence, and the average 
incarceration sentence length is just under 20 months. Drug and public order offenses are 
the most frequent offense types, with 30% each. Property offenses comprise 22% of the 
sample, violent offenses account for 15%, and sex and weapons offenses together 
comprise only 3%. Most of the offenses are misdemeanors (62% vs 38%), and the largest 
single offense severity class is Class A misdemeanors, which account for 34% of the 
sample by themselves. Nearly all of the other misdemeanors are Class B and C 
misdemeanors, while Class D and unclassified misdemeanors are quite rare. Among the 
felony classes, Class D and unclassified felonies occur most frequently, at 14-15% each 
of the total sample. Class B & C felonies account for 3% and 5% each, while Class A and 
Class E felonies, and Class A murders, are also very rare. 
 The average number of prior adult convictions in the sample is 3.28, and the 
average criminal history domain score for offenders in the sample is 4.73 out of 10. The 
average case has between 1 and 2 conviction counts. 15% of the cases in the sample 
involved a violation of probation charge alongside the primary offense. Consistent with 
the Connecticut Legislative Program Review & Investigations Committee’s (2005) 
report, which suggested that mandatory minimum sentences are applied very rarely, only 
1% of primary conviction charges received a mandatory minimum penalty. The study’s 
three measures of plea bargaining occur at very different rates; count reductions between 
charging and conviction occur in 57% of cases, offense severity reductions occur half as 




charge but no mandatory minimum conviction. The distribution of cases is fairly equal 
across fiscal years, though FY 2010 is slightly underrepresented. 
 Moving to offender demographics and risk factors, half of the cases in the final 
sample involve a white offender. Another 30% are black, while 20% are Hispanic and 
less than 1% are Asian. 17% of the final sample offenders are female. Most of the sample 
has completed 10
th
 grade or has a high school degree (68% combined), while another 
16% each completed either less than 10
th
 grade or some college. Offenders with some 
post-graduate education comprise only 1% of the sample. 62% of the sample cases 
involve an unemployed offender, about one half involve an offender who receives 
financial assistance, and the average score on the financial problems scale is 
approximately a 2, which corresponds with “a relatively unsatisfactory financial situation 
with a need for improvement”. 
 It does not appear that multicollinearity among the SES components used in this 
study, education, employment, and financial situation, is likely to be a substantial 
problem in the analyses. Table 7.3 shows Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma coefficients 
for pairs of SES components. The Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma coefficient measures 
the strength of association between two ordinal variables. Values range from -1, a perfect 
negative association, to 1, a perfect positive association (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). As 
Table 7.3 shows, the strongest associations are among employment and the financial 
variables, with gammas in the vicinity of .50 that indicate only moderate associations.  
Education appears to have weaker associations with all other components.  
The directions of all associations suggest that indicators of high SES tend to accompany 




indicators of low SES. Higher education is associated with more employment, a lower 
likelihood of receiving financial assistance, and fewer financial problems. More 
employment is associated with a lower likelihood of receiving financial assistance and 
fewer financial problems. And finally, receiving financial assistance is associated with 
more financial problems. 
 Turning back to Table 7.2, the age distribution slants toward younger offenders; 
about one-third are under 25 years old, and each older age group represents progressively 
less of the sample. 10% of the sample is married. The average LSI-R domain scores vary 
substantially across domains.  For the family/marital domain, the average score is a 2.04 
out of 4, which translates to 51% of the total points possible. The alcohol/drug and 
companions domains also average near the center of their possible ranges, at 4.26 out of 9 
(47%) and 2.74 out of 5 (55%) respectively. Offenders tend to score at the lower ends of 
the accommodations domain, with an average of .99 out of 3 (33%), the 
emotional/personal domain, with an average 1.70 out of 5 (34%), and the 
attitudes/orientations domain, with an average of 1.38 out of 4 (35%). Finally, offenders 
tend toward the upper end of the leisure/recreation domain, averaging a 1.60 out of 2 
(80%).  
 To gauge the impact of sample selection due to match failures between the case 
data and LSI-R data (as well as missing data), Table 7.4 compares demographic and case 
information for the final sample and for the 36,133 cases that were either unmatched to 
an LSI-R assessment or missing data on one or more variables. This comparison yields 
several noticeable differences. As expected, cases with longer incarceration sentences are 




points lower in the final sample than in the full case data, and among incarceration 
sentences, the average sentence length is 6.10 months shorter. Regarding offense type 
distributions, violent and drug offenses are more prevalent in the final sample, and public 
order crimes are less prevalent. The distributions of offense severity classes are fairly 
similar, though Class C misdemeanors are substantially less likely to be in the final 
sample. The average number of prior adult convictions is smaller in the final sample 
(3.28 vs 4.04), and the average number of current convictions is slightly larger (1.68 vs 
1.57). More cases in the final sample were charged with a violation of probation (15% vs 
11%), and fewer were convicted of a mandatory minimum offense, but count reductions, 
severity reductions, and the distribution of conviction years in the final sample are all 
within 2% of the distribution in the full case data. 
Regarding offender characteristics, the final sample is also more likely to be white 
(50% vs 40%) and less likely to be black (30% vs 36%) or Hispanic (20% vs 23%). 
Females are slightly more prevalent in the final sample, at 17% compared to 15% in the 
full case data. Finally, the final sample is younger than the full case data sample, with the 
18-24 age group comprising 8% more of the final sample and other age groups each 
making up 2-4% less.  
These differences provide evidence that more serious cases are less likely to have 
had a risk assessment conducted within one year of the conviction date and are less likely 
to be a part of the final sample. Not only are incarceration sentences less likely to end up 
in the final sample, but cases with longer incarceration sentences and longer criminal 
histories are less likely to do so. Cases with black, Hispanic, or male defendants are also 




minority and male offenders tend to be charged with more serious crimes and have more 
extensive criminal histories (Kramer & Steffensmeier, 1993; Kutateladze et al., 2015).  
The researcher believes that this sample selection has the potential to influence 
the results in this study in two ways. First, sample selection may increase observed 
disparities in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme. Second, it may inflate the 
observed relationship between LSI-R scores and punishment in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing scheme, which would in turn result in larger estimates of the relationship 
between risk and sentencing outcomes in the simulated evidence-based sentences. Each 
of these predictions will be addressed in turn, but both are drawn from the liberation 
hypothesis, which posits that judges feel constrained to issue harsh sentences when case 
seriousness is high; the extremity of legal characteristics like offense severity and 
criminal history crowd out the role that extralegal factors can play in determining 
punishment. In contrast, when case seriousness is low, judges feel liberated to incorporate 
extralegal considerations into their decision-making, and disparities are more likely to 
emerge (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991). Though results are not 
entirely consistent, prior research tends to support this supposition (Koons-Witt et al., 
2014; Hester & Hartman, 2017; Spohn, 2000; Rodriguez et al., 2006).  
Because non-serious cases are more likely to be selected into the sample, it is first 
expected that disparities observed among the selected cases will be larger in magnitude 
than disparities that would be observed among the cases excluded from analysis. It 
follows from the liberation hypothesis that among those excluded cases, particularly the 
most serious of them, judges would feel more constrained by the severity of the offense 




issue equally harsh sentences to offenders regardless of their sociodemographic 
characteristics. If these cases could be matched to a complete risk assessment and 
included in the analyses, they would counteract some of whatever disparity is observed 
among less serious cases, and the observed disparities in punishment would be slightly 
smaller overall. 
The tendency for more serious cases to be excluded from the sample also leads to 
an expectation that the relationship between LSI-R risk scores and punishment will be 
larger in the final sample than it would be among the excluded cases. Using the same 
liberation hypothesis logic, judges are likely to weight LSI-R risk scores less heavily in 
their decision-making in cases where the legal characteristics of the case already point to 
especially harsh punishment. In cases where offenders have a long string of prior felony 
convictions or committed Class A felonies, for example, the value of judges also 
knowing offenders’ risk scores likely decreases considerably; judges are likely to issue 
similarly long incarceration sentences even if the offenders receive very low risk scores. 
Consequently, the relationship between risk scores and punishment should be smaller 
among the more serious excluded cases than among the less serious final sample cases. If 
the excluded cases could be matched to a risk assessment and included in analyses, the 
observed relationship between risk scores and sentences would be attenuated to a degree. 
This would be expected to result in a) a weaker relationship between risk and punishment 
and ultimately b) less punishment disparity due to sociodemographic differences in LSI-
R scores in the simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario created in this study. Thus, 




CHAPTER 8: RESULTS 
 This chapter presents the findings for all three phases of the analysis. It begins by 
exploring sociodemographic disparities in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme, 
observing both aggregate disparities and how much of those disparities can be explained 
by legal factors and case processing factors, as well as by risk factors captured in the LSI-
R. The analyses then turn to evaluating disparities in the LSI-R and in potential evidence-
based sentences. First, differences in mean LSI-R composite and domain scores are 
detailed. Then the results of the evidence-based sentence construction procedure are 
described, and disparities in the evidence-based sentences are assessed. The chapter 
concludes with a comparison of disparities in Connecticut’s current scheme and 
disparities in potential evidence-based sentencing, to address whether or not evidence-
based sentencing could alter patterns of social inequality in Connecticut if implemented. 
Phase 1: Disparities in Connecticut’s Current Sentencing Scheme 
Aggregate Disparities. The first research question in this study asks to what 
extent there are aggregate sociodemographic disparities in sentencing outcomes in 
Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme. Table 8.1 displays aggregate disparities in the 
decision to incarcerate and incarceration length, estimated using a negative binomial 
hurdle model. This model focuses on the primary independent variables and does not 
include any control variables to address the first research question.  
The decision to incarcerate. Results indicate some noteworthy disparities in the 
decision to incarcerate. Interestingly, neither the coefficient for black offenders nor the 
coefficient for Hispanic offenders reaches statistical significance, though the odds of 






 The effect for Asian offenders is very small and does not reach 
statistical significance either. The similarity between Asian and white offenders in this 
model may be due to similar behavior and similar treatment by criminal justice actors, 
but it may also be partly due to the relatively small number of Asian offenders in the 
sample. Gender exerts an especially strong effect on the odds of incarceration, as males 
have over twice the odds of being sentenced to incarceration. 
There are also differences in the odds of incarceration based on SES components. 
Generally, more education decreases the likelihood of incarceration; compared to 
offenders who have not completed 10
th
 grade, the odds of incarceration are 14% and 12% 
lower for offenders who have a high school degree and offenders who completed some 
college, respectively. Likewise, employment status exhibits a substantial effect on 
incarceration; compared to unemployed non-student offenders, part-time employed or 
student offenders have 50% lower odds of incarceration and full-time employed or 
student offenders have 53% lower odds. The effects of the third indicator of SES, 
financial situation, are less consistent. Reliance upon government assistance decreases the 
odds of incarceration by 10%, but each additional point in the 4-point financial problems 
scale increases the odds of incarceration by 17%.  
Thus, there are several aggregate sociodemographic disparities in the decision to 
incarcerate, not all of which are consistent with previous literature on disparities in 
punishment. Disadvantages for males and low-SES individuals are well-documented in 
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 Because race and ethnicity are closely intertwined with SES (Howard, 1975; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & 
Kramer, 1998), the researcher performed supplementary analyses to evaluate whether or not the inclusion 
of SES variables affected observed aggregate racial/ethnic disparities in punishment. When all SES 
indicators are excluded from the aggregate model, such that race, ethnicity, and gender are the only 
predictors of the decision to incarcerate, black offenders have statistically significant 11% higher odds and 
Hispanic offenders have 1% lower odds of incarceration than whites. Though these differences suggest that 
there is some overlap between race/ethnicity and SES, overall substantive conclusions  about the 




the empirical literature (Baumer, 2013; Daly & Bordt, 1995; Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012), 
and the findings that suggest a disadvantage for male, low-educated, unemployed, and 
financially unstable offenders in Connecticut sentencing align with that prior work. 
However, the observed relationship between race/ethnicity and incarceration runs counter 
to general conclusions from prior work. While much scholarship indicates a disadvantage 
for black and Hispanic offenders at sentencing (e.g. Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 
2000), the effects for black and Hispanic offenders in this study do not reach statistical 
significance, and the Hispanic effect is in the opposite direction as expected. 
Additionally, given that some research finds disadvantages in punishment for low-income 
offenders (e.g. Mustard, 2001), and even specifically for offenders who rely on others for 
financial assistance (Wooldredge, 2010), it is surprising that in this sample, offenders 




Incarceration length. Results for the aggregate disparities sentence length model 
are also displayed in Table 8.1. Included in this part of the table are average marginal 
effects, which describe how many additional or fewer months an offender will receive, on 
average, if the offender is coded as a one (for dichotomous variables) or has one 
additional unit of a variable (for non-dichotomous variables). For ease of interpretation, it 
is the average marginal effects that are discussed in this text. When only the primary 
independent variables are included, aggregate disparities can be observed for race, 
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 Because this result is unexpected, the researcher conducted supplementary analyses to determine whether 
the observed effect for social assistance was impacted by the inclusion of a related measure, the financial 
problems scale. These two variables have a small-to-moderate correlation (.29), and the removal of the 
financial problems scale from the aggregate disparities incarceration model reduces the effect of receiving 
social assistance from an odds ratio of .90 to .94, which means that the direction of the social assistance 




ethnicity, gender, and every indicator of SES except for the financial problems scale. 
Unlike the model predicting the decision to incarcerate, in this model the effects for both 
black and Hispanic offenders are both positive and statistically significant. Black 
offenders receive, on average, 8.3 more months of incarceration than whites, while 
Hispanic offenders receive 6.25 more than whites.
30
 The coefficient for Asian offenders 
is not even close to statistically significant due to a large standard error (again, likely due 
to the small number of Asian offenders represented in the data), though the point estimate 
indicates that Asian offenders also receive an average of 6.9 more months of 
incarceration than whites. The gender gap is again quite large; males receive over 7 more 
months of incarceration than females.  
Disparities are present in each of the three indicators of SES as well. The 
coefficients for education follow a consistent pattern in which offenders with more 
education receive fewer months of incarceration. When compared to offenders who did 
not complete 10
th
 grade, these differences range from a relatively small 2.0 months less 
for offenders who completed 10
th
 grade up to 7.6 months less for offenders with some 
post-graduate education. Employed offenders also appear to have an advantage, as both 
part-time and full-time employed/student offenders receive approximately 7.4 months 
less incarceration time than unemployed/non-student offenders. Finally, disparities by 
financial situation follow a slightly different pattern than they did in the models 
predicting the decision to incarcerate. Reliance upon social assistance remains an 
advantage, reducing the incarceration sentence by an average of 5.8 months, but there is 
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 Supplementary analyses indicate that similarly to the decision to incarcerate, the observed effects of 
race/ethnicity on sentence lengths are marginally larger (9.21 and 7.90 months more for black and Hispanic 
offenders, respectively) when SES indicators are excluded from the model. This again suggests that there is 
some overlap between racial/ethnic and SES effects on incarceration length, but the general conclusions are 




no discernible effect of additional points on the financial problems scale on sentence 
length. 
These patterns of sociodemographic disparity are fairly similar to the patterns 
observed in disparities in the decision to incarcerate, and nearly all of them align with 
findings from prior empirical work (Bontrager et al., 2013; Franklin, 2017; Mitchell, 
2005; Spohn, 2000; Wooldredge, 2010). With the exception of the effects for Asians and 
for offenders who are reliant upon social assistance, these results generally indicate 
disadvantages for racial and ethnic minority, male, and low-SES offenders. However, 
these aggregate disparities capture differences both in treatment by the criminal justice 
system and in offending behaviors; though discretion may be causing some of the 
disparity, black, Hispanic, male, and low-SES offenders may also commit more serious 
crimes, have more extensive criminal histories, or otherwise interact with the criminal 
justice system in ways that earn them harsher punishments. For this reason, it is important 
to distinguish between disparities due to court actor discretion and disparities due to legal 
and case processing characteristics.   
Adding Legal and Case Processing Factors. Though Connecticut does not have 
sentencing guidelines to structure sentencing decisions, numerous case and case 
processing factors can (and in some instances are legally prescribed to) shape punishment 
outcomes. These factors may also serve as vehicles for sociodemographic disparities, so 
it is important to consider how much of observed disparities can be explained by these 
factors (RQ2). To address the second research question, in the next step of each stepwise 
regression, legal and case processing variables are added to the model. These additions 




The decision to incarcerate. Adding legal and case processing factors does 
change several sociodemographic disparities in the decision to incarcerate. The effect of 
being black actually becomes statistically significant in the opposite direction. After 
accounting for legal and case processing factors, black offenders have 14% lower odds of 
being incarcerated than whites. Hispanic offenders remain less likely to be incarcerated 
than whites as well, and the magnitude of the difference actually grows large enough to 
achieve statistical significance. The effect for Asians is again not statistically significant. 
Regarding the gender effect, legal and case processing factors reduce the difference in 
odds of incarceration between male and female offenders by 26% (from 217% higher 
odds to 160% higher odds).  
The effects of educational attainment are changed by the addition of legal and 
case processing factors as well. While the effect of completing 10
th
 grade remains 
insignificant, the significant advantage gained by earning a high school degree compared 
to completing less than 10
th
 grade is eliminated. The effect of completing some college 
changes direction, such that once legal and case processing factors are accounted for, 
college experience actually increases the odds of incarceration by 8% compared to 
completing less than 10
th
 grade. Interestingly, the education group with the highest odds 
of incarceration after legal and case processing factors are included is offenders with 
post-graduate education, whose odds of incarceration are now 49% higher than offenders 
who have completed less than 10
th
 grade. The effects of employment are reduced but not 
eliminated by the addition of legal and case processing variables, with reductions in 
magnitude of 22% (50% lower odds to 39% lower odds) for part-time employed/student 




offenders. In terms of financial situation, the effect of reliance on social assistance 
increases in magnitude, with an odds ratio that shifts from .90 to .82. At the same time, 
legal and case processing factors do appear to explain some of the relationship between 
financial problems and incarceration; an extra point on the financial problems scale now 
increases the odds of incarceration by only 9%. 
 On the whole, the addition of legal and case processing characteristics to the 
incarceration model does little to “explain” aggregate sociodemographic disparities. The 
gender effect is notably reduced, as are the effects of employment and financial 
problems. This suggests that gender and some SES differences in punishment are partly 
due to differences in legal and case processing factors. But the effects of race, ethnicity, 
and education are changed in other less expected ways. The effect of being Hispanic is 
more than doubled in magnitude, and the effect of reliance of government assistance 
increases by 80%, while the effects of being black and having more education change 
direction entirely. In these cases, the findings suggest that legal and case processing 
factors are related to offender sociodemographic characteristics, but not in ways that 
simply intensify existing disparities.
31
  
 Many of the legal and case processing factors also have their own direct impact 
on the decision to incarcerate. Violent, drug, sex, and weapons crimes are all more likely 
to earn an incarceration sentence than public order crimes. Somewhat surprisingly, 
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 Supplemental analyses show that it is the offense severity classifications and/or criminal history 
measures that are primarily responsible for these shifts. The magnification of the Hispanic effect is due to 
offense severity; when offense severity categories are the only legal/case processing variables added to the 
model, Hispanics’ odds of incarceration ratio drops all the way down to .82. The directional change in the 
effect for black offenders is driven by the addition of both criminal history and offense severity, as are most 
of the shifts in education effects. In support of these relationships, mean difference tests show that black, 
Hispanic, and less educated offenders are significantly more likely to commit more severe crimes (Kruskal-
Wallis tests, p<.001 for all comparisons), while black, and less educated offenders have significantly more 
prior convictions (two-sample t test for black-white difference, ANOVA for education differences, p<.001 




committing a violent crime appears to have a smaller effect than committing a drug, sex, 
or weapons crime. Property crimes do not appear to have a distinguishable effect on the 
likelihood of incarceration relative to public order crimes. The effects of offense severity 
generally align with reasonable expectations; the odds of incarceration are higher for all 
felony groups than for the reference category of Class A misdemeanors (the exception to 
this is the very small group of Class E felonies, the effect of which does not reach 
statistical significance). Moreover, as felony offense severity increases, the odds ratios 
get progressively larger, indicating larger differences in incarceration rates between more 
severe groups and the Class A misdemeanor reference group. On the flip side, the odds 
ratios for all other misdemeanor groups are less than 1, indicating that cases in those 
groups are all less likely to involve an incarceration sentence than cases with a Class A 
misdemeanor.  
 The two measures of criminal history appear to conjunctively have an effect on 
incarceration. Each additional prior conviction increases the odds of incarceration by 3%, 
while each additional point on the criminal history score increases the odds of 
incarceration by 19%.
32
 Each additional current conviction count increases the odds of 
incarceration by 41%, and being charged with a violation of probation alongside a felony 
or misdemeanor increases the odds of incarceration by 83%. Cases involving a 
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 The researcher conducted supplemental analyses to consider the value of including the criminal history 
domain score as a second indicator of criminal history in the incarceration model. Prior adult convictions 
and domain scores correlate highly at .65, suggesting potential overlap in the predictive utility of the two 
criminal history measures. Indeed, when the criminal history domain score is excluded from the model, the 
odds ratio for prior convictions jumps from 1.03 to 1.10, more than a threefold increase in the effect of an 
additional prior conviction. When prior convictions are excluded from the model, the odds ratio for the 
criminal history domain score increases from 1.19 to 1.21, an 11% increase. However, Wald tests indicate 
that the criminal history domain score does significantly increase model fit when prior convictions are 
already in the model (χ
2
 = 255.91, p<.001), and prior adult convictions significantly increase model fit 
when the criminal history domain score is already in the model (χ
2
 = 6.95, p=.008). Therefore, the 
researcher decided to keep both measures of criminal history in the incarceration model, acknowledging 




mandatory minimum also have odds of incarceration that are approximately 3.5 times 
greater. There appear to be some differences in incarceration across time too; cases with a 
verdict that occurred in FY 2009 or 2010 are more likely to involve an incarceration 
sentence than verdicts that occurred in FY 2008, though these effects do not reach 
statistical significance. 
Finally, the indicators of plea bargaining show mixed effects; cases involving a 
reduction in counts or offense severity have 12% and 5% lower odds of incarceration, 
respectively, but cases in which a mandatory minimum offense is dropped have 18% 
higher odds. When the plea bargain involves a count or severity reduction, these results 
suggest that judges may be rewarding offenders for pleading guilty and avoiding the 
resources necessary for a trial. On the other hand, the finding that cases with a dropped 
mandatory minimum are more likely to result in incarceration than cases with no 
mandatory minimum may be an indication that even when an offender pleads guilty in 
order to avoid a mandatory minimum penalty, the severity of the initial charges still 
impacts judges’ (and possibly prosecutors’) assessments of blameworthiness and affects 
the final sentence issued. These two sets of findings are difficult to reconcile, but it may 
be that the indicators of plea bargaining used in this study are more influential for 
determining conviction offenses. Because conviction offenses are accounted for in the 
model, the effects of the plea bargaining indicators on punishment severity become less 
consistent. 
 Sentence length. The addition of legal and case processing factors to the sentence 
length model appears to substantially reduce the magnitude of sociodemographic 




down from 8.3 extra months to 4.1 for blacks and from 6.3 extra months to 3.0 for 
Hispanics. The reduction in the gender gap is even larger. Once legal/case processing 
factors are added, the marginal effect for males drops from 7.2 months to 2.6, a 64% 
decrease. The effects for education groups also shrink by over 65%, and two of them 
(completion of 10
th
 grade and post-graduate education) lose statistical significance. 
Similarly, the effects for part-time and full-time employment are reduced by 84% and 
75% but remain significant, and the effect for reliance on government assistance is 
reduced by 74% but retains statistical significance. The effect for financial problems 
remains negligible. 
 Prior literature typically finds that large portions of sociodemographic disparity 
can be explained by offense and offense history characteristics (Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 
2000), and these results are consistent with that trend. Contrary to findings from the 
decision to incarcerate model, the introduction of legal and case processing factors into 
the sentence length model does substantially reduce the magnitude of sociodemographic 
disparities in every instance where a statistically significant difference had been 
previously observed. Though legal and case processing factors do not account for all the 
observed disparities, they do provide support to the proposition that differences in those 
factors are responsible for some disparities in incarceration length. 
 Of course, the legal and case processing characteristics also have their own 
independent effects on sentence lengths. Violent, property, sex, and weapons crimes all 
tend to lead to more months of incarceration than public order crimes. Perhaps 
surprisingly, drug crimes tend to receive shorter sentences than public order crimes, by an 




between offense severity classification and offense severity follows a predictable pattern 
in the incarceration length model. When compared to the Class A misdemeanor reference 
category, each increase in the severity level is associated with more months of 
incarceration. The most severe non-capital felony category, Class A murder, is associated 
with an average of 70 more months of incarceration than the Class A misdemeanor 
reference category, while the lowest misdemeanor category, Class D misdemeanor, is 
associated with 14.3 fewer months.
33
  
 Each additional prior conviction increases the incarceration length by only .5 
months, but each additional point on the LSI-R Criminal History domain score increases 
the sentence by about .4 months.
34
 Each additional conviction count increases the 
sentence length by 4.3 months. Committing a new crime while under probation 
supervision also increases sentence length; those charged with a probation violation 
receive sentences that are 4.2 months longer. The application of a mandatory minimum 
penalty increases the sentence by an average of 10.9 months as well. Once again, the 
indicators of plea bargaining show mixed effects. Cases in which one or more charges 
were dropped prior to conviction receive sentences that are over 5 months shorter. In 
contrast, cases involving a reduction in offense severity receive sentences that are over 6 
months longer. Cases in which a mandatory minimum charge was dropped also receive 
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 The effect for unclassified misdemeanors, which was small and statistically non-significant in the 
decision to incarcerate models, is here very large: unclassified misdemeanors receive, on average, nearly 35 
fewer months of incarceration. Because there are only 7 unclassified misdemeanors included in this sample, 
however, this point estimate should not be used to make inferences about the full population of unclassified 
misdemeanors. 
34
 Here again the researcher used supplementary analysis to evaluate the utility of including both the 
Criminal History domain score and number of prior convictions in the model. Wald tests indicate that the 
criminal history domain score does significantly increase length model fit when prior convictions are 
already in the model (χ
2
 = 33.96, p<.001), and prior adult convictions significantly increase length model fit 
when the criminal history domain score is already in the model (χ
2
 = 118.13, p<.001). Therefore, both 
indicators of criminal history are kept in this model, with the understanding that the two indicators 




sentences that are over 4.5 months longer. Again, these contrasting findings may be a 
signal that the plea bargaining indicators used in this study are more important for 
determining conviction offense severity than for determining punishment severity, and 
once conviction offense severity is controlled for, the effects of the plea bargaining 
indicators become less meaningful. Sentence lengths also appear to get slightly longer as 
time moves forward; convictions in FY 2009 and 2010 earn sentences that are about .5 
and 1.1 months longer than convictions in 2008, though only the effect for FY 2010 
reaches statistical significance. 
Adding Risk Factors. Especially in a non-guidelines state like Connecticut, 
where judges are afforded substantial discretion at sentencing, sociodemographic 
disparities may emerge indirectly through factors other than legal and case processing 
characteristics. The third research question asks whether differences in extralegal factors 
that have been empirically linked to risk of recidivism are responsible for some of the 
observed disparities in punishment. To examine this possibility, in the final step of the 
stepwise regression analyses, age, marital status, repeat convictions, and seven risk 




 The decision to incarcerate. Adding risk factors into the incarceration model has 
inconsistent effects on sociodemographic disparities. The racial and ethnic effects on 
incarceration grow larger, such that black offenders have 20% lower odds and Hispanic 
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 As a supplementary analysis, the researcher also estimated models in which composite LSI-R risk scores 
are used as a risk factor in place of the seven individual risk domains scores [results not shown]. When the 
composite score was included instead of the individual domain scores, observed sociodemographic 
disparities were all in the same direction but tended to be marginally larger, suggesting that the group of 
individual risk domains contribute more to the explanation of social inequality in punishment than the 
composite score alone. The composite score also had its own significant effect on punishment, with each 





offenders have 17% lower odds of incarceration compared to whites after accounting for 
legal, case processing, and risk factors. The effect for Asians remains insignificant. 
Adding risk factors reduces the gender gap by about 15%, changing the odds ratio from 
1.60 to 1.51, but the effect of gender on incarceration remains large and significant. 
 Turning to SES components, risk factors only seem to impact the effects of 
financial situation.  For education, the addition of the risk factors does little to the gap in 
incarceration between low-educated and high-educated offenders; the effects of 
completing 10
th
 grade and having a high school degree remain non-significant, and the 
effects of completing some college or post-graduate education remain positive and 
approximately the same magnitude. Likewise, adding risk factors to the model narrows 
the employment gap only slightly; the effects of part-time and full-time 
employment/student status on incarceration decrease by rather small margins. In contrast, 
though the effect of reliance upon social assistance barely changes at all, the addition of 
the other risk factors reduces the effect of an additional point on the financial problems 
scale by 56% and renders it statistically non-significant. 
 Overall, the effects of risk factors on sociodemographic disparities in the decision 
to incarcerate are quite varied. Some conform to expectations. For example, accounting 
for risk factors that previous research indicates are more prevalent for racial or ethnic 
minority, males, young, and low-SES offenders (see Manchak et al., 2009; Monahan, 
Skeem, & Lowenkamp, 2017; Skeem & Lowenkamp, 2016; Skeem, Monahan, & 
Lowenkamp, 2016) reduces the magnitude of the disadvantage that male and financially 
unstable offenders have at sentencing. This suggests that some of the sentencing 




the direction of the race effect is unexpected, the direction of the change in the race effect 
after accounting for risk factors is also consistent with expectations. The race effect 
becomes more negative, an indication that even though black offenders in this sample 
may receive an advantage at sentencing, they may still be perceived as having a higher 
risk of reoffending. At the same time, the impacts of education, employment, and 
receiving social assistance on incarceration are largely unchanged by the addition of the 
risk factors. It may be that because judges face such immense time and resources 
constraints at sentencing, easily observable factors that signal lower SES become 
especially salient as signals for blameworthiness, dangerousness, and even ability to 
withstand incarceration, leading to a large role for those factors independent of informal 
risk evaluation.  
 Adding risk factors to the model does little to change the effect of legal and case 
processing characteristics on incarceration either. Though many of the odds ratios shift, 
the changes are quite small and do not impact substantive conclusions about legal/case 
processing characteristics’ influence on the decision to incarcerate. However, many of the 
added risk factors do have their own unique effects on incarceration. Among age 
categories, only the comparison between the oldest and youngest offenders achieves 
statistical significance; offenders who are at least 45 years old have 12% higher odds of 
incarceration than offenders who are under 25. The effects for 25-34 year olds and 35-44 
year olds are small and not statistically significant. Likewise, married offenders do not 
appear to have a significant advantage over single offenders in the decision to incarcerate. 
However, multiple appearances in the dataset do appear to have a significant impact on 




likelihood of incarceration by 14%, even after accounting for number of prior 
convictions.  
There are also several noteworthy effects among the risk domains included in the 
LSI-R. Interestingly, the largest observed per-point effect lies in the Accommodation 
domain, which captures both residential stability and neighborhood crime rates. An 
additional point in this scale increases the odds of incarceration by a sizeable 14%. 
Several of the domain scores, including Leisure/Recreation, Companions, Alcohol/Drug, 
and Attitudes/Orientations, have more modest interval impacts on the likelihood of 
incarceration and do not reach statistical significance, with changes in odds between -1% 
and 4%.
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 Finally, the Family/Marital domain score and Emotional/Personal domain 
score actually have negative significant impacts on sentencing; each additional point on 
the Family/Marital scale decreases the odds of incarceration by 3%, and each additional 
point on the Emotional/Personal domain score decreases the odds by 5%. These negative 
effects are somewhat surprising, but the effect for the Emotional/Personal domain may 
due to the fact that the indicators in that domain all relate to mental illness diagnoses and 
mental health treatment. Though poor mental health may indeed predict recidivism, 
judges may also see a diagnosis as a factor that mitigates the severity of the offense or the 
blameworthiness of the offender. Moreover, judges may be more inclined to allow 
community supervision for offenders who are already receiving mental health treatment, 
so that an incarceration stint will not interfere with their progress. 
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 Note however, that because domains contain different numbers of items, the maximum effect of one 
domain score on incarceration varies substantially across domains even when odds ratios are similar. 
Setting statistical significance aside, an odds ratio of 1.01 for the Alcohol/Drug domain means that each 
additional point increases the odds of incarceration by only 1%, for example, but because there are nine 
items in the domain, the difference in incarceration likelihoods between offenders at the very top and 
bottom of the scale is larger than it is for offenders at the top and bottom of the Companions scale, which is 




 Sentence length.  The addition of risk factors also has mixed effects on disparities 
in sentence lengths. Age, marital status, repeat convictions in the dataset, and LSI-R risk 
domains appear to account for about 19% of the remaining disparity between black and 
white offenders, reducing the extra months of incarceration for blacks from 4.1 to 3.3. 
The coefficient remains statistically significant. For Hispanics, the addition reduces the 
incarceration length gap from 3.0 to 2.5 months, another modest 18% reduction that does 
not result in a loss of statistical significance. Surprisingly, risk factors do almost nothing 
to account for the remaining gender gap in incarceration; the coefficient for male 
offenders decreases by only .06 months, or 2%, with the addition of those factors. After 
accounting for both legal/case processing and risk factors, the gender gap remains.  
In terms of SES effects, the addition of risk factors noticeably attenuates the 
differences between more-educated and less-educated offenders as well as between 
unemployed non-student and full-time employee or student offenders. Specifically, 
including other risk factors reduces the advantage for offenders with a high school degree 
by 32% (from 1.54 to 1.05 fewer months), the advantage for offenders with a college 
degree by 48% (from 1.97 to 1.03 fewer months), and the advantage for full-time 
employed/student offenders by 24% (from 1.87 to 1.42 fewer months). There does not 
appear to be any change in the effect of reliance on government assistance, which 
remains statistically significant, or the effect of an additional point on the financial 
problems scale, which remains minimal and non-significant. 
Thus, differences in recidivism risk seem to account for some residual disparity in 
incarceration length, but the risk factors captured in this analysis fail to account for all of 




and the effects of educational attainment, employment status, and financial problems are 
attenuated but not eliminated by the addition of the risk factors. Even with all risk factors 
included in the model, race, gender, education, employment, and reliance upon social 
assistance continue to have influences on incarceration length. These findings are 
consistent with theoretical expectations, which predict that sociodemographic disparities 
can be observed even after accounting for legal and case processing factors because 
stereotypes that disadvantage certain groups are used to make crime-related attributions 
about offenders at the time of sentencing (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1996). 
The effects of legal and case processing characteristics change relatively little 
once risk factors are included in the model. Turning now to the direct effects of risk 
factors on length of incarceration, age again appears to have very little effect on sentence 
length. Only one of the three comparisons reaches statistical significance; offenders who 
are 45 years or older receive an average of about 2.4 fewer months of incarceration than 
offenders who are under 25. Married offenders receive sentences that are .7 months 
longer, on average, but the effect does not reach statistical significance. Having been 
previously convicted during the study period does not significantly change the average 
sentence length when criminal history is already accounted for.  
Among the LSI-R risk domains, the effects on incarceration length are all quite 
modest, and only some of them achieve statistical significance. The Companions domain 
score, which has virtually no effect on the decision to incarcerate, has the largest per-
point effect on incarceration length; each additional point in the Companions scale 
increases the average sentence length by 1.1 months. The other significant positive 




with .50 months of extra incarceration time, and in the Emotional/Personal domains, 
where an additional point increases the sentence length by .23 months. The 
Accommodations domain also appears to have a comparable effect, at .34 months extra 
per point, though this effect does not reach statistical significance. In two domains, higher 
scores are actually associated with lower sentences; in the Leisure/Recreation domain, an 
additional point actually reduces the sentence length by .57 months, and in the 
Alcohol/Drug domain, an additional point is associated with a .19 month decrease. 
Finally, the effect for Family/Marital is also slight and does not reach statistical 
significance.  
 Summary of Disparities in Connecticut’s Current Sentencing Scheme. In 
sum, patterns of disparity vary between the decision to incarcerate and sentence length. In 
the decision to incarcerate, racial and ethnic disparities are not observed in the aggregate, 
but accounting for legal and case processing factors and then risk factors actually 
uncovers an advantage for black and Hispanic offenders, which runs counter to 
expectations based on prior work (Baumer, 2013; Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000). In 
contrast, black and Hispanic offenders are consistently disadvantaged in the sentence 
length model; even though the addition of legal, case processing, and risk factors lessen 
the sentence length gap between these groups and whites, the differences do not 
disappear entirely. The pattern is more consistent between the two punishment outcomes 
for gender, such that males are more likely to be incarcerated and receive longer 
incarceration sentences. In both models, legal and case processing factors account for 




 Differences in SES disparities between the decision to incarcerate and sentence 
length depend upon which indicator of SES is considered. When education is the focus, 
the pattern differs between outcomes. Disparities in the decision to incarcerate according 
to educational attainment follow an unexpected pattern; in the aggregate, higher levels of 
education are associated with lower odds of incarceration, a pattern that is consistent with 
prior literature (Albonetti, 1997; Franklin, 2017), but accounting for legal/case processing 
factors and risk factors exposes a disadvantage for the most highly educated offenders. 
On the other hand, there are aggregate disparities in sentence lengths that also favor 
higher-educated offenders, but legal/case processing and risk factors appear to explain 
some of those disparities rather than reverse their direction.  
Patterns of disparity are likewise different between the two punishment outcomes 
for the other indicators of SES. In both models, greater levels of employment serve as an 
advantage in the aggregate; being a part-time or full-time employee/student decreases the 
odds of incarceration and sentence lengths. The addition of legal, case processing, and 
risk factors account for some of these disparities, but employed offenders retain an 
advantage even in the fully specified models. These trends are generally consistent with 
prior literature, which often suggests a persistent disadvantage for unemployed offenders 
(Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Myers, 1987; Wooldredge, 2010). Counter to expectations (e.g. 
Wooldredge, 2010), reliance upon social assistance is associated with an aggregate 
advantage in both the decision to incarcerate and sentence length, but the addition of 
legal/case processing factors and risk factors increases the magnitude of the effect on the 
decision to incarcerate and decreases the effect on sentence length. Finally, having a 




incarcerate; additional points on the financial problems scale increases the likelihood of 
incarceration but not sentence lengths, though the effect for the incarceration decision is 
rendered non-significant by the addition of legal/case processing and risk factors.  
These results provide evidence that there are important sociodemographic 
disparities in Connecticut’s current sentencing system. For the decision to incarcerate, 
aggregate disparities are noticeable by gender, education level, employment status, and 
financial situation. For incarceration length, there are aggregate disparities in every 
sociodemographic characteristic considered: race, ethnicity, gender, education level, 
employment status, and financial situation. These findings confirm that there are pre-
existing disparities in punishment that must be taken into account in this evaluation of the 
impact of evidence-based sentencing on social inequality. With that in mind, the analysis 
now turns toward disparities in LSI-R scores and in simulated evidence-based sentences. 
Phase 2: Disparities in LSI-R Scores and Evidence-Based Sentences 
Disparities in LSI-R Scores. Scholars argue that evidence-based sentencing 
generates sociodemographic disparities in sentencing because the correlates of recidivism 
captured in risk assessment are also correlated with defendants’ demographic 
characteristics (Hannah-Moffat, 2005, 2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 
2014b). To evaluate this proposition, it is first necessary to determine whether the 
underlying assumption that there are disparities in risk assessment is accurate. The fourth 
research question in this study asks whether there are sociodemographic disparities in 
LSI-R composite and domain scores.  
Aggregate disparities. Table 8.4 first shows differences in average LSI-R 




are substantial aggregate disparities in composite scores. The largest racial difference is 
in the Asian-white comparison: Asian defendants receive average composite scores that 
are over five points lower than white defendants. Blacks receive an average score that 
1.17 points higher than whites, and for Hispanics, the increase in risk is smaller, at .65 
additional points. There is virtually no difference in average composite scores between 
male and female offenders. Because race, ethnicity, and gender are not directly captured 
in the LSI-R, differences between racial/ethnic and gender groups are attributable to 
racial/ethnic and gender differences in items that are captured in the LSI-R assessment. 
Fully interpreting disparities among components of SES requires an 
understanding that some of these variables are drawn directly from the LSI-R risk 
assessment itself. Specifically, an offender earns one additional point each on the 
composite score if he/she is 1) currently unemployed, 2) has not completed grade 10, 3) 
has not completed grade 12, 4) has an unsatisfactory financial situation, or 5) is reliant 
upon social assistance. Therefore, the base expectation for disparities based on 
educational attainment is that compared to offenders who have not completed 10
th
 grade, 
offenders who have completed 10
th
 grade will receive one less point on the LSI-R, and 
offenders who have completed high school, some college, or post-grad education will 
receive two less points. Regarding employment, the base expectation for disparities is 
that compared to unemployed non-student offenders, offenders who have part-time or 
full-time employment will receive an average of one less point on the LSI-R. Reliance 
upon social assistance is expected to show a one-point average increase in risk scores as 
well. Finally, because the 4-point financial problems scale is collapsed into a binary 




and “relatively satisfactory” finances are given zero points, “very unsatisfactory” and 
“relatively unsatisfactory” are given one point), it is expected that compared to offenders 
with very satisfactory finances, offenders with relatively unsatisfactory or very 
unsatisfactory finances will have an average of one additional point on the LSI-R. 
Offenders with relatively satisfactory finances are expected to have the same average 
score as offenders with very satisfactory finances. Disparities beyond these expectations 
are attributable to covariance between race/gender/education/employment/finances and 
other items in the LSI-R. 
A clear and consistent pattern in composite scores emerges across all indicators of 
SES; low-SES individuals receive higher average risk scores regardless of which SES 
indicator is considered. For educational attainment, higher levels of education lead to 
lower risk scores. The difference between offenders who have and have not completed 
10
th
 grade is approximately what is expected (completing 10
th
 grade yields 1.1 fewer 
points, compared to the expected one point). However, the disparity compared to the 
reference group grows progressively larger as educational attainment increases, and the 





 grade. Completing high school nets the average offender over 
four fewer risk points than the reference group, when the expectation based on directly-
captured education items is that the difference will be only two. Offenders with college 
and post-graduate education experience earn 6.36 and 11.73 fewer points, respectively, 
when the expectation is still only two. 
There is a similar trend for employment. Compared to unemployed, non-student 




is one less point. The difference for full-time employed/student offenders is even larger, 
as they earn 10.8 fewer points on average, and the base expectation is still only one less 
point. Reliance on social assistance is associated with 6.3 additional points, compared to 
the expected one additional point. Lastly, the financial problems scale exhibits the same 
pattern as educational attainment and employment; the difference in average risk scores 
gets progressively larger as the comparison groups become less similar. Compared to 
offenders with very satisfactory finances, offenders who have relatively satisfactory 
finances receive 3.8 fewer risk points, on average. This difference is not directly captured 
in the LSI-R, so the base expectation is that there would be no difference in average 
scores between these two groups. A one-point difference is expected for the relatively 
unsatisfactory and very unsatisfactory finances groups compared to the reference group, 
however, and both comparisons far surpass this expectation: offenders with relatively 
unsatisfactory finances earn 10.5 fewer points, and offenders with very unsatisfactory 
finances earn an average of nearly 14 fewer points.   
These observations indicate that there are indeed disparities in LSI-R composite 
scores. Though race and ethnicity are not directly captured in the LSI-R, black and 
Hispanic offenders receive higher average risk scores than whites, while Asian offenders 
receive substantially lower scores. This is consistent with prior work, which often finds a 
risk score gap between racial/ethnic minorities and whites (Manchak et al., 2009; 
Monahan, Skeem, & Lowenkamp, 2017). However, the magnitude of the disadvantage 
for black and Hispanic offenders is quite modest, and it provides at most tepid support for 
critics of risk assessments and evidence-based sentencing, who often focus their concerns 




2014a,b). Interestingly, the difference in composite scores between male and female 
offenders is negligible, which is perhaps only slightly surprising, as prior research 
looking at the gender gap in risk scores yields mixed conclusions (Andrews & Bonta, 
2003; Lowenkamp et al., 2001; Mihailides et al., 2005). The trends for educational 
attainment, employment status, and financial situation all support the conclusion that 
low-SES offenders receive higher LSI-R scores. Moreover, these differences are not 
attributable entirely to the individual LSI-R items that directly measure them; low-
educated offenders, unemployed offenders, and offenders with less satisfactory financial 
situations must receive higher average scores in at least some of the other LSI-R 
domains. To determine which specific domains contribute to each of the observed 
disparities, differences in domain scores are evaluated next. 
Table 8.4 also shows differences by race, ethnicity, gender, and indicators of SES 
in the 10 LSI-R domain scores. The largest domain score differences between black and 
white offenders exist in the Criminal History and Education/Employment domains, which 
disadvantage black offenders, and in the Alcohol/Drug and Emotional/Personal domains, 
which actually appear to counteract that disadvantage for blacks. Black offenders also 
have small disadvantages, ranging from .04 to .37 additional points, in the other six 
domains, which explains why the overall composite score indicates a relatively modest 
disadvantage for black offenders. For Hispanics, the largest disadvantage is centered in 
the Education/Employment domain and is nearly double the magnitude of the composite 
difference. The next two largest domain differences are in the Alcohol/Drug and 
Emotional/Personal domains, where Hispanics have significantly lower scores than 




small and favor whites, which leads to a relatively small composite disadvantage for 
Hispanics. Comparisons between Asian and white offenders are fairly consistent across 
domains; Asian offenders receive lower domain scores in seven of the ten domains, and 
among two of the remaining domains, the difference does not even reach statistical 
significance. The largest differences are in the Criminal History and Alcohol/Drug 
domains, where Asian offenders average 1.26 and 1.38 points lower than whites. 
Among the racial/ethnic domain comparisons, then, patterns for black and 
Hispanic offenders are very similar; the Education/Employment domain contributes the 
most to composite disadvantages for black and Hispanic offenders, and lower scores on 
the Alcohol/Drug and Emotional/Personal domains appear to mitigate much of what 
would have otherwise been large disadvantages in composite risk scores. These findings 
are fairly consistent with what little prior work there is; for example, Chenane and 
colleagues (2015) found that both black and Hispanic inmates had higher 
Education/Employment scores and lower Alcohol/Drug and Emotional/Personal scores 
than white inmates. Asian offenders, on the other hand, accumulate substantial 
advantages in several domains that are not counteracted in any meaningful way; 
differences in the Criminal History and Alcohol/Drug domains alone given Asian 
offenders an advantage of over 2.6 points, and other domains differences only add to that 
gap.  
Turning to gender differences in domain scores, the two most prominent score 
differences counteract each other. They are in the Criminal History domain, where men 
score .87 points higher, and the Emotional/Personal domain, where men score .84 points 




Companions, Alcohol/Drug, and Attitudes/Orientations domains, while women score 
higher on the Financial, Family/Marital, and Accommodations domains, though the 
differences are not as stark. These results are also consistent with prior work; studies 
often find that men score higher on Criminal History, while women score higher on the 
Financial and Emotional/Personal scales (e.g. Manchak et al., 2009; Mihailides et al., 
2005). The nearly non-existent gender difference in composite scores, then, masks 
several more noticeable domain disparities that suggest different risk factors are more 
prominent for male or female offenders.  
As was the case with the composite score trends, the trends in domain scores for 
each SES indicator are remarkably consistent: low-SES offenders receive higher average 
domain scores. This is true in nearly every domain for every pairwise comparison, 
regardless of whether education, employment, reliance on social assistance, or financial 
situation is used as the indicator of SES.
37
 As could reasonably be expected, the largest 
differences for several SES indicators are in the Education/Employment category, but 
while some of the differences can be explained by items that directly measure the 
education or employment status of the offender, the differences exceed the contribution 
of those particular items in most instances (e.g. two items in the Education/Employment 
domain measure educational attainment, but the differences between education groups 
are more than two points in all applicable comparisons). Other notable sources of 
composite score disparity are the Finances domain, which is subject to the same 
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th
 grade education, a high school degree, or some college experience receive 
higher risk scores than offenders with less than a 10
th
 grade education, while offenders with a post-grad 




individual item considerations as Education/Employment, and the Criminal History 
domain.   
The findings for SES indicators show that low-SES offenders are at a substantial 
disadvantage in the LSI-R risk evaluation process. Not only are educational attainment, 
employment status, reliance on social assistance, and financial situation captured directly 
in the LSI-R, they additionally influence risk scores indirectly by increasing the 
likelihood of higher scores in all other domains. This is not an entirely new revelation. 
Scholars have argued that traditional indicators of recidivism risk are often proxies for 
social class (e.g. Silver & Miller, 2002). This practice is grounded in data-supported 
offending patterns; there is ample research showing that low SES is predictive of future 
criminality (see Gendreau et al, 1996 for meta-analytic evidence). That said, the marked 
consistency of these domain-specific findings within an assessment tool like the LSI-R, 
which identifies a seemingly diverse range of criminogenic factors, provides strong 
evidence that risk evaluation can easily become an exercise in identifying low-class 
offenders. 
Disparities accounting for other sociodemographic factors. It is possible that 
these aggregate sociodemographic disparities may overlap statistically with each other; 
for example, there may be substantial shared variance in LSI-R scores among the separate 
indicators of SES. To account for this possibility and identify the unique relationship 
between each sociodemographic characteristic and the LSI-R, multivariate regression 
analyses assess the joint impact of race, ethnicity, gender, and SES on risk scores. Table 




First, an ordinary least squares regression shows that significant (though 
sometimes modest) sociodemographic disparities exist for all characteristics examined. 
After controlling for other sociodemographics, black and Hispanic offenders receive 
slightly lower risk scores than whites: .32 and 1.58 points lower, respectively. For Asians, 
the advantage is slightly larger, at nearly three points. Consistent with the descriptive 
statistics, the gender gap remains relatively small in the regression model, with males 
earning only 1.2 points more than females. The indicators of SES, on the other hand, 
again show a consistent disadvantage for low-SES offenders that grows progressively 
larger as education, employment, and financial stability lessen. Though the differences 
here are not as large as the aggregate disparities, they are still substantial. The education 
difference rises to well over eight points between the highest- and lowest-educated 
offenders, for employment the gap is nearly six points between the full-time employed 
and unemployed offenders, social assistance is associated with over three additional 
points, and the top and bottom of the financial situation scale differ by 8.7 points. These 
findings reinforce the conclusions drawn from the consideration of aggregate disparities 
in composite scores; while composite scores are similar among racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups, indicators of SES maintain strong and consistent associations. 
 Ordered logistic regressions are also used in Table 8.5 to evaluate each domain 
from the LSI-R in turn. Unlike the ordinary least squares model, these models focus on 
the probability of membership in higher or lower categories rather than on risk point 
differences, so they are not directly comparable to the aggregate difference estimates 
detailed in Table 8.4. However, these models still provide valuable additional information 




Specifically, most of the relationships between race, ethnicity, gender, and SES 
categories and LSI-R scores observed in the multivariate ordered logistic regression 
models are in the same direction as they were observed in the aggregate statistics. To 
illustrate, the logistic model predicting Criminal History scores still shows that black, 
male, less educated, unemployed, assistance-reliant, and financially unstable offenders 
tend to receive higher scores. Interestingly, after controlling for gender and SES, 
Hispanic offenders are less likely than whites to be in a higher Criminal History category, 
a finding that stands in direct contrast to the aggregate descriptive statistics. A few other 
inconsistencies like this between the aggregate and multivariate analyses can be 
identified. For example, black and Hispanic offenders are less likely to receive higher 
Family/Marital scores only in the multivariate regression, and some of the relationships 
for Asian, low-educated, and assistance-reliant offenders that are significant in the 
aggregate statistics do not reach statistical significance in multivariate regressions. 
Generally speaking, though, the results from the multivariate analysis reinforce the 
conclusions drawn from the aggregate descriptive analysis: while domain scores do not 
consistently favor any particular racial, ethnic, or gender group, low-educated, 
unemployed, assistance-reliant, and financially unstable offenders receive higher scores 
across nearly all LSI-R domains. 
Summary of disparities in the LSI-R. Overall, there are composite and domain 
disparities in LSI-R scores. The composite differences are modestly disadvantageous for 
black and Hispanic offenders, much more so for low-SES offenders. Asian offenders 
receive substantially lower scores than any other racial/ethnic group, and there is not 




risk domain patterns for race/ethnicity and gender are a mixed bag—some domains yield 
higher scores for black, Hispanic, Asian, and male offenders, while other domains yield 
lower scores—, the composite disadvantage for SES indicators is driven by disadvantages 
in every domain. These composite disparities may translate into disparities in punishment 
in an evidence-based sentencing scheme. The next section of the analysis simulates 
evidence-based sentences that incorporate these LSI-R risk scores. 
Simulating Evidence-Based Sentences. As discussed in Chapter 6, this study 
relies on the relationship between risk and punishment in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing scheme to illustrate the potential effects of incorporating LSI-R scores into 
punishment decisions. The first step in the evidence-based simulation process is therefore 
to estimate this relationship. Table 8.6 shows results for both the in/out and sentence 
length decisions. In this negative binomial hurdle model, sentence length is regressed on 
legal/case processing factors and composite LSI-R scores. This model constrains all other 
potential determinants of sentencing, most notably race, ethnicity, gender, and SES, to 0.  
The odds ratios and average marginal effects obtained in this model are very 
similar to those obtained in Tables 8.2 and 8.3, when the sociodemographic variables of 
interest were also included as predictors. In this model, a relationship between composite 
LSI-R scores and punishment can also be observed. Each additional point on the LSI-R is 
associated with 2% higher odds of incarceration and with .18 months of additional 
incarceration time, on average. These marginal increases represent the relationship 
between aggregate risk and punishment in Connecticut’s current system. Though they 
seem trivial at first glance, it is worth remembering that in this sample, LSI-R scores 




scored a 51 are expected to have over twice the odds of incarceration and over nine 
additional months of incarceration length than the lowest-risk offenders who scored a 0.
38
 
 From this model, the researcher first uses a post-estimation procedure to predict 
the likelihood of incarceration for each offender.
39
 For each offender in the sample, this 
procedure yields an expected probability between 0 and 1 that the offender would be 
incarcerated, given his/her legal/case processing characteristics and LSI-R composite 
score. These predicted probabilities can be interpreted as each offender’s likelihood of 
incarceration in a system where only legal/case processing characteristics and LSI-R 
composite scores are allowed to determine punishment. These predicted probabilities are 
therefore treated as the predicted probabilities of incarceration for each offender in a 
simplified evidence-based sentencing scheme. 
 Using these predicted probabilities, the researcher assigns each offender either an 
evidence-based incarceration or non-incarceration sentence. As discussed in Chapter 6, a 
threshold rule is used to make these assignments. The researcher begins with a .5 
threshold rule: if the offender has a probability of at least .5 of being incarcerated based 
on legal/case processing factors and LSI-R scores alone, the offender is assigned 
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 Supplementary analyses suggest that the relationship between LSI-R composite scores and punishment is 
larger when legal and case processing variables are excluded from the model. When composite scores are 
the only predictor of punishment, each additional point on the LSI-R composite score is associated with a 
6% increase in the odds of incarceration and .31 additional months of incarceration. This translates into a 
threefold difference in the odds of incarceration and over 15 months of incarceration on average between 
offenders at the top and bottom of the LSI-R distribution. This provides some evidence that legal and case 
processing characteristics typically captured in official court records do partially tap into elements of 
offenders’ risk of recidivism.    
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 The hurdle model used to model punishment in this study is not supported by post-estimation prediction 
commands in Stata. Therefore, in order to generate these predictions, the researcher separately estimated a 
logistic regression that predicted the in/out decision using the same independent variables. As a consistency 
check, the coefficients from the separate logistic regression were compared to the coefficients obtained 
from the logistic component of the hurdle model; the coefficients were identical, indicating that the hurdle 
model produced the same estimates as the logistic regression did separately. Following the logistic 
regression, the Stata post-estimation command “predict” was entered in Stata. This command yielded 




incarceration. If not, the offender is assigned non-incarceration. However, this decision 
rule is expected to yield an artificially low proportion of evidence-based incarceration 
sentences (see Footnote 25), which may in turn impact punishment disparities observed 
in the evidence-based system. To consider the sensitivity of this study’s findings to the .5 
threshold, thresholds of .4 and .6 are treated as alternative specifications as well. 
 The next step in the evidence-based sentencing simulation process requires 
assigning a sentence length to each evidence-based incarceration sentence. Returning to 
the model detailed in Table 8.6, the researcher uses a second post-estimation procedure to 
predict an expected incarceration length to each offender.
40
 This procedure yields an 
expected sentence length for each offender if incarcerated, given his/her legal/case 
processing characteristics and LSI-R composite score. Offenders who were assigned an 
evidence-based incarceration sentence using the threshold decision rule are then assigned 
their evidence-based incarceration lengths. Offenders who were assigned an evidence-
based non-incarceration sentence are assigned an evidence-based incarceration length of 
0. 
 In the final step of the simulation process, evidence-based sentences issued in 
cases involving a mandatory minimum conviction are adjusted to meet the mandatory 
minimum penalty. For cases in which the mandatory minimum penalty exceeds the 
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all predictors for the sample of offenders who were issued a non-zero incarceration sentence. The Stata 
“predict” command was then used to generate the expected sentence length based on legal/case processing 








Table 8.7 shows key statistics for the resultant simulated evidence-based 
sentencing distributions. As expected, the use of the .5 threshold leads to a substantially 
smaller group of evidence-based incarceration sentences; only 23% of offenders are 
issued an incarceration sentence in this scenario, compared to the 34% of offenders in 
Connecticut who were actually incarcerated. The .4 threshold nets the most similar 
proportion of incarcerated offenders, at 33%, and the .6 threshold produces an extremely 
low proportion, at just 15% incarcerated.  
Looking at average sentence lengths among evidence-based incarcerated 
offenders, the average length in each threshold scenario is higher than the average 
sentence length actually received. As the probability threshold for evidence-based 
incarceration increases, so does the average sentence length of the offenders who are 
incarcerated in the evidence-based system. Even in the lowest threshold scenario, where 
offenders are assigned incarceration if their probability of evidence-based incarceration is 
at least .4, the average sentence length is over five months longer than the actual average 
sentence lengths received. This may be an indication that in Connecticut, many offenders 
with a low probability of incarceration based on their legal/case processing factors and 
risk of recidivism are sentenced to short stints in jail or prison rather than being assigned 
alternative sanctions. In fact, of the 22,515 offenders in the sample who were issued an 
actual incarceration sentence, 9,403 (42%) were assigned a probability of evidence-based 
incarceration less than .4 [results not shown]. Furthermore, those 9,403 offenders were 
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sentenced to an average of 6.68 months of actual incarceration, a figure well below the 
full group average of 19.22 months.
42
 At the same time, it may also be an indication that 
Connecticut judges already divert many offenders with higher likelihoods of evidence-
based incarceration based on their legal/case processing factors and risk levels away from 
incarceration, perhaps to rehabilitative programming.
43
 Among the 44,469 offenders who 
were issued non-incarceration sentences, 2,822 (6%) were assigned a probability of 
evidence-based incarceration greater than .6, suggesting that at least a few of the 
offenders most likely to be incarcerated were diverted [results not shown]. 
Disparities in Simulated Evidence-Based Sentences 
It is clear that the evidence-based sentencing simulation procedures generate 
simulated sentences that differ substantially from the sentences actually issued in 
Connecticut during the study period. However, it is unclear whether or not there are 
sociodemographic disparities in these simulated evidence-based sentences, as there are in 
Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme. The fifth research question asks to what extent 
sociodemographic disparities can be observed in the simulated evidence-based sentencing 
scenario. 
Table 8.8 displays aggregate disparities in the evidence-based decision to 
incarcerate and sentence length, drawn from a negative binomial hurdle model when the 
.4 incarceration threshold is used. No control variables are included in this model. The 
same model is also estimated under the .5 and .6 threshold conditions (results displayed 
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 At this point, however, it is important to remember that the study does not have a reliable way to identify 
sentences of time served in the dataset. It is therefore likely that some of the 9,403 cases recorded as 
receiving an incarceration sentence are cases where the offender was sentenced to a short period of time 
served, which may explain why the data suggests that many offenders with low probabilities of 
incarceration received short incarceration sentences. 
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 Though it would be both interesting and informative to consider what alternative sanctions/programming 
offenders with higher likelihoods of evidence-based incarceration who were issued non-incarceration 




in Tables 8.9 and 8.10). Though the coefficients for each variable are similar across 
conditions, there is a distinct pattern in which several of the disparities grow slightly 
larger as the incarceration probability threshold increases. To remain consistent with 
other facets of this study that are expected to lead to conservative estimates of evidence-
based punishment disparities, the presentation of these results will focus on evidence-
based disparities when the incarceration probability threshold of .4 is used. This condition 
produces the smallest observed disparities in punishment.
44
 
Even in the .4 threshold condition, which has the smallest odds ratios, there are 
substantial differences in the likelihood of evidence-based incarceration based on race, 
gender, education, employment status, and financial situation. Black offenders have 38% 
higher odds of evidence-based incarceration compared to whites. Males have just shy of 
twice the odds of evidence-based incarceration compared to females. Trends in the odds 
ratios for education groups indicate that higher educational attainment leads to 
progressively lower odds of evidence-based incarceration, ranging from 22% to 52% 
lower, and only the comparison between offenders who completed 10
th
 grade and 
offenders who did not fails to reach statistical (and undoubtedly practical) significance. 
Employment trends likewise show that part-time employment reduces the odds of 
evidence-based incarceration by 42%, and full-time employment reduces them by 49%. 
Reliance upon government assistance and additional points on the financial problems 
scale also both increase the likelihood of evidence-based incarceration by 19% and 26%, 
respectively. The one general domain in which some disparities do not emerge is 
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race/ethnicity: in the evidence-based sentencing models, Hispanic and Asian offenders do 
not have significantly higher or lower odds of incarceration than whites. 
These results largely conform to expectations based on both prior literature and 
earlier findings from this study’s own consideration of disparities in the LSI-R. As 
discussed in the results from Phase 1, prior work tends to find disadvantages for black, 
Hispanic, male, and low-SES offenders at sentencing, much of which can be explained by 
differences in legally relevant factors (Bontrager et al., 2013; Franklin, 2017; Mitchell, 
2005; Spohn, 2000; Wooldredge, 2010). With the exception of Hispanic offenders, those 
same trends are observed here, where punishment variation is driven entirely by legal and 
case processing factors plus LSI-R composite scores. Black, Hispanic, and low-SES 
offenders in this study’s sample also received higher LSI-R composite scores, which 
likely further contributed to disadvantages in evidence-based incarceration for those 
groups. 
Turning now to disparities in evidence-based incarceration lengths, Table 8.8 also 
illustrates aggregate disparities resulting from the zero-truncated negative binomial 
component of the hurdle model under the .4 incarceration threshold. Again, a comparison 
between the three threshold conditions in Tables 8.8, 8.9, and 8.10 show that the .4 
threshold model yields the smallest sociodemographic disparities (according to average 
marginal effects; negative binomial coefficients show a slightly less consistent trend 
across models), and the presentation of results focuses on disparities in this more 
conservative model. It should be noted this time, however, that the magnitude of the 




Unlike the evidence-based decision to incarcerate model, the evidence-based 
length model reveals no major differences according to race or ethnicity. Black offenders 
receive, on average, only 2.6 additional months of incarceration than whites, while 
Hispanic offenders receive 1.7 more, but with large standard errors these differences do 
not reach statistical significance. Asians receive an average of 5.77 additional months 
compared to whites, but this difference is not statistically significant either. On the other 
hand, male offenders receive an average of 3.3 more months of incarceration than 
females, a difference which does achieve statistical significance. 
There are SES disparities in evidence-based incarceration lengths as well. Among 
the education groups, more education is generally associated with less incarceration time. 
Compared to offenders who did not complete 10
th
 grade, offenders who completed 10
th
 
grade would receive 2.6, offenders who obtained a high school degree or experienced 
some college would receive 3.5, and offenders who had post-graduate education would 
receive 5.2 fewer months of evidence-based incarceration, on average. Unemployment is 
also a disadvantage in evidence-based sentencing; compared to unemployed offenders, 
part-time and full-time employed/student offenders would receive an average of 5.2 and 
4.6 fewer months of incarceration. In terms of financial situation, reliance on social 
assistance is associated with 5.4 fewer months of evidence-based incarceration, but points 
on the financial problems scale appear to have little relationship with it.  
In this model, the biggest surprise is that there is relatively little evidence of racial 
or ethnic inequality in simulated evidence-based sentence lengths. None of the threshold 
conditions reveal significant disparities between black, Hispanic, Asian, and white 




legal/case processing factors and risk factors appear to generate a fair amount of racial 
and ethnic disparity in Connecticut’s current system. So it would have been reasonable to 
expect that sentence lengths predicated entirely on those factors would have exhibited 
noteworthy disparities as well. However, these results indicate that racial (though not 
ethnic) inequality is centered more in the decision to incarcerate than in incarceration 
lengths in the evidence-based scenario. The findings for gender and SES effects in 
evidence-based sentence lengths are less surprising. Large portions of the disparities that 
disadvantage male and low-SES offenders in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme 
can be explained by differences in legal and case processing factors, and low-SES 
offenders receive substantially higher LSI-R composite scores (though the same cannot 
be said for males and the LSI-R) regardless of which SES indicator is considered.  
Gender and SES disparities in the simulated evidence-based sentence lengths were 
therefore expected. 
The trends across the .4, .5, and .6 threshold models reveal interesting information 
about the distribution of evidence-based incarceration risk and sentence length among 
different sociodemographic groups. Because moving from a .4 incarceration threshold to 
a .6 incarceration threshold increases the magnitude of disparities in the decision to 
incarcerate, one can ascertain that black, male, and low-SES offenders are 
overrepresented more among the group of offenders with a risk of evidence-based 
incarceration over .6 than they are among offenders with a risk between .4 and .6 (who 
are assigned incarceration in the .4 model but not in the .6). In other words, incarceration 
disparities for black, male, and low-SES offenders are more noticeable at the upper end 




incarcerated in the simulated evidence-based scenario, than they are in the middle of the 
distribution where there is less certainty.  
This inference can be demonstrated descriptively. Black offenders make up 33% 
of the offenders with a probability between .4 and .6, but 37% of offenders with a 
probability above .6. For white offenders, the opposite is true: 46% of the mid-range 
probability group is white, while only 42% of the high-probability group is. Male 
offenders likewise make up 86% of the mid-range probability group and 90% of the high-
probability group. The same pattern extends to most of the lowest-SES group within each 
SES indicator. Offenders who are the least-educated, unemployed, and have the least 
satisfactory finances make up 17%, 72%, and 28% of the mid-range probability group but 
19%, 77%, and 31% of the high-probability group. The opposite trends are observed for 
the highest-educated, full-time employed, and most financially satisfactory offenders. For 
those who are reliant on social assistance, the proportion is nearly the same between 
threshold groups (55% vs 56%). 
Moreover, because moving from a .4 to a .6 threshold also increases the 
magnitude of disparities in the simulated evidence-based sentence lengths, one can use 
the same logic to deduce that the gaps between black and white, male and female, and 
low-SES and high-SES offenders in expected evidence-based sentence lengths are larger 
at the top of the spectrum than in the middle as well. Descriptive statistics again match 
this conclusion. The average difference between white and black offenders’ expected 
sentence lengths is .21 months in the mid-probability group and 4.06 months in the high-
probability group. For gender, the difference actually favors males in the mid-probability 




Similar trends exist within SES groups. These observations together suggest that it is 
among the more serious cases, where legal/case processing factors tend to be severe 
and/or risk scores tend to be high, that black, male, and low-SES offenders are the most 
disadvantaged. 
By and large, the evidence-based sentences simulated in this study do contain 
their own set of sociodemographic disparities. In the evidence-based scenario’s decision 
to incarcerate, black, male, and low-SES offenders would be at a substantial 
disadvantage. In terms of evidence-based sentence lengths, male and low-SES offenders 
would tend to receive a few additional months of incarceration. Absent context, these 
findings provide preliminary evidence that the implementation of evidence-based 
sentencing in Connecticut may lead to disparate outcomes that further disadvantages 
some traditionally marginalized groups, such as black and low-SES individuals. Does 
evidence-based sentencing have the potential to foster social inequality in Connecticut? 
Patterns of disparity in the evidence-based sentences simulated in this study provide some 
indirect evidence that points to yes. However, earlier findings in this study indicate that 
sociodemographic disparities exist under Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme as 
well, which brings a different question to the forefront: does evidence-based sentencing 
have the potential to worsen existing social inequality in Connecticut? This more nuanced 
question requires consideration of disparities in simulated evidence-based sentences 
relative to disparities in Connecticut’s current system. 
Phase 3: Comparing Disparities in Actual and Simulated Sentences 
The sixth and final research question in this study asks to what extent the 




to make sociodemographic disparities in punishment larger or smaller. To get at this 
important question, the final phase of this study compares disparities observed in 
Connecticut’s current sentencing system to disparities observed in the simulated 
evidence-based sentencing scenario. Table 8.11 displays the odds ratios observed in the 
actual and simulated evidence-based models for the decision to incarcerate, as well as 




Based on these results, simulated evidence-based sentences do not exhibit 
disparities in the likelihood of incarceration that are consistently greater or smaller than 
disparities in actual sentences, but several significant differences do emerge. Black 
offenders are disadvantaged to a substantially greater extent in simulated evidence-based 
incarceration compared to whites, and while Hispanic offenders maintain a slight 
advantage in the observed decision to incarcerate, they have a slight disadvantage in the 
simulated evidence-based decision to incarcerate. The advantage for Asian offenders 
grows larger in the simulated sentences, but the effect never reaches statistical 
significance. On the other hand, the gender gap appears to be somewhat smaller in 
simulated evidence-based sentences, though males retain a significant disadvantage 
regardless.  
The potential effects of evidence-based sentencing on SES disparities are likewise 
mixed. Disparities based on educational attainment are greater in the simulated evidence-
based sentences; offenders who obtained a high school degree, completed at least some 
college, or had some post-graduate education experience all receive greater advantages in 
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the evidence-based scenario. In contrast, the effects on punishment of employment status 
are statistically significantly smaller in the simulated incarceration decision, albeit by 
relatively modest margins. Evidence-based sentencing has mixed effects on the two 
financial indicators as well. Reliance upon social assistance is an advantage in the actual 
decision to incarcerate, but it appears as a noteworthy disadvantage in the evidence-based 
decision to incarcerate. Meanwhile, each additional point on the financial problems scale 
is associated with larger increases in the likelihood of incarceration in the evidence-based 
scenario. 
Overall, for the decision to incarcerate, disparities according to race, ethnicity, 
educational attainment, and financial situation are greater in the evidence-based sentences 
simulated in this study; consistent with scholarly criticisms of evidence-based sentencing 
(Hannah-Moffat, 2005, 2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014a,b), black, 
Hispanic, less educated, and financially unstable offenders are disadvantaged more in the 
evidence-based decision to incarcerate than they were in Connecticut’s existing 
sentencing scheme. The gender and employment gap, on the other hand, are slightly 
smaller in evidence-based sentences, though men and unemployed offenders are still 
significantly more likely to be incarcerated.
46
 
Turning one more time back to sentence lengths, Table 8.12 displays the average 
marginal effects observed in actual and simulated evidence-based sentence lengths. 
Again, arrows are included to show whether each disparity grows or shrinks in the 
simulated evidence-based model. This table shows very different results for the effects of 
evidence-based sentencing than were observed in the decision to incarcerate 
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comparisons. Here, every statistically significant differences shows less disparity in the 
evidence-based scenario; the disadvantages for black, Hispanic, male, less educated, 
unemployed, and financially unstable offenders (based on reliance on government 
assistance) are all statistically significantly smaller in simulated evidence-based sentence 
lengths. Furthermore, some of these differences are quite substantial. The average 
marginal effects for black and Hispanic offenders shrink by 68% and 72%, respectively, 
and the average marginal effect for males decreases by 54%. The significant reductions in 
average marginal effects for SES indicators are somewhat smaller but still meaningful, 
ranging from 7% to 44%.
47
 The effects for Asians, offenders who either completed 10
th
 
grade or had some post-graduate education, and offenders with lower financial problems 
scores do not differ substantially between the actual and simulated evidence-based 
sentence length models. 
Circling back to the final research question in the study, these results provide 
preliminary evidence that evidence-based sentencing does have the potential to increase 
some sociodemographic disparities in punishment, primarily through differences in the 
likelihood of incarceration. Disadvantages for black, Hispanic, less educated, and 
financially unstable offenders are larger in the simulated evidence-based decision to 
incarcerate than in the decision to incarcerate in Connecticut’s current system. This 
suggests that structural sources of disparity, such as LSI-R scores used in an evidence-
based sentencing scheme, have the potential to generate as big or even bigger disparities 
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 The magnitude of differences tends to be smaller, but only few substantive conclusions change when 
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of reliance on social assistance is larger in simulated evidence-based sentence lengths than in actual 
sentence lengths when the .5 threshold model is used, and the effects of both employment and reliance on 
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in punishment than judicial discretion alone. In stark contrast, disparities are almost 
uniformly lessened in simulated evidence-based sentence lengths. Though disparities in 
simulated sentence lengths are observable, they constitute a much smaller amount of 
inequality than disparities in Connecticut’s current sentence lengths.
48
 All in all, these 
findings suggest that an evidence-based sentencing scheme has the potential to 
exacerbate social inequality in Connecticut by creating larger differences in incarceration 
rates between groups, but once incarceration has been assigned, the addition of risk 
assessment scores into the sentencing process has less potential to worsen existing 
disparities and may even reduce them to a degree. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
Research on social inequality in criminal punishment has maintained a position at 
the forefront of courtroom literature for decades, spurred on by countless studies that 
identify sociodemographic disparities in sentencing (Baumer, 2013; Daly & Bordt, 1995; 
Mitchell, 2005; Ulmer, 2012; Wu & Spohn, 2009; Zatz, 2000). The advent of innovations 
aimed at reforming sentencing processes in the criminal justice system introduced new 
sources of disparity in punishment, opening the door for scholars to examine the effects 
of sentencing reform on observed disparities (Bushway & Piehl, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2007; 
Zatz, 2000), but newer innovations such as evidence-based sentencing have not been 
evaluated in this manner.  
Evidence-based sentencing is lauded by supporters as a data-driven approach to 
risk evaluation and sentencing, one that has the potential to help judges more effectively 
differentiate between high-risk and low-risk offenders, identify offenders who would 
benefit most from rehabilitative programming, and reduce reliance on incarceration 
(Hyatt et al., 2011; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Warren, 2007). At the same time, critics 
assail the practice for its use of profiling and possibly discriminatory consideration of 
factors that historically correlate with members in marginalized groups (Hannah-Moffat, 
2005, 2013; Starr, 2014b). Risk assessments, while perhaps more precise than clinical 
judgments, may still generate substantial margins of error in risk prediction (Berk & 
Bleich, 2014; Harcourt, 2007; Hart et al., 2007). Lastly, and most relevant for this study, 
scholars argue that evidence-based sentencing will increase social inequalities in 




This study seeks to inform the efficacy of this final criticism, capitalizing on 
recent interest from the state of Connecticut in understanding the potential effects of 
introducing the LSI-R into its sentencing system. Connecticut, which does not currently 
have sentencing guidelines, is well-suited for this study of evidence-based sentencing. 
Broad offense categories allow ample room for judicial discretion that can be shaped by 
risk evaluation, and the state’s familiarity with (and openness to) risk assessment tools 
helps maximize the study’s potential utility.  
At its core, the study evaluates disparities based on race, ethnicity, gender, and 
SES in three settings: Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme, the LSI-R, and a 
simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario. This chapter discusses results from these 
three setting evaluations, as well as how the results can be combined conceptually to 
inform how the introduction of the LSI-R into sentencing decisions may be expected to 
alter patterns of sociodemographic disparity in punishment. It concludes with a 
consideration of study limitations, directions for future research, and policy implications. 
Discussion of Findings 
In order to properly evaluate whether  evidence-based sentencing has the potential 
to change sentencing patterns in Connecticut, the first aim of the study focused on 
characterizing patterns of disparity according to race, ethnicity, gender, and SES (as 
captured by educational attainment, employment status, and financial situation) in 
Connecticut’s existing sentencing structure. Using sentences issued to offenders during a 
three-year period, analyses were conducted to first identify aggregate sociodemographic 




of those aggregate disparities could be explained by legal and case processing factors and 
later factors that tap into offenders’ risk of recidivism as well. 
Results from negative binomial hurdle models showed some interesting trends. 
Patterns of disparity differed substantially between the decision to incarcerate and 
sentence length. In the decision to incarcerate, aggregate disparities by gender and SES 
generally disadvantage male and low-SES offenders, though financial instability 
appeared to serve as an advantage. Accounting for legal, case processing, and risk factors 
reduced the gender, employment, and financial problems gaps but exposed a 
disadvantage for the most highly educated offenders. Meanwhile, the aggregate analysis 
unexpectedly showed little disparity according to race and ethnicity, and the addition of 
legal/ case processing characteristics and risk factors actually revealed a significant 
advantage for black and Hispanic offenders in the decision to incarcerate. 
Among sentence lengths, however, most of the social inequality patterns take 
another form. Black, and Hispanic offenders were disadvantaged in the aggregate and 
maintain a disadvantage even after legal, case processing, and risk factors are controlled. 
This trend is more consistent with traditional theory, which posits that racial and ethnic 
minorities will be perceived as more blameworthy, more risky and dangerous, and more 
able to endure the harsh conditions of incarceration (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998). For male, low-educated, and unemployed offenders, aggregate disadvantages were 
explained partially by legal/case processing characteristics and factors that estimate risk 
of recidivism. Disparities by financial situation also depended upon the indicator used; 




persists after accounting for legal/case processing and risk factors, but no relationship 
between the financial problems scale and sentence length was observed. 
The first conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that sentencing disparities 
exist in Connecticut in the absence of an evidence-based sentencing scheme. In the 
aggregate, disparities in every sociodemographic characteristic considered were evident 
in one or both of the decision to incarcerate and sentence length. Even after accounting 
for legal and case processing factors, several disparities persisted, and in some cases the 
residual disparities were still large enough to be substantively meaningful. These results 
are consistent with expectations; as noted throughout this study, prior research supports 
the notion that sociodemographic disparities in punishment exist at least some of the 
time, and in some contexts, even after accounting for legally relevant offender and 
offense characteristics (Baumer, 2013; Daly & Bordt, 1995; Mitchell, 2005; Ulmer, 2012; 
Wu & Spohn, 2009; Zatz, 2000).  
As described by theorizing from the behavioral economics and sociolegal 
literatures, these persistent disparities may be the result of judges using heuristics to make 
sentencing decisions under conditions of limited time and resources (Scholz, 1983). In 
high-pressure situations, judges turn to stereotypes and other cognitive shortcuts that 
make decision-making more efficient but also open it up to errors that may systematically 
disadvantage certain groups of individuals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When judges 
use heuristics to inform their perceptions of offenders’ blameworthiness and risk, the 
process can result in biased perceptions and ultimately generate sociodemographic 
disparities in punishment (Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Even after 




However, the finding in this study that black and Hispanic offenders are less 
likely to receive incarceration sentences than whites after controlling for legal, case 
processing factors, and risk does not sync well with popular sentencing theorizing, which 
typically relies on cultural stereotypes of racial and ethnic minority individuals as violent, 
unstable criminals to explain why judges are more likely to issue those groups harsher 
punishment at sentencing (e.g. see Steffensmeier et al., 1998). One potential explanation 
for this observation is provided by Bernstein and colleagues (1977), who discuss the 
potential for a cultural acclimatization effect following their discovery that white 
defendants were sentenced more severely than black or Hispanic defendants in a sample 
of male felony offenders in New York (see p. 753). Because deviant behavior is often 
viewed as acceptable in non-white subcultures, they argue, familiarity with non-white 
subcultures normalizes non-white crime in the eyes of judges and prosecutors, making it 
appear less offensive. White subcultures are less tolerant of deviant behavior, on the other 
hand, so white crime is viewed as a violation of both the law and white cultural norms, 
and it consequently earns more severe punishment for white offenders. Though this 
phenomenon cannot explain specifically why racial and ethnic effects would differ 
between the decision to incarcerate and sentence lengths, it does offer a meaningful 
counterpoint to the expectations of attribution and focal concerns theories and provides 
some context for why minority offenders may be treated relatively leniently in some 
cases. Judges may view crimes by white offenders as more deviant and therefore more 
deserving of harsher punishment. 
This finding may additionally reflect unique racial and socioeconomic dynamics 




state is relatively wealthy as a whole, income inequality between the top and bottom 
earners is substantial (Sommeiller, Price, & Wazeter, 2016; U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). 
With such little racial and ethnic diversity, it stands to reason that a nontrivial part of 
Connecticut’s poorest proletariat is comprised of white residents. The existence of a 
white underclass, whose pathology includes the same limited social and economic 
resources that have historically characterized minority populations, would help explain 
why white offenders receive harsher punishments, on average, in the criminal justice 
system. Subject to the same marginalization as minority offenders in other more diverse 
areas of the U.S., many white offenders may be punished for their deviance with 
sentences that exceed those of other racial and ethnic groups. 
In the context of this study’s larger goals, these results altogether highlight the 
need to identify the correct baseline levels of disparity before assessing how evidence-
based sentencing might change them. The disparities observed in Connecticut’s existing 
sentencing scheme serve as reference points with which to compare disparities in 
evidence-based sentencing. Critics use sociodemographic disparities in actuarial risk 
assessment instruments to suggest that evidence-based sentencing would worsen social 
inequality, but this evidence only demonstrates that there are likely to be disparities in 
evidence-based sentencing, not that there are likely to be larger disparities in evidence-
based sentencing. In fact, the observation that disparities are already noticeable in 
Connecticut shows that introducing actuarial risk assessment in the state even has some 
ipso facto opportunity to reduce social inequality in punishment. 
 Though racial and ethnic disparities are more often the focus of sentencing 




Zatz, 2000), the disadvantages for low-SES offenders were among the largest disparities 
observed in this study’s analysis of Connecticut punishment outcomes. Evidence from 
prior literature generally supports the notion of a prominent role for SES in sentencing 
(Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Franklin, 2017; Miethe & Moore, 1985; Wooldredge, 2010), 
but research on the topic is limited due to difficulties measuring SES in official records. 
SES is typically captured using only one of its multiple dimensions if it is captured at all. 
Results from this study, which boasts a fairly robust set of indicators representing all 
three of the widely accepted components of SES, suggest that the way SES is captured 
can affect substantive conclusions made about its relationship with legal variables, case 
processing characteristics, and sentencing. Educational attainment, employment status, 
reliance on government assistance, and financial problems all yielded somewhat different 
trends across model specifications, underscoring the importance of measuring SES 
clearly and completely in order to better understand the role SES plays in determining 
punishment. 
Switching gears, the unique risk factors included in this sentencing evaluation 
accounted for relatively little portions of remaining disparities. Given that sociolegal 
theorizing frequently emphasizes the role of risk perceptions in both sentencing decisions 
themselves and in disparities in those sentencing decisions (Albonetti, 1991; Spohn, 
2009; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; von Hirsch, 1976), it is perhaps surprising that 
individual elements of risk captured in the LSI-R did not explain more of the residual 
sociodemographic disparities in sentencing. It may be the case that the range of legal and 
case processing factors included in this study sufficiently captured variation in 




possibility is that racial, ethnic, gender, and SES group memberships do uniquely affect 
judicial perceptions of offender risk, but they do so in ways that are not systematically 
related to the latent risk characteristic measured by the LSI-R. 
Though risk factors did not explain large portions of sociodemographic disparity, 
some of them did have their own independent effects on punishment in Connecticut. Age 
had only a slight impact on the two sentencing outcomes, and marital status likewise had 
little effect. Having a previous conviction in the dataset, however, had a substantial effect 
on the odds of incarceration (not sentence length) even after accounting for number of 
prior convictions. Though the measure is included in analyses to prevent offenders who 
appear multiple times in the dataset to have an outsized effect on results, the measure 
may also serve as a rough indicator of offending frequency. If offenders who cycle 
through the criminal justice system repeatedly in relatively short amounts of time are 
treated more harshly than offenders who manage to last years before being convicted 
again, this variable may have captured some of that effect. 
Scores on criminogenic domains included in the LSI-R also have independent 
effects on punishment. While higher scores on most domains are associated with higher 
likelihoods of incarceration and/or longer sentence lengths, the direction of the 
Emotional/Personal domain effect in particular appears to depend on the punishment 
outcome. Higher Emotional/Personal scores are associated with longer sentences but 
lower odds of incarceration. As mentioned in the presentation of results (see also 
Appendix B), the items in the Emotional/Personal domain focus on offenders’ mental 
health, tapping into diagnoses, treatment, and severity of mental illness. Though mental 




to issue a non-incarceration sentence, either because the offender is perceived as less 
responsible for his/her crimes or because incarceration would interfere with any ongoing 
treatment. These two separate mechanisms may explain why the Emotional/Personal 
domain score is associated with both more severity in sentence lengths but more leniency 
in the decision to incarcerate. 
The domains for which higher scores are most notably associated with more 
severe sentences in Connecticut even without the use of evidence-based sentencing are 
the Accommodation, Companions, and Attitudes/Orientations domains, though the 
magnitude of most associations are modest. Accommodation scores are most impactful 
for the decision to incarcerate, while the effects of the Companions and 
Attitudes/Orientations scores are centered in sentence length. These are all rather 
interesting relationships to ponder.  
The Accommodation domain estimates the quality and stability of the offender’s 
living situation, as well as whether the offender lives in a high-crime neighborhood. 
These characteristics likely correlate with socioeconomic status (a notion supported by 
findings from Phase 2 of this study), but even after controlling for educational attainment, 
employment status, and financial situation, the Accommodation domain continued to 
have a significant association with incarceration. This suggests that there is some other 
aspect of offenders’ residential situation that influences judges’ sentencing decisions. 
Perhaps residential instability and residence in a high-crime neighborhood behave as 
proxies for gang affiliations (Sampson & Wilson, 1995), which may lead prosecutors to 
offer less favorable plea deals and judges to issue harsher sentences. Perhaps frequent 




to which judges may respond by using jails as either temporary shelters or as warehouses 
for managing transient “rabble” (Irwin, 1985).  
The Companions domain is the first of two domains that most strongly impacted 
sentence lengths for incarcerated offenders (though again, the incremental effect is 
relatively modest). This category measures offenders’ social isolation, criminal 
acquaintances/friends, and non-criminal acquaintances/friends. The link between criminal 
peers and deviance is well-established (Gendreau et al., 1996; Elliott et al., 1985; 
Thornberry et al., 1994), but unless judges routinely ask adult offenders about their 
relationships with peers, this does not provide sufficient explanation for why offenders 
who have mostly criminal friends or few friends at all would receive harsher punishment 
at sentencing. Instead, it may be that this domain taps into gang affiliations, which likely 
lead to more criminal friends/acquaintances and fewer non-criminal 
friends/acquaintances. Alternatively, it may indicate a lack of involvement in prosocial 
activities (recreational sports, hobbies, etc.), which often introduce people to non-
criminal peers. 
The other most influential domain predictor of sentence length is the 
Attitudes/Orientations domain, which captures offenders’ sentiments about crime, 
convention, and punishment in the criminal justice system. If these sentiments are 
expressed by offenders either verbally or nonverbally during courtroom appearances, it is 
easy to envision how they could come to be associated with longer sentences. Prior 
research has demonstrated the importance of nonverbal courtroom cues such as demeanor 
(Frazier, 1979; Hedderman, 1990) and showing remorse (Harrel, 1981; Robinson et al., 




negatively to a prosecutor or a judge, as may perceived commitment to a deviant lifestyle. 
Antisocial attitudes are also correlated with recidivism (Gendreau et al., 1996), so 
prosecutors and judges may also view offenders who express more negative attitudes 
toward the conventions of the criminal justice system as riskier. 
The second general aim of the study was to characterize disparities in the LSI-R 
and in evidence-based sentencing based on LSI-R scores. Critics of evidence-based 
sentencing contend that the practice will deepen unwarranted punishment disparities 
because items on actuarial risk assessments correlate with sociodemographic 
characteristics, allowing indirect pathways for biases to creep into sentencing decisions. 
Phase 2 of this study sought to test the foundations of that argument by first assessing 
disparities in LSI-R composite and domain scores.  
Disparities in LSI-R composite scores according to race and ethnicity are 
generally modest. Asian offenders receive substantially lower scores than any other racial 
group (and the disparity is spread across the majority of criminogenic domains), but the 
margins for black and Hispanic offenders compared to whites are both close to one point. 
In these cases, though, composite scores conceal a variety of meaningful relationships 
between risk elements and race/ethnicity. Black and Hispanic offenders receive higher 
average scores in eight of the ten total domains, with the largest gaps centered in 
Criminal History and Education/Employment, but the two remaining domains counteract 
nearly all of the disadvantage: white offenders score much higher in the Alcohol/Drug 
and Emotional/Personal categories than blacks or Hispanics. The pattern for the 




Hispanic individuals as drug users (Curry & Corral-Comacho, 2008; Gibbs, 1988; 
Richey-Mann et al., 2006).
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Though consistent with prior research (e.g. Chenane et al., 2015), it is a little less 
clear how the patterns observed in the Emotional/Personal category fit with current 
scholarly understanding of race/ethnicity and mental health. There is little evidence that 
mental health problems are more prevalent among one racial/ethnic group or another in 
correctional settings (James & Glaze, 2006), but given that several items in the 
Emotional/Personal domain focus on receiving mental health treatment rather than just 
having mental health problems, it is possible that much of the racial/ethnic gap in 
Emotional/Personal scores is due to differences in either access to mental health care or 
culture-specific attitudes toward mental health treatment (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1999).   
The LSI-R composite score difference between male and female offenders 
likewise averages out remarkably close to zero, which is at least not discordant with 
previous research’s mixed conclusions about gender differences in risk scores (Andrews 
& Bonta, 2003; Lowenkamp et al., 2001; Mihailides et al., 2005). However, the 
composite similarity again masks more variable patterns of disparity in individual LSI-R 
domains. As expected, men score higher on the Criminal History domain. They also score 
higher in Leisure/Recreation, Companions, Alcohol/Drug, and Attitudes/Orientations. 
These results match prior work on disparity and risk assessments (Manchak et al., 2009; 
Mihailides et al., 2005). Trends in many of the domains in which women appear “riskier” 
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convictions (33% vs 27% for blacks and 28% for Hispanics) in this sample, the relationship between 




mirror findings from other criminological and feminist scholarship as well. Higher female 
scores on the Emotional/Personal domain are consistent with research that finds higher 
rates of mental health concerns among women than men in incarcerated populations 
(James & Glaze, 2006). Higher female scores on the Family/Marital domain are 
consistent with the tendency for females to be led into criminal activity by male 
significant others or family members (e.g. Miller, 1986), while higher female scores on 
the Financial and Accommodations domains support the narrative that female offenders 
are often worse off economically than their male counterparts (Chesney-Lind, 1997). 
Among LSI-R composite scores, the largest disparities emerge for SES groups. 
Even after accounting for the fact that educational attainment, employment status, 
reliance on government assistance, and financial problems are directly captured in the 
LSI-R, substantial gaps based on SES indicators are apparent.  The gap between the 
highest- and lowest-education offenders reaches upwards of 12 points, the gap between 
full-time employed and unemployed offenders is almost 11 points, reliance upon 
government assistances increases average risk scores by 6.3 points, and offenders with 
very unsatisfactory finances have scores that are 13.9 points higher than offenders with 
very satisfactory finances. Subsequent domain-specific analyses indicate that these SES 
disparities are spread across every single LSI-R domain; disadvantages for uneducated, 
unemployed offenders who rely on government assistance and have very unsatisfactory 
finances appear across the board.  
Altogether, these are rather intriguing findings in light of the fact that many 
scholars choose to focus on racial and ethnic rather than socioeconomic disparities in risk 




concluding that risk scores produced using a wider set of criminogenic factors predict 
recidivism better and tend to be less correlated with race and ethnicity (Berk, 2009; 
Skeem & Lowenkamp, 2015). The results from this study, on the other hand, suggest that 
racial and ethnic differences in risk evaluation would not necessarily be the largest and 
most egregious source of social inequality in evidence-based sentencing. Risk score 
disadvantages based on SES may instead hold that title. The LSI-R, this study suggests, is 
not kind to low-SES offenders. 
The next section of the study evaluated whether or not these apparent disparities 
in risk evaluation may translate into disparities in evidence-based sentencing outcomes. 
Analyses first established that there is indeed a meaningful relationship between LSI-R 
composite scores and punishment in Connecticut’s current system even after controlling 
for legal and case processing factors, which lent some credence to the study’s crucial 
assumption that judges conduct informal risk evaluation even in the absence of evidence-
based sentencing and that their risk evaluation taps into the same underlying risk trait that 
the LSI-R measures. If LSI-R scores did not have an observable relationship with 
punishment outcomes, this assumption would not able to hold water. The second step in 
the process created a simplified simulation of evidence-based sentencing by assigning 
incarceration and sentence lengths to all cases using legal/case processing factors and 
LSI-R scores as determinants. Different probability thresholds were used to determine 
which cases were assigned evidence-based incarceration, and as the results showed, these 
different thresholds had a substantial effect on both the portion of cases that were 
assigned incarceration and sentence lengths. After considering the distributions created 




the lowest probability threshold (.4) had the most similar distribution to actual sentencing 
outcomes and was therefore most appropriate for assessing disparities in the simulated 
evidence-based sentencing scenario.  
Sociodemographic disparities in the resultant simulation were noticeable. In the 
simulated decision to incarcerate, black, male, and low-SES offenders were at a large 
disadvantage. In simulated sentence lengths, race/ethnicity had less of an effect, but male 
and low-SES offenders were assigned longer sentences. Given that the gender difference 
in LSI-R composite scores was almost non-existent and the racial/ethnic differences were 
relatively small as well, the disparities for black and male offenders observed in 
punishment outcomes are likely due far more to differences in legal and case processing 
characteristics than to differences in LSI-R scores. Much of the differences for low-SES 
offenders, however, can be linked back to disparities in the LSI-R, where low-SES 
offenders racked up considerably higher risk scores regardless of which SES indicator 
was used to assess. 
The substantive conclusions were not particularly sensitive to the threshold 
decision rule used to assign evidence-based incarceration. Though the .4 threshold model 
served as the primary model, the .5 and .6 threshold models also led to sizeable 
disadvantages for black, male, and low-SES offenders. What differed between the three 
conditions was the magnitude of the disparities observed. As the threshold increased, the 
magnitude of disparities in the evidence-based decision to incarcerate model grew 
slightly, and the magnitude of disparities in the evidence-based sentence lengths model 
grew dramatically. This trend indicates that disparities in the simulated evidence-based 




incarceration probability distribution, where legal/case processing factors and risk scores 
tend to signal for more punitive punishment. 
Ultimately, this study sought to address one of the more contentious criticisms of 
evidence-based sentencing, that it will result in increased sociodemographic disparities in 
punishment.  Therefore, the final research aim of the study was to assess potential 
changes in disparity between Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme and an evidence-
based sentencing approach. To do this, the study juxtaposed comparable coefficients 
from the aggregate disparity model of Connecticut’s actual sentencing system with the 
aggregate disparity model of the simulated evidence-based scenario.  
The findings from this comparison do not conform to critics’ predictions quite as 
consistently as they could. However, in the decision to incarcerate, there did appear to be 
several disparities that were aggravated in the simulated evidence-based sentencing 
model. In support of scholars who express concern that racial and ethnic disparities in 
punishment will grow if risk assessments are incorporated into sentencing (Hannah-
Moffat, 2005, 2009, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b,c), this study did find 
that both black and Hispanic offenders have a larger aggregate disadvantage in simulated 
evidence-based sentences than in Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme. The 
difference in magnitude for the black effect in particular was sizeable, with an odds ratio 
in the simulated model that was over three times larger. For males, the gap was smaller in 
simulated evidence-based sentences, which can again be interpreted as unsurprising given 
that the average gender difference in LSI-R composite scores was negligible. Among 
SES categories, it was educational attainment and both indicators of financial situation 




based sentencing scheme; employment status appeared to have a slightly smaller (though 
still large) role in determining punishment in the simulated model. Among sentence 
lengths, on the other hand, this study provides little evidence that an evidence-based 
sentencing scheme should be expected to exacerbate social inequality. Where significant 
differences between actual and simulated disparities existed, the disparities were all 
smaller in the evidence-based scenario. Though the magnitude of differences varied 
according to the incarceration probability used in the simulated model, substantive 
conclusions were not sensitive to this change.  
These results are a tentative indication that concerns about an increase in social 
inequality following the implementation of an evidence-based sentencing scheme may be 
well-founded. Though larger disparities weren’t apparent across the board, 
socioeconomic disparities in the LSI-R translated into differences in simulated 
incarceration rates that generally disadvantaged black, Hispanic, and low-SES offenders 
more than judicial discretion did in Connecticut’s actual sentencing scheme. 
Placing this study’s findings in the context of overarching themes in criminal 
justice research and policy leads to several worthy points of discussion. First, the 
consistency of disadvantages for low-SES offenders observed in this study invites 
commentary about how low-SES offenders are viewed and treated in the justice system. 
SES disparities are readily observable in Connecticut’s current scheme, a fact that 
corresponds well with previous research on the relationship between SES and sentencing 
(D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993; Chiricos & Waldo, 1975; Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; 
Miethe & Moore, 1985). Of course, some differences in punishment are likely due to 




by the small amount of SES disparity accounted for by legal and case processing factors, 
but residual disparities indicate that there is more to the story. Conflict theories of 
criminal justice posit that this relationship is the result of the social elite using the justice 
system to subdue marginalized group in society (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 
1973), but this study’s evaluation of disparities in LSI-R composite and domain scores 
offers an additional explanation for why this pattern may emerge.  
The consistency of higher scores on the LSI-R for low-SES offenders in this study 
is striking, and it raises concerns about just how closely the criminal justice system’s 
concept of risk is intertwined with socioeconomic status. Hannah-Moffat (1999: 71) 
describes risk as “ambiguous, fractured, and flexible”, a characterization which hints at 
ample room for subjectivity and bias in the risk evaluation process. Conceptualizations of 
risk tend to rely on both cultural and moral evaluations that could be tied, even 
unintentionally, to sociodemographic characteristics such as SES. Even though the LSI-R 
is praised for its inclusion of a variety of seemingly neutral criminogenic domains, low-
SES offenders received higher scores in every domain captured in the LSI-R in this 
study, essentially turning actuarial composite risk scores into a proxy for SES. Under an 
evidence-based sentencing scheme, where actuarial assessments are intended to shape 
judicial discretion by informing perceptions of offenders’ risk, it is easy to see how the 
LSI-R’s association with SES could translate directly into punishment disparity. Even 
without an evidence-based sentencing system in place, though, perceptions of offender 
risk still play an important role in punishment determinations. If the justice system’s 
perceptions of offender risk are otherwise built on factors that correlate highly with SES, 




disparities emerge in punishment contexts in the absence of actuarial risk assessment. In 
this evaluation, which pits punishment disparities borne from judicial discretion against 
disparities from structural forces like risk assessments, low-SES offenders come out on 
the bottom no matter how you slice it.  
Close scrutiny of the domains in the LSI-R also brings to light an interesting 
pattern whereby factors that determine an offender’s risk score are in other sentencing 
contexts regarded as unwanted, unwarranted influences on punishment. The popularity of 
risk assessment tools like the LSI-R, coupled with a lack of intensive discussion about the 
individual items used to construct them, suggests that by virtue of their status as 
significant predictors of recidivism risk, actuarial risk assessments can be treated as legal 
factors that can effectively be used to justify disparities in sentencing. Resistance to 
challenging actuarial risk assessments as a valid sentencing factor may spring from the 
comfortability of placing confidence in numbers and scores. Policymakers, and people 
more generally, enjoy using numbers to justify their decisions; numbers tend to carry 
with them an air of factualness and an implicit authority that wards off criticism (Porter, 
1996). Hannah-Moffat (2013: 277) wrestles with this idea in the context of actuarial risk 
assessment, noting that “Risk scores impart a sense of moral certainty and legitimacy into 
the classifications they produce.” Undoubtedly, the fact that risk scores are numbers 
‘backed by science’ makes them both more palatable and more readily accepted. As a 
result, the objectivity and neutrality of the items used to construct them are more often 
assumed than tested.  
But these same characteristics that are deemed suitable in the context of 




explanations for punishment. In this study’s evaluation of disparities in Connecticut’s 
current sentencing scheme, several significant and meaningful disparities were observed. 
But while the focus was on disparities according to sociodemographic characteristics, 
specifically race, ethnicity, gender, and SES, disparities according to domain scores from 
the LSI-R emerged as well. The Accommodations, Companions, and 
Attitudes/Orientations domains in particular had significant and nontrivial associations 
with punishment. In a traditional sentencing study, these relationships would be 
characterized as “unwarranted disparities”; scholars routinely lament the existence of 
punishment differences according to characteristics such as educational attainment or 
neighborhood of residence (Franklin, 2017; Wooldredge, 2007). The implication from the 
tone of such studies is that these disparities are neither desirable nor justifiable.  
Thus, the perceived acceptability of linking social characteristics to sentencing 
may depend on whether or not the relationships are observed through the lens of risk 
evaluation. If the association is framed as a direct relationship, without risk assessment 
serving as an intermediary, it is difficult to view the association as anything but 
unwelcome. On the other hand, if the association is framed as indirect, such that factors 
such as having criminal relatives or little organized activity are connected to sentencing 
decisions only through their relationship with risk, it becomes more tolerable. It may be 
that this indirect pathway allows decision-makers to mentally compartmentalize social 
and other extralegal factors as predictors of risk rather than predictors of punishment, a 
subtle distinction that nevertheless could allow decision-makers to cognitively divorce 
themselves from the moral complication associated with using extralegal characteristics 




To the researcher’s knowledge, there has also been little political or scholarly 
discussion about the implications of translating an actuarial instrument designed for 
correctional settings to the courtroom in its entirety. In Malenchik v. State of Indiana 
(2010), a defendant challenged the use of his high scores on two actuarial assessments 
(one of which was the LSI-R) as aggravating circumstances at sentencing, arguing that 
the practice was discriminatory on a variety of grounds. Malenchik’s arguments were 
summarily rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court, and in its decision, the Court 
concluded that “an evidence-based tool such as the LSI-R may be utilized in the 
sentencing process if employed consistently with its proper purpose and limitations.” 
(Malenchik v. State of Indiana, 2010: 3).  
What are the proper purpose and limitations of the LSI-R? The tool was originally 
designed to assist practitioners in the correctional system with assigning supervision 
levels and lengths to offenders (Andrews, 1982). It is relatively easy to see how a tool 
used for this function only can be applied to judicial decision-making: just as corrections 
staff may impose tighter, longer supervision on riskier offenders, judges may impose 
incarceration and longer sentences on riskier defendants. However, consistent with the 
principles of the RNR model on which the tool is based, amendments to the instrument 
shifted part of its focus to identifying service and treatment provisions. It is now intended 
to measure dynamic risk and serve as an aid for risk reduction rather than simply risk 
management. Assessment results are used to target high-risk offenders in particular for 
rehabilitative programs that can help reduce their risk of recidivism, and in some cases, 





In the sentencing system, it is unclear whether there is a viable role for risk 
assessments to help judges contribute to risk reduction rather than risk management goals 
only. It is difficult to reconcile using scores on the LSI-R to justify harsher sentences 
(without correspondingly more service provisions) with the RNR model’s emphasis on 
rehabilitation rather than deterrence. The tendency to treat risk scores as a barometer of 
sentence severity rather than as a signal for rehabilitative intervention options creates 
ample opportunity for evidence-based sentencing to become a tool for justifying selective 
incarceration rather than for preventing recidivism (Garland, 2003; Hannah-Moffat, 
1999). What is therefore needed is more in-depth consideration of whether/how the LSI-
R and other similar correctional risk assessment instruments can be adapted to guide 
sentencing decisions without compromising the integrity of the service-oriented 
principles on which they are based. 
The final theme that the results in this study speak to is the tension between 
effectiveness/efficiency and fairness in evidence-based sentencing. The LSI-R is a well-
validated risk prediction tool that performs relatively well in ‘competition’ with clinical 
risk judgments, which makes it an asset to the criminal justice system as a means of 
improving precision in judicial risk evaluations conducted at the time of sentencing. 
However, its predictive validity comes with costs, and one of those costs is a nearly 
systematic disadvantage for offenders who are often marginalized in other non-criminal 
justice settings. This study’s findings identified disparities in a simulated evidence-based 
sentencing scenario that disadvantaged black, Hispanic, male, and low-SES offenders, 
and in several of those cases, the disadvantages exceeded those observed in Connecticut’s 




efficient use of resource-intensive punishments, the criminal justice system compromises 
some of the fairness and equity that it promises to espouse. 
It is unrealistic to assume that either of these objectives will ever be permitted to 
entirely dominate the other; a maximally precise sentencing scheme with complete 
disregard for equity would dramatically undermine the legitimacy of the entire criminal 
justice system, while a perfectly equitable sentencing system without any precision in 
risk prediction would be of little value to it. Therefore a balance between the two ideals 
must be struck, and the task is to identify the appropriate balance between predictive 
validity and equity. How much inequality in punishment is society willing to tolerate in 
order to advance public safety and use limited criminal justice resources more efficiently? 
This is a difficult ethical question, one for which the answer will likely depend on who is 
giving it. Even so, it is one that scholars, policymakers, and practitioners must all engage 
with if evidence-based sentencing is to become a mainstay in criminal justice policy. 
Limitations 
This study, of course, has its limitations. First, the most unique aspect of this 
project, the simulation of evidence-based sentences, brings with it a unique set of 
drawbacks. Because the evidence-based sentence building procedure uses the existing 
relationship between risk and sentences in Connecticut’s current scheme to estimate the 
relationship between risk and punishment in a simulated evidence-based scenario, the 
study assumes two things: first, that LSI-R risk evaluations and judges’ informal risk 
evaluations tap into the same underlying risk characteristic for each offender, and second, 
that the aggregate impact of risk on punishment would not change if risk assessments 




tenuous, as some scholars suggest that evidence-based sentencing is a method for turning 
the spotlight onto public safety and increasing the relative impact of recidivism risk on 
sentencing (Etienne, 2009; Marcus, 2009; Warren, 2007). If this is the case, and 
incorporating risk assessments into sentencing leads to a greater role for risk in 
sentencing decisions, then the current study’s estimates may be a conservative estimate of 
potential differences in disparities between Connecticut’s current system and an 
evidence-based system. 
This conservative estimation would have differing effects on the substantive 
conclusions from this study for the decision to incarcerate and sentence lengths. For the 
decision to incarcerate, this study provided evidence that disparities may increase under 
an evidence-based sentencing scheme. If the disparity estimates in the simulated 
evidence-based scenario are low, then disparities in an actual evidence-based sentencing 
system would be expected to be even larger, amplifying the gap between evidence-based 
disparities and disparities in Connecticut’s current scheme. This effect would only bolster 
the general conclusion that evidence-based sentencing has the potential to increase 
disparities in the decision to incarcerate even more. Conversely, for sentence lengths, 
results in this study indicated that for most sociodemographic factors, evidence-based 
sentences generated smaller disparities in sentence lengths than Connecticut’s current 
scheme does. In this case, if estimates of disparity in the simulated evidence-based 
scenario are low, the study is overestimating the gap in disparity between the two 
sentencing systems, and evidence-based disparities would be expected to be more similar 




suggested. The general conclusion that evidence-based sentencing has the potential to 
actually decrease disparities in incarceration lengths would be undermined. 
Relatedly, the evidence-based sentencing scenario is modeled for a sample of 
sentenced offenders. All of the offenders have been charged, some of them were likely 
detained pretrial, many of them have negotiated plea deals, and those who did not agree 
to a plea deal were convicted at trial. However, current perspectives on criminal case 
processing (Kutateladze et al., 2014; Wooldredge et al., 2015) emphasize the importance 
of these earlier case processing outcomes for punishment determinations; small 
disparities at several different case processing decision nodes can accumulate as each 
defendant moves through the system, ultimately effecting large differences in 
punishment. Moreover, if implemented, evidence-based sentencing may have 
consequences on some of these earlier case processing decisions. It is possible that 
introducing risk assessments into sentencing outcomes would alter the decision-making 
patterns of court actors other than judges in ways that would have downstream effects on 
a) which offenders are convicted and sentenced and b) disparities in sentencing 
outcomes. For example, prosecutors have vast discretionary authority in processing cases 
(Johnson, King, & Spohn, 2016), and risk assessment scores may become a piece of 
information that prosecutors use as leverage to negotiate more favorable plea deals. 
These possibilities, and their influence on sentencing patterns, are not modeled or 
accounted for in the current study. 
There are also two concerns related to sample selection in this study that must be 
considered. First, the use of a sentenced sample introduces the potential for selection bias 




cases selected into conviction and sentencing differs from the full population of cases that 
enter into the criminal justice system. Estimates derived from modeling punishment 
outcomes among convicted offenders may therefore be biased (Berk & Ray, 1982; Hagan 
& Parker, 1985). Previous research has demonstrated that bias can indeed be introduced 
into sentencing analyses by excluding cases that do not result in conviction and equally 
importantly, that the effects of other predictors on punishment can differ when bias is 
present (Zatz & Hagan, 1985). Though many scholars acknowledge this selection 
concern, it is less often addressed well empirically (see Bushway et al., 2007; Johnson, 
2014 for further discussion). The current study does not account for this possibility either. 
In the future, it would be ideal to model selection into the convicted sample, in order to 
estimate how this selection process may influence obtained disparity estimates.  
The potential for selection bias is additionally ushered in by the number of cases 
that were excluded from analysis due to a lack of LSI-R information. Descriptive 
statistics showed a marked difference in several sociodemographic and legal 
characteristics between the cases that were and were not matched with a complete LSI-R 
risk assessment. These differences indicated that more serious cases, as indicated by 
more/longer incarceration sentences and longer criminal histories, were less likely to be 
matched. Because more serious cases were less likely to be matched to a complete risk 
assessment, estimates of disparities in both Connecticut’s actual sentencing system and in 
the simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario may have been affected. A 
consequence of this is that the external validity in the study is limited to sentenced felony 
or misdemeanor cases in which a complete LSI-R risk assessment is administered under 




changed its risk assessment policy and began administering the LSI-R assessment to all 
offenders in the state, the analyses conducted in this study could yield slightly different 
conclusions about disparities in evidence-based and non-evidence-based sentencing 
systems.   
Omitted variable bias may be another concern. As noted in Footnote 20, this 
study’s three measures of plea bargaining, offense severity reductions, count reductions, 
and mandatory minimum reductions, are an imperfect representation of guilty pleas. They 
do not account for the full range of plea negotiation mechanisms (e.g. sentence and fact 
bargaining cannot be captured), they do not capture non-negotiated pleas, and they may 
well include reductions that were the result of something other than a plea deal, such as 
insufficient evidence. The study also has no reliable way to measure pretrial detention. 
There is some evidence that sociodemographic disparities characterize the decision to 
detain offenders pretrial (Kutateladze et al., 2014; Wooldredge et al., 2015) and that 
pretrial detention influences sentencing outcomes (Lee, 2016; Sacks & Ackerman, 2014), 
so this pathway for disparities in sentencing cannot be captured. Though the study is able 
to measure a wide variety of risk factors, there are some additional risk factors that would 
augment the evaluation of sentencing disparities even more. Gang membership would be 
especially useful for evaluating racial/ethnic disparities in sentencing. Parenthood, often 
captured in sentencing research as number of dependents (Koons-Witt, 2002), may be 
one missing source of gender disparities. Indicators of health and fitness other than 
alcohol/drug dependency may explain some age disparities. Lastly, though government 




measure of income would help better identify SES disparities. These variables are not 
available in the dataset.  
The study would have further been informative if it had been able to consider 
disparities in evidence-based and non-evidence-based sentencing for Asian and American 
offenders more fully. Recent developments in the literature on race and ethnicity 
emphasize the value of evaluating disparities for minority groups other than blacks 
(Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Franklin, 2013; Johnson & Betsinger, 2009), and though this 
study’s datasets included cases involving black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American 
offenders, only black and Hispanic offenders appeared often enough to ensure the 
statistical power needed to detect significant disparities. Native Americans appeared so 
infrequently that the researcher decided to remove them from the sample altogether, and 
though Asians were included in the analyses, they were likely not represented well 
enough for the study to make strong conclusions about their treatment in the LSI-R and in 
the sentencing process. 
This study is also unable to distinguish between jail and prison sentences. Prior 
work indicates that legal and extralegal factors may influence the decision to send an 
offender to jail and the decision to send an offender to prison differently (Holleran & 
Spohn, 2004), so the disparities in Connecticut’s current system observed in this study 
may be covering up subtle differences between disparities in jail assignment and 
disparities in prison assignment. Moreover, by focusing on incarceration and 
incarceration lengths, this project ignores a variety of other sentencing outcomes (e.g. 
probation length, fines/restitution, community service, etc.) that the LSI-R and risk 




system. The narrow focus allows this study to zero in on disparities in incarceration, 
which is consistent with previous literature’s attention to the use of jail and prison as 
punishment during the era of mass incarceration (Cullen et al., 2011). Still, it is crucial to 
consider and model the entire battery of sentencing options if the field is to understand 
the full range of sociodemographic disparities in punishment and effects of incorporating 
risk assessments into sentencing. 
One additional remark about punishment measurement is necessary. This study 
was unable to distinguish between sentences of incarceration and sentences of time 
served in the available datasets, which resulted in some degree of overestimation of 
incarceration sentences in the state of Connecticut. This slight distortion of the outcome 
variable may have an impact on the estimation of disparities in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing scheme, but it became more salient in the context of the evidence-based 
simulation process, where the researcher found that a nontrivial number of actual 
incarceration sentences had very low probabilities of evidence-based incarceration. It is 
likely that in actuality, some of those low-probability cases involved sentences of time 
served, such that the offenders’ experienced punishment differed from what was recorded 
in the data. Though this fact is unlikely to have drastically altered observed disparities in 
actual sentences and simulated evidence-based sentences, the limitation should be 
acknowledged. 
The data for this study comes from a single state. Connecticut is arguably an 
excellent location for a study of the potential impacts of evidence-based sentencing on 
disparities; its criminal court system has not been subjected to much prior empirical 




guidelines, it has extensive familiarity with actuarial risk assessments in the criminal 
justice system, and it has already demonstrated some interest in evidence-based 
sentencing, which increases the potential utility of the study. But some of these same 
qualities that make Connecticut an ideal site for the evaluation also make it unique from 
other states, which limits the generalizability of the study to other locations in the U.S. 
Findings from this study can only be applied to other states with great caution.  
While the study’s sampling frame covers the entire state of Connecticut, the only 
contextual factor that it is able to account for (with clustering) is the court in which each 
sentence was issued. It does not account for variation in courtroom actors or other 
courtroom contexts within the state, nor is it able to measure the relationship between any 
contextual-level characteristics and punishment. Previous literature makes it clear that 
community, courtroom, and court actor characteristics can have noteworthy effects on 
criminal justice processing outcomes (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977; Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 
2005). Research on court/community contexts and sentencing finds that a variety of 
factors such as courtroom caseload, court organizational culture, political environment, 
unemployment rate, crime rate, and racial and ethnic representation all impact 
punishment (Britt, 2000; Crow & Johnson, 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Wang & 
Mears, 2015).  
Judge-level characteristics may be a particularly influential source of contextual 
variation in disparities that this study is unable to capture. In Connecticut, where 
guidelines have not been established and sentencing ranges for various offense 
classifications are broad, there is abundant room for judicial discretion to enter the 




relies on judges using their discretion to incorporate actuarial risk information into 
sentencing decisions. Judge characteristics that shape how discretion is used and how 
punishment is determined can therefore have substantial effects on disparities in 
punishment outcomes both in evidence-based and non-evidence-based sentencing 
schemes. Traditional demographic characteristics like race and gender appear to have 
only modest and inconsistent effects on punishment and disparity (Spohn & Cederblom, 
1991; Johnson, 2006; Steffensmeier & Hebert, 1999), but other more dynamic 
characteristics such as political liberalism, punishment orientations, prior legal 
experience, religion, and proximity to reelection times are identified by criminal justice 
and political science literatures as unique and impactful determinants of sentencing 
(Gibson, 1978; Gordon & Huber, 2007; Hogarth, 1971; Huber & Gordon, 2004; Myers, 
1988). There may be variation in sentencing disparities according to these types of 
judicial characteristics. The analyses in this study, aggregated across all judges and all 
Connecticut courtrooms, mask those potentially important variations. 
Altogether, this study has limitations stemming from required assumptions, 
sample selection, potential omitted variable bias and other data constraints, and an 
inability to capture contextual characteristics. Despite these limitations, the study makes a 
unique and distinctive contribution to the sentencing literature and to policymakers and 
practitioners seeking to understand the potential effects of an evidence-based sentencing 
scheme on punishment and social inequality. 
Future Directions for Research 
 This study builds on existing scholarship to inform the understanding of 




time, it also highlights several areas for future research. First, it is important that future 
sentencing scholarship continues to explore and test mechanisms through which social 
disparities may emerge in the absence of evidence-based sentencing. This study found 
that in Connecticut, social and personal characteristics that may help shape judges’ 
perceptions of offenders’ recidivism risk explained small but meaningful portions of 
observed sociodemographic disparity. The risk variables that this study was able to 
capture are unique, tapping into characteristics like criminal peer influences, quality of 
living situation, and attitudes toward crime and the criminal justice system that are 
hypothesized to affect punishment outcomes but are rarely able to be tested (Frazier, 
1979; Irwin, 1985; Robinson et al., 1994; Wooldredge, 2007). Similar analyses that 
attempt to tap into other aspects of offenders’ social and personal characteristics may 
provide additional explanatory power. Innovative studies have begun making strides in 
that direction. Recent work by Johnson and King (Johnson & King, 2017; King & 
Johnson, 2016), for example, found that minority offenders were perceived as having 
more threatening appearances, while facial characteristics such as physical attractiveness, 
baby-faced appearances, and facial tattoos were also linked to perceptions of threat and to 
subsequent incarceration outcomes. This type of work shows great promise for improving 
scholarly understanding of court actor decision-making processes. Future work should 
continue to examine these types of factors to determine the extent to which they can help 
explain sociodemographic disparities and punishment outcomes. 
 Second, the dataset compilation procedures used in this study call attention to the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of how recidivism risk changes over time. In this 




assessment occurred no more than one year before or after the verdict date in the case. 
However, supplementary analyses in the study (see Footnote 8) indicated that risk scores 
fluctuated substantially across time, raising questions about how risk assessments can and 
should be used to make punishment decisions in the case of repeat offending. Scholars 
have previously pointed out the need to evaluate changes in LSI-R score over time 
(Lowenkamp & Bechtel, 2007). A study by Vose and colleagues (2009) showed that 
among probationers and parolees, changes in LSI-R scores over time were noticeable, 
and that the changes even served as significant predictors of subsequent recidivism. 
Additional work that evaluates changes over time specifically for repeat offenders, and 
perhaps explores how changes in LSI-R score over time could be used to inform the 
sentencing decision, would make an interesting line of research.   
The application of behavioral economics principles to explain judicial decision-
making is a third important area for future work. With its broad focus on choice under 
uncertainty, behavioral economics has shown its abundant utility across the social 
sciences and humanities (Slovic et al., 1977), but its principles are only just beginning to 
percolate into the realm of criminal justice research. This study’s theoretical framework 
unites prominent sociolegal theorizing with core concepts from the behavioral economics 
literature to provide a more complete narrative of how disparities may emerge in 
Connecticut’s current sentencing scheme and in an evidence-based sentencing scheme. 
Other exciting work that use principles from the behavioral economics literature such as 
framing (Leibovitch, 2017; Rachlinski et al., 2015) and anchoring (Englich, 2005; 
Englich et al., 2006) to explain trends in sentencing outcomes further demonstrates the 




decision-making. Placing judicial decision-making into utility modeling frameworks, 
considering the role of concepts like risk aversion and affective bias in judicial decision-
making, and identifying particular heuristics that may bias sentencing decisions are 
potential developments that may assist criminal justice scholars in more fully 
understanding sociodemographic disparities in punishment. 
Evaluation of the factors that shape judges’ perceptions of risk is another example 
of a particular line of inquiry within the larger frame of judicial decision-making that 
would constitute an important contribution to the empirical and theoretical literature. 
Despite sociolegal theorizing that posits a link between risk evaluation, demographic 
characteristics, and punishment, relatively little is known about which offense and 
offender characteristics judges use to form their impressions of offender risk (Albonetti, 
1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Research that explores previously unconsidered 
mechanisms for shaping judicial perceptions of risk would inform both theory and 
practice. It is also unclear whether the factors captured in prominent actuarial risk 
assessments like the LSI-R are the same factors that play into judicial perceptions of risk. 
This study assumes that judges consider similar social and personal offender 
characteristics and tap into the same latent risk attribute that the LSI-R does, but it would 
be interesting and informative to evaluate whether this assumption can be demonstrated 
empirically. Thoroughly addressing these research questions will likely require the use of 
qualitative or mixed methods.  Though used relatively infrequently in criminal justice 
research, interview and survey techniques have the potential to provide valuable new 
insights into decision-making and impression formation processes among sentencing 




The headlining finding in this study, that evidence-based sentencing has large 
potential to increase social inequality in punishment if implemented in Connecticut, 
represents an important step forward in the pursuit of understanding the full range of 
effects of evidence-based sentencing. That said, the study’s use of simulation rather than 
direct observation of evidence-based sentences also underscores the need for research 
that looks into disparities and other punishment trends in observable evidence-based 
sentencing schemes. This research would inform the efficacy of this study’s simulation 
approach to policy evaluation as well as provide more nuance about how incorporating 
actuarial risk assessment into sentencing changes decision-making.  
Existing scholarship on evidence-based sentencing is largely non-empirical, 
focusing on legal and philosophical reasons why actuarial risk prediction and evidence-
based sentencing represent either great progress or gross injustice. To be clear, this 
scholarship makes a substantial contribution to the sentencing literature and has advanced 
the field’s conceptual understanding of risk logics, compatible and incompatible 
punishment goals, and the constitutionality of risk assessment at sentencing (Hannah-
Moffat, 1999, 2013; Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b). However, it is time for the 
evidence-based sentencing debates to be informed by data. As evidence-based sentencing 
becomes more popular among local and state jurisdictions, more and more opportunities 
for evaluation of sentencing outcomes in evidence-based settings should arise. It is 
important that researchers capitalize on these opportunities and provide further empirical 
analysis that can help scholars, policymakers, and practitioners understand and make 




 Ultimately, it will be important to expand this study’s inquiries and test this 
study’s research questions in other jurisdictions in the U.S. and in other contexts as well. 
Connecticut is a single state, and though it may be particularly well-suited for an 
evaluation of evidence-based sentencing, it has its own unique political, social, and 
criminal justice cultures that may affect conclusions about social inequality and evidence-
based sentencing. Evidence-based sentencing is growing in popularity, and its expansion 
across the country invites investigation into how it may be used in different ways and 
may influence social inequality differently in different locations. The practice may also 
be differentially impactful for sentencing decisions involving specific offense types as 
well. Though the sample in this study includes both felony and misdemeanor offenses, it 
is possible that risk plays a different role in determining punishment for more or less 
serious offenses. For reasons such as these, future research should consider the effects of 
evidence-based sentencing in jurisdictions outside Connecticut and seek to understand 
other contextual differences in whether and how punishment disparities emerge in 
evidence-based and non-evidence-based sentencing schemes.   
Policy Implications 
 One of the strengths of this study is that it has clear and direct policy implications. 
First, the study provides a snapshot of sentencing outcomes in Connecticut and details the 
extent to which structural factors (i.e. legal and case processing factors), risk 
characteristics, and possibly judicial discretion foster sociodemographic disparities in 
punishment. Results demonstrate that there are indeed significant disparities by race, 
ethnicity, gender, and SES in punishment outcomes in the state, but that these disparities 




accounted for their own portions of observed disparities. But disparities persisted even 
after all of these factors were accounted for, suggesting that other aspects of judicial 
decision-making such as the use of stereotyping and other heuristics may also be 
contributing to disadvantages for certain offender groups. These findings indicate that 
tackling sociodemographic disparities in punishment will require a broad intervention 
strategy, one that acknowledges multiple sources of disadvantage. It should entail the 
recruitment of multiple criminal justice actors, from police who make discretionary 
decisions about whom to arrest, to prosecutors who make decisions about who/what to 
charge, to judges and correctional officers who make punishment and supervision 
decisions. It should consider the role that both structural sentencing policies and 
individual discretion play in generating disparate outcomes, offering guidance to 
policymakers about what types of policy promote fair treatment and to practitioners about 
how to reduce their own biases. Ultimately, a holistic approach is needed if the criminal 
justice system is to be made equitable. 
 Second, the finding that low-SES offenders are substantially disadvantaged across 
the board in this study has meaningful implications. Offenders with less education, less 
employment, and poorer financial situations receive harsher sentences in Connecticut’s 
current sentencing scheme, higher LSI-R composite and domain scores, and harsher 
sentences in the simulated evidence-based sentencing scenario. This information should 
prompt practitioners and policymakers to discuss why disparities based on SES are so 
ingrained in the criminal justice system and to think about potential solutions that could 
change this pattern. There are a variety of directions for these conversations. Discussions 




unfit to be determinants of sentencing due to their discriminatory nature. They may also 
lead to the identification of more treatment and other intervention programs that target 
the various needs of low-SES offenders specifically. They may even lead to the 
consideration of adjustments to criminal case processing that would provide low-SES 
offenders with more effective representation and better equip them to combat unfavorable 
risk evaluations. 
 Third, analysis of sociodemographic differences in LSI-R composite and domain 
scores provides valuable information about areas of greatest need for different offenders. 
Hannah-Moffat and colleagues argue that actuarial risk assessments like the LSI-R are 
built on middle-class, white, male norms (Hannah-Moffat, 2009; Hannah-Moffat & 
Shaw, 2001), and along those same lines, particular risk factors may be more or less 
prominent for middle-class, white, and male offenders than for other groups. Composite 
scores showed little variation across racial/ethnic and gender groups, but inspection of 
individual domain differences revealed that the composite differences were masking far 
more nuanced patterns of disparity. Black and Hispanic offenders were most 
disadvantaged in the Criminal History and Education/Employment domains, trends which 
are consistent with research indicating that minority offenders tend to have longer 
criminal histories and be less well-off socially and financially than whites (Kutateladze et 
al., 2015; Spohn, 2000). The Education/Employment disadvantage in particular 
highlights the linkage between race/ethnicity and SES and should signal to policymakers 
that continued attention to how these characteristics can be disassociated is warranted. A 
second finding from the race/ethnicity comparisons, that the Alcohol/Drug and 




reinforces the need for criminal justice policymakers to identify effective ways to contend 
with alcohol/drug use and mental illness among offending populations. Together, these 
differences further hint at the notion that the impetus for offending may differ across 
racial and ethnic groups, and that effective interventions should take this into account: 
racial and ethnic minority offenders may be better served by receiving education and 
employment assistance, while focusing on alcohol/drug treatment programs and mental 
health services may be more productive for white offenders (Chenane et al., 2015).  
Similar distinctions can be made for LSI-R domains across gender groups. Consistent 
with prior literature (Manchak et al., 2009; Mihailides et al., 2005), men in this study 
scored higher in the Criminal History, Education/Employment, Leisure/Recreation, 
Companions, Alcohol/Drug, and Attitudes/Orientations domains. Women scored higher 
in the Emotional/Personal, Financial, Family/Marital, and Accommodations domains. 
Male-specific interventions, then, may choose to focus on services that assist offenders in 
areas like job hunting, structuring free time and associating with prosocial peers, and 
alleviating alcohol/drug dependence. Female offenders, on the other hand, may be more 
responsive to services that target mental health, financial and residential stability, and 
family/romantic relationships. 
Fourth, this study’s analytic strategy shows the utility of prospective simulation 
techniques for understanding the consequences of future sentencing policies. In this 
study, evidence-based sentences are a hypothetical rather than a reality, so they had to be 
simulated rather than observed. Though using a simulation method rather than an 
observational method ignores the role of judicial discretion in determining punishment 




sentence, it also allows for a preliminary evaluation of evidence-based sentencing prior to 
implementation rather than after it. In the case of this study, the benefit of such an 
approach is that the Connecticut Sentencing Commission, along with Connecticut 
General Assembly, has the opportunity to make a more informed decision about whether 
or not to transition to an evidence-based sentencing scheme. Most evaluations of 
disparities related to criminal justice policies are conducted after the policy has been 
enacted, such that any negative consequences observed in the evaluation have already 
borne out in reality (e.g. Crawford et al., 1998; Miethe & Moore, 1985; Ulmer et al., 
2007). While these post-implementation evaluations are undoubtedly of great importance, 
it is also beneficial to consider the potential effects of policies before they are 
implemented, so that in some cases, the negative consequences can be avoided or at least 
carefully monitored during initial implementation. Connecticut’s own racial impact 
statement policy embodies this principle; when a racial impact statement is prepared in 
response to proposed sentencing policies, policymakers can use it to make a more 
informed, data-driven decision (London, 2011). 
The final policy implication to be drawn from this study is that evidence-based 
sentencing is likely to come at a social cost. Critics of evidence-based sentencing argue 
that the innovation would worsen social inequality in punishment (Hannah-Moffat, 2013; 
Monahan & Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2014b,c), and this study provides some indirect evidence 
in support of that claim. Though disparities were apparent in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing scheme, disparities in a simulated evidence-based scenario were larger in the 
decision to incarcerate (though not in incarceration lengths). Disparities in scores on 




for groups like racial/ethnic minorities and low-SES offenders. It is important that 
policymakers considering the implementation of an evidence-based sentencing scheme be 
aware of this social cost and weight it appropriately against other benefits and costs 
associated with the practice. 
In conclusion, this study informs the contentious debate about the merits and 
demerits of evidence-based sentencing but also highlights several unanswered questions 
about how disparities emerge in both evidence-based and non-evidence-based sentencing 
schemes. Sociodemographic disparities were observed in Connecticut’s current 
sentencing scheme, in LSI-R scores, and in simulated evidence-based sentences derived 
from those LSI-R scores. Evidence-based sentencing, the results also suggest, has the 
potential to increase social inequality through its impact on decisions about which 
offenders to incarcerate. These findings have meaningful implications for scholars 
interested in understanding disparities in judicial decision-making as well as 
policymakers seeking to make maximally informed decisions about the future of 
sentencing policy. The researcher hopes that in the future, more research will focus on the 
critical issues discussed in this study and further advance the field’s understanding of risk 
evaluation and disparity so that criminal sentencing may become a more data-driven, 






Table 4.1: Offense Classifications in the Connecticut Penal Code (Title 53a of General 
Statutes) 
 
Offense Type Offense Severity Statutory Sentence 
   
Felony Capital  Life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
 Class A (Murder) 25-60 years imprisonment and/or fines up to $20,000 
 Class A 10-25 years imprisonment and/or fines up to $20,000 
 Class B 1-20 years imprisonment and/or fines up to $15,000 
 Class C 1-10 years imprisonment and/or fines up to $10,000 
 Class D 1-5 years imprisonment and/or fines up to $5,000 
 Class E 1-3 years imprisonment and/or fines up to $3,500 
 Unclassified Variable 
Misdemeanor Class A 0-1 year imprisonment and/or fines up to $2,000 
 Class B 0-6 months imprisonment and/or fines up to $1,000 
 Class C 0-3 months imprisonment and/or fines up to $500 
 Class D 0-1 month imprisonment and/or fines up to $250 









Added Dataset Cases From Case Data 
Successfully Linked 
Observations from Added 
Dataset Successfully Linked 
 
    
Case Data Statute Data 103,117 cases (100%) 472 out of 3,933 statutes (12%) 
    
Case Data Demographic 
Data 
103,117 cases (100%) 63,521 out of 70,220 offenders 
(90%) 
    
Case Data LSI-R Data 67,526 out of 103,117 
cases (65%) 






Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable     
     Incarceration (Y/N) .34 .47 0 1 
     Incarceration Length in Months 19.22 44.18 .1 720 
     
Independent Variables     
     White .50 .50 0 1 
     Black .30 .46 0 1 
     Hispanic .20 .40 0 1 
     Asian .004 .06 0 1 
     Female .17 .38 0 1 
     Education     
          Completed Less Than 10
th
 Grade .16 .37 0 1 
          Completed 10
th
 Grade .38 .48 0 1 
          High School Degree .30 .46 0 1 
          Completed At Least Some College .16 .36 0 1 
          Post-Graduate Education .01 .08 0 1 
     Employment     
          Unemployed, Non-Student .62 .49 0 1 
          Part-Time Employed or Student .10 .30 0 1 
          Full-Time Employed or Student .28 .45 0 1 
     Financials     
          Reliant Upon Social Assistance .49 .50 0 1 
          Financial Problems 1.96 .74 0 3 
     
Legal and Case Processing Factors     
     Offense Type     
          Violent .15 .35 0 1 
          Property .22 .42 0 1 
          Drug .30 .46 0 1 
          Sex .01 .12 0 1 
          Weapons .02 .14 0 1 
          Public Order .30 .46 0 1 
     Offense Severity Class     
          Class A Murder .000 .01 0 1 
          Class A Felony .002 .04 0 1 
          Class B Felony .03 .17 0 1 
          Class C Felony .05 .23 0 1 
          Class D Felony .14 .35 0 1 
          Class E Felony .005 .07 0 1 
          Unclassified Felony .15 .36 0 1 
          Class A Misdemeanor .34 .48 0 1 
          Class B Misdemeanor .16 .37 0 1 
          Class C Misdemeanor .10 .30 0 1 
          Class D Misdemeanor .005 .07 0 1 
          Unclassified Misdemeanor .000 .01 0 1 




          Prior Adult Convictions 3.28 3.48 0 12 
          LSI-R Criminal History Score 4.73 2.45 0 10 
     Number of Current Convictions 1.68 1.03 1 5 
     Under Probation Supervision .15 .36 0 1 
     Mandatory Minimum Applied .01 .11 0 1 
     Counts Dropped After Charging .57 .50 0 1 
     Severity Reduced After Charging .28 .45 0 1 
     MM Dropped After Charging .02 .15 0 1 
     Conviction Year     
          FY2008 .34 .47 0 1 
          FY2009 .34 .48 0 1 
          FY2010 .32 .47 0 1 
          
Risk Factors     
     Age     
          18-24 .34 .47 0 1 
          25-34 .28 .45 0 1 
          35-44 .21 .41 0 1 
          45+ .17 .38 0 1 
     Married .10 .30 0 1 
     Family/Marital Domain Score 2.04 1.18 0 4 
     Accommodation Domain Score .99 .94 0 3 
     Leisure/Recreation Domain Score 1.60 .65 0 2 
     Companions Domain Score 2.74 1.29 0 5 
     Alcohol/Drug Domain Score 4.26 2.56 0 9 
     Emotional/Personal Domain Score 1.70 1.55 0 5 

















Education (0-4) 1.00    
Employment (0-2) .16 1.00   
Financial:  
Social Assistance 
-.15 -.55 1.00  
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 Education and employment are both measured using series of dichotomous variables in all analyses. 
However, the education/employment categories can easily be combined into meaningful ordinal variables, 
in which higher numbers represent more education/employment. The ordinal education variable contains 
five categories ranging from less than ninth grade completed to post-grad education, while the ordinal 
employment variable contains three categories ranging from unemployed to full-time employed/student. In 
order to capture the full association between SES components, the researcher uses these ordinal variables 














 Mean Mean 
Dependent Variable   
     Incarceration (Y/N) .46 .34 
     Incarceration Length in Months 25.91 19.22 
   
Independent Variables   
     White .40 .50 
     Black .36 .30 
     Hispanic .23 .20 
     Asian .00 .004 
     Female .15 .17 
   
Legal and Case Processing Factors   
     Offense Type   
          Violent .12 .15 
          Property .22 .22 
          Drug .26 .30 
          Sex .02 .01 
          Weapons .02 .02 
          Public Order .36 .30 
     Offense Severity Class   
          Class A Murder .000 .000 
          Class A Felony .003 .002 
          Class B Felony .03 .03 
          Class C Felony .07 .05 
          Class D Felony .13 .14 
          Class E Felony .004 .005 
          Unclassified Felony .14 .15 
          Class A Misdemeanor .32 .34 
          Class B Misdemeanor .15 .16 
          Class C Misdemeanor .15 .10 
          Class D Misdemeanor .005 .005 
          Unclassified Misdemeanor .000 .000 
     Prior Adult Convictions 4.04 3.28 
     Number of Current Convictions 1.57 1.68 
     Under Probation Supervision .11 .15 
     Mandatory Minimum Applied .02 .01 
     Counts Dropped After Charging .55 .57 
     Severity Reduced After Charging .27 .28 
     MM Dropped After Charging .02 .02 
     Conviction Year   
          FY2008 .37 .34 
          FY2009 .33 .34 




        
Age   
     18-24 .26 .34 
     25-34 .30 .28 
     35-44 .25 .21 







Table 8.1: Aggregate Disparities in Punishment 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 Odds Ratio  Length AME  


































     Completed 10
th








































      
McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
.04  .01   
N=66,984 
Models are estimated using a negative binomial hurdle model 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001 






Table 8.2: Disparities in Punishment, Accounting for Legal Factors 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 Odds Ratio  Length AME  
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Legal and Case Processing Factors   
    
     

























     Class A Murder 
 
--  3.71 
(.20) 
70.01 *** 







































































































      
McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
.20  .06   
N=66,984 
Models are estimated using a negative binomial hurdle model 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001 






Table 8.3: Disparities in Punishment, Accounting for Legal and Risk Factors 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 Odds Ratio  Length AME  
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Legal and Case Processing Factors   
    
     

























     Class A Murder 
 
--  3.71 
(.15) 
64.41 *** 
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(.03) 
  































































      
McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
.21  .07   
N=66,984 
Models are estimated using a negative binomial hurdle model 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001 











Domain Score Differences 
CH EE FI FM AC LE CO AD EP AO 
            
Black 1.17 .73 .96 .08 .04 .36 .10 .37 -1.05 -.69 .27 
Hispanic .65 .25 1.13 .09 .01 .32 .13 .21 -.98 -.51 .03 
Asian -5.05 -1.26 -.70 -.28 -.55 -.10 .04 .26 -1.38 -.58 .03 
            
Male -.02 .87 .11 -.28 -.34 -.05 .07 .11 .14 -.84 .20 
            
Completed 10
th
 Grade -1.10 .23 -1.04 -.06 -.04 -.14 -.07 -.02 .11 -.06 -.02 
High School Degree -4.33 -.36 -2.80 -.12 -.24 -.30 -.12 -.33 .11 -.05 -.12 
At Least Some College -6.36 -.77 -3.44 -.22 -.44 -.46 -.31 -.70 .08 .13 -.24 
Post-Graduate Education -11.73 -2.15 -4.91 -.57 -.78 -.68 -.62 -1.45 -.58 .45 -.44 
            
Part-Time Employed/ Student -3.64 -1.16 -.07 -.35 -.19 -.28 -.11 -.30 -.71 -.33 -.16 
Full-Time Employed or Student -10.84 -1.28 -3.88 -.68 -.42 -.48 -.31 -.54 -.86 -.46 -.25 
            
Reliant Upon Social Assistance 6.27 1.04 1.22 1.24 .43 .45 .13 .40 .59 .65 .13 
            
Relatively Satisfactory Finances 3.81 .93 .89 .10 .28 .14 .27 .49 .57 -.02 .17 
Relatively Unsatisfactory Finances 10.48 1.90 2.39 1.35 .78 .56 .55 .90 1.36 .25 .44 
Very Unsatisfactory Finances 13.90 2.26 3.28 1.51 1.14 .94 .64 1.23 1.76 .49 .67 
N=66,984 
CH=Criminal History ; EE=Education/Employment ; FI=Finances ; FM=Family/Marital ; AC=Accommodations ; LE=Leisure ; CO=Companions ; 
AD=Alcohol/Drug ; EP=Emotional/Personal ; AO=Attitudes/Orientations 
Reference groups for categorical outcomes are: white, female, completed <10
th
 grade, unemployed, and very satisfactory finances. 
Values in the table indicate the score difference between the specified group and the reference group 
Kruskal-Wallis tests are used to evaluate statistical significance. 





Table 8.5: LSI-R Composite and Domain Score Differences by Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and SES 
 Composite* CH EE FM AC LE CO AD EP AO 




























































































































































































































































































CH=Criminal History ; EE=Education/Employment ; FM=Family/Marital ; AC=Accommodations ; LE=Leisure ; CO=Companions ; AD=Alcohol/Drug 




Finances domain score is represented in its entirety in the independent variables and is excluded from this analysis  
*Composite model is estimated using an ordinary least squares regression 
All domain models are estimated using an ordered logistic regression 
Coefficients for ordered logistic regressions are odds ratios 





Table 8.6: Negative Binomial Hurdle Model Establishing the Relationship Between Risk 
and Punishment 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 OR  Length AME  
Legal and Case Processing Factors           

























     Class A Murder --  3.79 
(.20) 
71.27 *** 




































































































           





      
McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
.19  .06   
N=66,984 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 





Table 8.7: Comparison of Simulated Evidence-Based Sentencing Distributions 
 % Incarcerated Average Sentence 
Length 
Actual Sentences 34 
19.22 
(44.18) 
Simulated Sentences   
     .4 Threshold 33 
24.36 
(33.60) 
     .5 Threshold 23 
30.11 
(38.92) 









Table 8.8: Disparities in Simulated Evidence-Based Punishment, Using .4 Threshold 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 Odds Ratio  Length AME  
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McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
.05  .00   
N=66,984 
Models are estimated using a negative binomial hurdle model 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001 







Table 8.9: Disparities in Simulated Evidence-Based Punishment, Using .5 Threshold 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 Odds Ratio  Length AME  








     




















     Completed 10
th








































      
McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
.05  .00   
N=66,984 
Models are estimated using a negative binomial hurdle model 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001 






Table 8.10: Disparities in Simulated Evidence-Based Punishment, Using .6 Threshold 
 Decision to Incarcerate Sentence Length 
 Odds Ratio  Length AME  
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McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 
 
..04  .00   
N=66,984 
Models are estimated using a negative binomial hurdle model 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by court (n=37) 
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001 


















 Odds Ratio Odds Ratio   
     
Black 1.09 1.38 ↑ *** 
Hispanic .94 1.05 Switch *** 
Asian .99 .78 ↑  
Male 2.17 1.98 ↓ ** 
Completed 10
th
 Grade .99 1.00 ↓  
High School Degree .86 .78 ↑ *** 
Completed At Least Some College .88 .68 ↑ *** 
Post-Graduate Education .98 .48 ↑ *** 
Part-Time Employed or Student .50 .58 ↓ ** 
Full-Time Employed or Student .47 .51 ↓ * 
Reliant Upon Social Assistance .90 1.19 Switch *** 
Financial Problems 1.17 1.26 ↑ *** 
↑ = evidence-based sentences show more disparity 
↓ = evidence-based sentences show less disparity 
Switch = disparity switches direction in evidence-based sentences 
Evidence-based sentences are drawn from the .4 threshold model. 



















 AME  AME    
     
Black 8.25 2.63 ↓ *** 
Hispanic 6.25 1.73 ↓ *** 
Asian 6.91 5.77 ↓  
Male 7.21 3.29 ↓ *** 
Completed 10
th
 Grade -1.99 -2.62 ↑  
High School Degree -5.38 -3.53 ↓ *** 
Completed At Least Some College -6.33 -3.53 ↓ *** 
Post-Graduate Education -7.56 -5.17 ↓  
Part-Time Employed or Student -7.38 -5.19 ↓ *** 
Full-Time Employed or Student -7.40 -4.64 ↓ *** 
Reliant Upon Social Assistance -5.78 -5.37 ↓ *** 
Financial Problems -.03 -.32 ↑  
↑ = evidence-based sentence shows more disparity 
↓ = evidence-based sentence shows less disparity 
Evidence-based sentence lengths are drawn from the .4 threshold model. 









Figure 6.1: Data Compilation Process   
  
APPENDICES 




Classification Statute § Offense 
Mandatory Minimum 
Sentence 
    
Capital Felony 53a-54b Capital Felony 
Execution or life 
imprisonment without 
possibility of release 
Class A Felony 53a-54a Murder 25 years 
 53a-54c Felony Murder 25 years 
 53a-70c 




 offense: 25 years 
Subsequent offense: 50 
years 
 53a-59c 
Assault of pregnant woman 







(wen use force and victim 
under 16 or victim under 13 
and actor more than two 
years older) 
5 years; 20 years if use 
force; 10-year mandatory 
minimum period of 
combined imprisonment 
and special parole 
 53a-70a 
Aggravated sexual assault 1
st
 
degree (victim under 16) 
5 years; 20 years if use 
force; 10-year mandatory 
minimum period of 
combined imprisonment 
and special parole 
 53a-92 Kidnapping 1
st




 degree with a 
firearm 
1 year 
 53a-111 Arson 1
st
 degree None 
 53a-196a 
Employing a minor in an 
obscene performance 
10 years 
 PA 08-1 Home invasion 10 years 
 -- All other Class A Felonies 10 years 
Class B Felony 53a-55a 
Manslaughter 1
st








 degree (when 
cause injury using deadly 
weapon or dangerous 
5 years; 10 years if victim 
is under age 10 or a 
witness 
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Assault of an elderly, blind, 
disabled, pregnant, or 






Aggravated sexual assault 1
st
 
degree (victim over age 16) 
5 years; 10-year 
mandatory minimum 
period of combined 













 degree (when 
committed with explosive, 








 degree (when 






 degree (except 
when use deadly weapon or 
dangerous instrument) 
10 years if victim under 
age 10 or a witness 
 53a-70 Sexual assault 1
st
 degree 
2 years; 10 years if victim 
under age 10; 10-year 
mandatory minimum 
period of combined 
















Enticing a minor (victim 
under age 13 or 3
rd
 or 
subsequent offense with 
victim 13 or older) 
When minor under age 13:  
1
st
 offense: 5 years 
Subsequent offense: 10 
years 
 53a-94 Kidnapping 2
nd
 degree 3 years 








Computer crime in 
furtherance of terrorism 
When directed toward 
public safety agency: 5 
years 
 53-21 
Injury or risk of injury to a 
minor (involving contact 
with intimate parts of a 











































Contamination of public 
water or food for terrorism 
5 years 
 53-202b 
Selling or transporting 
assault weapons 
2 years; 6 years if sale is to 
a minor 
Class D Felony 53a-216 
Criminal use of firearm or 
electronic defense weapon 
5 years 
 53a-60c 
Assault of an elderly, blind, 
disabled, pregnant, or 
mentally retarded person 2
nd
 
degree with a firearm 
3 years 
 53a-60b 
Assault or larceny of an 
elderly, blind, disabled, 






Criminal possession of 






















Increasing speed to elude 
police after signaling to stop 
(involving death or serious 
physical injury) 
Subsequent offense: 1 year 
 15-154(c) 
Refusing to stop boat when 
ordered by officer in law 
enforcement vessel and 
interfering with or 
endangering a boat, people, 
or property or increasing 
speed to escape or elude 
(causing death or serious 
physical injury) 





Illegal sale or transfer of 













 degree (when, 
with criminal negligence, 
cause physical injury with 
deadly weapon, dangerous 




Assault of an elderly, blind, 
disabled, pregnant, or 





Unclassified 53a-136a Carjacking 3 years 
 53a-300 
Acts of terrorism (when 
commit a class B felony) 
10 years (law authorizes 
the court to impose the 
penalty for the next most 
serious degree of felony; if 
the felony is a class B 
felony, this law imposes 
the penalty for a class A 
felony which carries a 10-
year mandatory minimum 
sentence) 
 14-36(h) 
Operating a motor vehicle 
without a license or with a 
suspended or revoked 
license 





Sale of drugs to minor 
2 years (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 




Using person under 18 to 
sell drugs 
3 years (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 
underlying drug crime) 
 53-202 
Commit class A, B, or C 
felony with assault rifle 
8 years (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 
underlying drug crime) 
 53-202k 
Commit class A, B, or C 
felony with firearm 
5 years (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 
underlying drug crime) 
    








Use, possession, or delivery 
of drug paraphernalia near 
school by non-student 
1 year (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 
underlying violation) 
Unclassified 21a-278(a) 
Manufacture or sale of 
heroin, methadone, cocaine, 
or crack by non-dependent 
person 
5 years  
The court may suspend if 
the person (1) was under 
age 18 at the time or (2) 




Manufacture or sale of 
narcotic, hallucinogen, 
amphetamine, or at least 1 




 offense: 5 years 
Subsequent offense: 10 
years 
The court may suspend if 
the person (1) was under 
age 18 at the time or (2) 





Sale of drugs to minor near 
school, public housing 
project, or day care center 
3 years (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 
underlying drug crime) 
 21a-279(d) 
Possess narcotic, 
hallucinogen, or controlled 
substance near school or day 
care center 
2 years (in addition and 
consecutive to any 
imprisonment for the 
underlying drug crime) 
 14-215(c) 
Driving during license 
suspension for DUI or DUI-
related offenses 
30 days 




related offenses: 120 days 
If offense is after 3
rd
 or 
subsequent suspension for 
DUI-related offenses: 1 
year 
 14-227a(g) 
Operating a motor vehicle 
under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (DWI) 




 offense: 48 hours if not 
given community service 
2
nd
 offense: 120 days 
3
rd
 and subsequent 
offenses: 1 year 
 15-133 
Operating a vessel (boat) 
under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (DWI) 
1
st
 offense: 48 hours if not 
given community service 
2
nd
 offense: 120 days 
3
rd
 and subsequent 




Operating boat while 
certificate or right to operate 
is suspended or revoked for 









Operating boat while 
certificate or right to operate 










Carry handgun without a 
permit 
1 year 
*Judges can depart from presumptive sentence if no one was hurt during the crime and the 
defendant (1) did not use, attempt, or threaten to use physical force; (2) was unarmed; and (3) did 
not use, threaten to use, or suggest that he had a deadly weapon or other instrument that could 
cause death or serious injury. Defendants must show good cause and can invoke this provision 





Appendix B: Individual Items in the LSI-R Risk Assessment 
 
All items on the LSI-R are measured either in a “yes-no” format or in a “0-3” rating 
format, based on the following scale. 
 3: A satisfactory situation with no need for improvement 
 2: A relatively satisfactory situation, with some room for improvement evident. 
 1: A relatively unsatisfactory situation with a need for improvement 
0: A very unsatisfactory situation with a very clear and strong need for 
improvement 
Items measured in a “0-3” format are denoted with a *. For scoring purposes, ratings of 0 
or 1 are converted to a “yes” answer and ratings of 2 or 3 are converted to a “no” answer. 
“Yes” answers are worth one point each, while “no” answers are worth zero points. 
----------------------- 
 
I. Criminal History Component 
 
1. Any prior adult convictions? 
2. Two or more prior adult convictions? 
3. Three or more prior adult convictions? 
4. Three or more present offenses? 
5. Arrested under age 16? 
6. Ever incarcerated upon conviction? 
7. Escape history from a correctional facility? 
8. Ever punished for institutional misconduct? 
9. Charge laid or probation/parole suspended during prior community service? 
10. Official record of assault/violence? 
 
II. Education/Employment Component [reversed coded] 
 
When in labor market: 
11. Currently employed? 
12. Frequently unemployed? 
13. Never employed for a full year? 
14. Ever fired? 
 
School or when in school: 
15. Less than regular grade 10? 
16. Less than regular grade 12? 






III. Education/Employment Component [reverse coded] (continued) 
 
Offender completes #18 only if a homemaker or pensioner. Offender completes #18-20 if 
in school or working. Offender rates 0 for #18-20 if unemployed. 
18. Participation/performance?* 
19. Peer interactions?* 









23. Dissatisfaction with marital or equivalent situation?* 
24. Non-rewarding parental situation?* 
25. Non-rewarding situation with other relatives?* 





28. 3 or more address changes last year?* 




30. Absence of recent participation in an organized activity? 




32. A social isolate? 
33. Some criminal acquaintances? 
34. Some criminal friends? 
35. Few anti-criminal acquaintances? 






IX. Alcohol/Drug Problem 
 
37. Alcohol problem, ever? 
38. Drug problem, ever? 
39. Alcohol problem, currently?* 
40. Drug problem, currently?* 
41. Law violations? 
42. Marital/Family alcohol/drug problem? 
43. Interference with school/work? 
44. Receiving medical treatment? 




46. Moderate interference? 
47. Severe interference (active psychosis)? 
48. Mental health treatment, past? 
49. Mental health treatment, present? 




51. Supportive of crime?* 
52. Unfavorable toward convention?* 
53. Poor, toward sentence? 
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